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Abstract 
This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by presenting an analysis of 
anarchist conceptions of solidarity. Whilst recent academic literature has 
conceptualised solidarity from a range of perspectives, anarchist interpretations have 
largely been marginalised or ignored. This neglect is unjustified, for thinkers of the 
anarchist tradition have often emphasised solidarity as a key principle, and have 
offered original and instructive accounts of this important but contested political 
concept. In a global era which has seen the role of the nation state significantly 
reduced, anarchism, which consists in a fundamental critique and rejection of 
hierarchical state-like institutions, can provide a rich source of theory on the meaning 
and significance of solidarity. 
The work consists in detailed analyses of the concepts of solidarity of four prominent 
anarchist thinkers: Michael Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Murray Bookchin and Noam 
Chomsky. The analytic investigation is led by Michael Freeden’s methodology of 
‘ideological morphology’, whereby ideologies are viewed as peculiar configurations 
of political concepts, which are themselves constituted by sub-conceptual idea-
components. Working within this framework, the analysis seeks to ascertain the way 
in which each thinker attaches particular meanings to the concept of solidarity, and 
to locate solidarity within their wider ideological system. Subsequently, the thesis 
offers a representative profile of an ‘anarchist concept’ of solidarity, which is 
characterised by notions of universal inclusion, collective responsibility and the social 
production of individuality. 
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No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of 
the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a 
promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend’s or of thine own were: any 
man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never 
send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee. 
John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions 
(Donne, 2008: p. 344) 
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1. Introduction 
Thinkers of the anarchist tradition have frequently invoked solidarity as a key 
principle, for the sake of both popular struggles against oppression in the present, 
and the social cohesion of a non-hierarchical and egalitarian society in the future. 
Given this, it is curious that contemporary scholarship on solidarity (Bayertz, 1999; 
Crow, 2002; Brunkhorst, 2005; Stjernø, 2005; Scholz, 2008) has largely overlooked 
anarchist conceptions. The purpose of this thesis is to rectify this lacuna by 
conducting an original exploration of the ways in which anarchist thinkers have 
conceptualised solidarity and assessing how anarchist notions of solidarity might 
serve to enhance our understanding of what solidarity means. To this end, the study 
consists in analyses of the concept of solidarity as conceived by four anarchist 
thinkers: the Russian revolutionary and classical anarchist Michael Bakunin (1814-
1876); the geographer and perhaps the most influential of all anarchist theorists, 
Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921) – also Russian; the American anarchist and social 
ecologist, Murray Bookchin (1921-2006); and the US linguist, philosopher, political 
commentator and social justice activist, Noam Chomsky (born 1928). The analysis 
utilises Michael Freeden’s methodology of ‘ideological morphology’, which asserts 
that ideologies are constituted by peculiar configurations of political concepts which 
are in turn made up of various sub-conceptual ‘idea-components’. Concepts are 
understood in relation to their specific ideational context, since they are shaped by 
their relationships with neighbouring concepts in their host ideology. As such, this 
study makes original contributions in two distinct fields. First, in exploring the nature 
of anarchist conceptions of solidarity, it uncovers a perspective on solidarity that 
afforded scant consideration in contemporary literatures on the concept. Second, in 
locating the concept of solidarity within anarchism’s conceptual configuration 
according to the premises of ideological morphology, it presents an instructive 
interpretation of what constitutes anarchism as an ideology. 
Solidarity is an important concept for social and political theorists, although it has 
been the subject of relative neglect since it was made prominent by Émile Durkheim 
in The Division of Labour in Society (1893). However, recent scholarship 
demonstrates an increasing interest in the concept, which, as Graham Crow argues, 
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is relevant in many areas of social life, including ‘Family and kinship relations, 
community life, trade union activity and the identity politics of new social movements’ 
(Crow, 2002: p. 1). In his study of Solidarity in Europe Steinar Stjernø identifies 
solidarity as ‘a key concept in two of the main political traditions within European 
politics – social democracy and Christian democracy’, which warrants 
reconsideration in an age of neoliberal individualism (Stjernø, 2005: pp. 1, 2). Sally J. 
Scholz argues in favour of ‘political solidarity’ as a commitment and means to the 
end of social justice, as an effective response to ‘injustice, oppression, or social 
vulnerability’ and highlights its ‘tremendous potential for modelling political and social 
participation in the twenty-first century’ (Scholz, 2008: pp. 189, 264). For Kurt 
Bayertz, ‘the concept of solidarity is … indispensable for a philosophy of morality and 
politics’ (Bayertz, 1999: p. 26), whilst Hauke Brunkhorst argues for a global 
institutionalisation of ‘democratic solidarity’ as a solution to social exclusion 
(Brunkhorst, 2005). Lawrence Wilde appeals to the normative goal of ‘global 
solidarity’ as a means to break the neoliberal stranglehold on the world economy and 
to establish an ethical commitment to social justice (Wilde, 2013). 
The importance of solidarity for political theory is not questioned. However, what 
constitutes solidarity itself is the subject of a debate from which anarchist voices 
have been largely excluded. Although Stjernø notes that ‘anarchists developed a 
consistent and coherent theory and practice of working-class solidarity’, he 
deliberately ignores anarchist conceptions on the grounds that ‘anarchism failed to 
achieve political power’ (Stjernø, 2005: pp. 57, 58). This dismissal is unwarranted, 
not least because, as Wilde puts it, ‘anarchist contributions of the past may still have 
resonance today, when the idea of strong interventionist welfare states is in retreat, 
or … has ended’ (Wilde, 2007: p. 118). The deliberate neglect of anarchist 
conceptions of solidarity seems doubly unjustified when one considers the 
prominence of anarchist currents within the very global social movements (see, for 
instance, Day, 2005; Gordon, 2007a; Graeber, 2002) that many mark as important 
bulwarks for solidarity. Indeed, it is eminently possible that thinkers of the anarchist 
tradition, grounded in a fundamental rejection of external authority as embodied by 
hierarchical, state-like institutions, can offer original and instructive perspectives on 
this important concept. As such, this study will make a contribution to our knowledge 
and understanding of anarchist conceptions of solidarity. 
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With this in mind, I offer detailed analyses of the concept of solidarity as conceived 
by Bakunin, Kropotkin, Bookchin and Chomsky. The selection of these four thinkers 
is due in part to the prominence they afford solidarity within their respective 
ideologies, but also because each of them has influenced anarchist thought in 
distinctive and interesting ways at different periods in the history of the tradition. 
Bakunin and Kropotkin are both seen, almost without exception, and particularly 
within Anglo-American studies, as key thinkers of the classical anarchist tradition 
(Kinna, 2005: p. 12). Bookchin’s contribution to anarchist thought weds it to a 
theoretical ecologism that is particularly resonant in relation to the present 
environmental crisis, whilst Chomsky’s is perhaps the most prominent anarchist-
intellectual voice within the contemporary global justice movement. Of course, this is 
not to say that other anarchist thinkers have little to say about solidarity, or that these 
four are categorically the most influential. Neither is it to suggest that these four 
thinkers are representative of anarchist ideology more generally, nor that their 
conceptions of solidarity exemplify those of anarchists as such. Rather, it should be 
stated simply that the identification of anarchist thought as a potentially rich source of 
theorisation on solidarity leads to the logical suggestion that the conceptions of 
individual anarchist thinkers warrant close analysis. To reiterate, then: in selecting 
the work of Bakunin, Kropotkin, Bookchin and Chomsky as source material for this 
analysis, I am not suggesting that those four thinkers are representative of 
anarchism generally, but rather that they, as anarchist thinkers, may provide us with 
fresh, instructive perspectives on solidarity. Indeed, it is hoped that this study is the 
first of many to examine anarchists’ (both theorists’ and practitioners’) conceptions of 
solidarity. 
The structure of this thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents an extended explication and 
critique of Freeden’s methodology of ideological morphology. Chapter 3 consists in 
an analysis of Bakunin’s concept of solidarity and seeks to capture the idea-
components contained within it. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 perform similar analyses of the 
concept of solidarity as decontested by Kropotkin, Bookchin and Chomsky 
respectively. In the final chapter, I draw together the findings of these analyses and 
attempt to construct a profile of a broadly representative anarchist concept of 
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solidarity. Ultimately I conclude that this concept comprises four aspects, one of 
which (the notion of a bond between individual and collective) is common to all 
concepts of solidarity; the other three of which are promoted – not necessarily 
exclusively, it must be noted – by anarchist conceptions. These three additional 
components are universal inclusion, collective responsibility and the social 
production of individuality. Subsequently, I explore the way in which solidarity 
operates as a core concept within the morphology of anarchist ideologies, paying 
particular attention to the way in which it is interlinked with the concepts of liberty and 
equality.
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2. Methodology: ideological morphology 
The present work conducts an analysis of anarchist conceptions of solidarity 
according to the methodological procedure advanced by Michael Freeden, the most 
comprehensive outline of which is to be found in his Ideologies and Political Theory 
(1996). In contrast to traditional conceptions of ideologies, which in various ways 
view them as ‘tantamount to what they do’,1 Freeden contends that there is a more 
fundamental level on which ideologies exist: ‘as ideational formations consisting of 
political concepts’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 48). Political concepts represent the building 
blocks of ideologies and individual ideologies are characterised by their own unique 
configurations of various political concepts. Freeden terms these conceptual 
formations ‘morphologies’, a term which emphasises the multidimensional aspect of 
the inter-conceptual relationships inherent to political thinking, which he argues is ‘in 
constant flux over space and time’ (Freeden, 2006: p. 19). Within an ideology’s 
morphology, the meanings of essentially contested political concepts are determined 
by a process of ‘decontestation’, whereby an ideology seeks to affix singular 
meanings to certain key terms in order to establish control over the political language 
(Freeden, 1996: p. 76). The notions of morphology and decontestation represent the 
nucleus of Freeden’s theory of ideologies and, as such, he promotes an approach to 
their study which consists in ‘identifying, describing, and analysing the building 
blocks that constitute [them] and the relationships among them’ (ibid.: p. 48). 
My intention here is to provide a detailed summary of Freeden’s method, paying 
particular attention to the notions of morphology and decontestation which lie at the 
heart of his approach. I will seek also to explain the notion of essential contestability 
first theorised by W. B. Gallie (Gallie, 1956), an idea which underpins and is 
developed by Freeden’s theory of ideologies and of which some consideration is 
therefore necessitated. Subsequently, I subject the framework of ideological 
morphology to a critical evaluation with reference to a wider literature on the study of 
ideologies and political thinking in general, and seek to demonstrate its suitability in 
                                                          
1
 Freeden notes that orthodox approaches to the study of political thought ‘have focused on truth and 
epistemology, ethical rightness, logical clarity, origins and causes, prescriptions, purposes and 
intentions’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 4). As such, ideologies have been construed variously as ‘integrative 
mechanisms, systems of domination, justificatory blueprints for political action, schemes of history, or 
reflections of social relationships and environments’ (ibid.: p. 48). 
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relation to the purposes of the current project. Ultimately, I argue that, despite some 
of the analytical weaknesses highlighted in the literature, the morphological 
approach represents a valid and methodologically robust framework within which to 
conduct an analysis of the concept of solidarity in anarchist thought. 
As a longstanding proponent of their study, Freeden sees ideologies as having been 
unduly neglected in favour of analytical and normative political philosophies 
(Freeden, 1996: p. 1). He contends that ideologies warrant proper academic 
examination, since they represent ‘forms of political thought that provide important 
direct access to comprehending the formation and nature of political theory’ (ibid.). 
Broadly conceived, Freeden’s central thesis is that ‘ideologies are distinctive 
configurations of political concepts, and that they create specific conceptual patterns 
from a pool of indeterminate and unlimited combinations’ (ibid.: p. 4). The wide range 
of possible conceptual combinations is not the product of an infinite number of 
political concepts, but of the near-endless ways in which concepts can be 
interpreted, practically applied and arranged in systems of thought. One might 
assume at first sight, then, that the variety and flexibility of political thought and the 
morphological forms displayed by ideologies are derived from the essential 
contestability of political concepts. However, as we shall see, the inverse is in fact 
the case: essential contestability, as Freeden tells us, is a product of the inter-
conceptual relationships brought about by the morphological property of ideological 
thinking. Before we discuss Freeden’s theory of ideological morphology in more 
depth, however, we must revisit Gallie’s original thesis of essential contestability, on 
which Freeden’s approach to ideological analysis is largely dependent. 
Essential contestability 
In his seminal essay ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Gallie sets out to explain the 
nature of those conceptual terms of which there is ‘no one clearly definable general 
use’ (Gallie, 1956: p. 122). Such concepts mean different things to different people 
and this inevitably leads to conceptual dispute. Often, argues Gallie, it is likely that 
the position of each party is supported by a perfectly robust body of argument and 
evidence and that these disputes cannot simply be attributed to different readings of 
the evidence: they are characteristically irresolvable (ibid.: p. 123). In such cases we 
are dealing with essentially contested concepts, ‘concepts the proper use of which 
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inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their 
users’ (ibid.). 
Ultimately, Gallie delineates seven conditions of ‘essential contestability. First, a 
concept must be ‘appraisive’; it must connote some kind of valued achievement 
(ibid.: p. 125). The concept of ‘democracy’, for instance, recognisably signifies the 
achievement of a democratic state of affairs, irrespective of its proponent’s notion of 
what that entails. Second, this achievement must be ‘of an internally complex 
character’; it must be the object of potentially multiple descriptions. Third, any 
explanation of the concept’s worth must refer to the relative importance of its 
components (ibid.). To take ‘democracy’ again as an example (for both the second 
and third conditions): some may consider the concept to constitute the power of the 
citizenry to choose their government, while others may emphasise the principle of 
self-government as a more important facet of a democratic society. There are 
numerous other ways in which ‘democracy’ can be interpreted, but the nature of 
one’s interpretation rests on the relative import one ascribes to the concept’s internal 
components. Fourth, the concept must be ‘open’ in character; it must be amenable to 
modification in changing circumstances (ibid.). In the case of democracy, the 
attainment of a democratic society is always liable to such permutation. The 
expansion of the suffrage to include women, for instance, represents but one clear 
example of this. Fifth, each party must recognise that its own use of the concept is 
opposed by those of others and appreciate to some extent the nature of such other 
uses (ibid.). Sixth, the concept must be derived from an ‘original exemplar’, the 
authority of whom is ‘acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept’ (ibid.: 
p. 131). With the concept of democracy, as Gallie notes, users may invoke the 
authority of ‘historically independent but sufficiently similar traditions’, all of which are 
in some way ‘anti-inegalitarian’ in character (ibid.: p. 136). The seventh and final 
condition stipulates that, for an essentially contested concept to exist, the perpetual 
and varied nature of the dispute must enable ‘the original exemplar’s achievement to 
be sustained and/or developed in optimum fashion’ (ibid.: p. 131). Perhaps, explains 
Gallie, the concept of democracy does not comply with this final condition, since it is 
more likely that the mutual recognition of contestability by the disputants would ‘help 
fan the flames of conflict’ (ibid.: p. 137). However, concepts need not fulfil all seven 
conditions with the utmost precision. Rather, the question, states Gallie, is ‘do they 
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conform to [the] conditions sufficiently closely for us to agree that their essential 
contestability explains – or goes a very long way towards explaining – the ways they 
function in characteristic … arguments?’ (ibid.: p. 132).  
The idea of essential contestability – albeit in a somewhat developed form (see 
Connolly, 1974; Freeden, 1996: pp. 55-60) – is central to Freeden’s approach, since 
it accounts for the diversity and flexibility of political thinking that provide the basis for 
his morphological model of ideologies. However, whereas Gallie sees essential 
contestability as a product of the intrinsic complexity of concepts themselves, 
Freeden views the phenomenon as a product of the inter-conceptual relationships 
that are formed when political concepts are arranged in an ideology’s morphology, in 
a system of thinking about politics. As noted by Iain MacKenzie, the essential 
contestability of concepts is not simply the result of our inability to agree on the 
meaning of key political terms, but is ‘derived from the fact that the meaning of 
concepts changes, depending on the relationships concepts are thought to have with 
each other’ (MacKenzie, 2003: p. 10). Morphology therefore precedes and indeed is 
the basis for the essential contestability of political concepts. 
The morphology of concepts 
The idea of morphology is one which applies on a more fundamental level than that 
of the ideology: it can be used to understand the internal complexity of political 
concepts themselves. As demonstrated by Gallie, political concepts are more 
complex than merely the words that are used to convey them; they cannot be 
understood simply in terms of their distinct etymologies. Rather, meaning is 
determined by usage and is therefore subject to alter according to the context in 
which a concept is deployed. As we have seen, in order for political concepts to be 
subjected to a range of usages (in order for them to be essentially contested), they 
must necessarily consist of multiple sub-conceptual features or components; they 
must be internally complex. In Freeden’s scheme, this complexity requires that we 
understand the morphology of political concepts (the pattern created by a concept’s 
internal components) as consisting of ‘both ineliminable features and quasi-
contingent ones’ (Freeden, 1996: pp. 61-62); they must contain some components 
which are constant and some which are temporary or changeable but equally 
necessary. A feature is ineliminable ‘merely in the sense that all known usages of the 
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concept employ it, so that its absence would deprive the concept of intelligibility and 
communicability’, while simultaneously, ‘the concept cannot be reduced to its 
ineliminable component’ (ibid.: p. 62). Despite the fact that the removal of a 
concept’s ineliminable component inevitably brings about its collapse, without 
additional features it remains a somewhat vacuous entity, devoid of any significant 
meaning. In order to explain this dynamic Freeden invokes the analogy of the 
‘concept’ of the table. He notes that while all tables have one ineliminable feature – a 
raised level surface – the property of raised levelness alone is insufficient to 
communicate a full concept, since it gives us no information as to what the table 
looks like or how it functions: ‘The surface may be brown, it may stand on four legs, 
and it may be made out of wood’ (ibid.: p. 65). None of these attributes is essential to 
the concept of a table – ‘we can dispense with any of them and yet may still have a 
table’ (ibid.) – but nor are they immutable: if the surface of a table is not brown it 
must be another colour. If it does not stand on four legs it must be supported by 
more or fewer than four legs, or else be raised from the floor by some other means. 
Equally, if it is not made of wood it must be fashioned from some other material. 
‘Those categories are necessary, while their particular instances are contingent’ 
(ibid.: p. 66), explains Freeden. The cogency of a concept demands that certain 
other features, other than and additional to the ineliminable component, are 
necessary. While these features remain non-specific in the first instance, the 
categories to which they correspond often must be satisfied in some form or another. 
In this way, additional components serve to make sense of the ineliminable core and 
furnish the concept with proper meaning.  
Particular concepts imply particular categories. Take the concept of liberty. It seems 
reasonable to assume, as does Freeden, that the notion of non-constraint constitutes 
the ineliminable component of the concept of liberty (ibid.). But the very existence of 
‘liberty’ demands that certain other categories are addressed: ‘liberty requires the 
notion of a subject, it requires the idea of obstruction, and it may require an 
evaluation as to its desirability’ (ibid.). These and others are questions (categories) 
which have to be addressed in order for a ‘full’ concept to be articulated. The way in 
which they are addressed may vary according to the particular usage of the concept 
in question – the subject of liberty may be the individual, or it may be a social group, 
for instance – but, logically, they necessitate additional components in some form. In 
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Freeden’s terms, therefore, these additional features are ‘logically adjacent’ to the 
ineliminable component (ibid.: p. 68). 
But logical adjacency cannot account for all of the ways in which a concept can be 
extended or fleshed out; not all additional components follow logically from the 
ineliminable core. Though logical adjacency places some constraints on the possible 
additional content of a concept, it does not always allow for this content to be 
specifically defined. Put differently, while it narrows the number of logical options 
from which additional features may be drawn, logical adjacency does not necessarily 
specify the choice amongst them. Indeed, there must be some other function which 
allows concepts to be fully communicated, some method by which the additional 
components are selected from the options provided by logical adjacency. Moreover, 
there may also be additional features whose adjacency is not logical, which are not 
necessitated by the core element. These two instances are accounted for by the 
notion of ‘cultural adjacency, which imposes further constraints on the morphology of 
political concepts’ (ibid.: p. 69). The specifics of concepts’ internal formations are 
shaped by ‘culture’, which refers to ‘temporally and spatially bounded social 
practices, institutional patterns, ethical systems, technologies, influential theories, 
discourses, and beliefs’ (ibid.: pp. 69-70). Cultural adjacency works in two ways. 
Firstly, it operates within a framework imposed by logical adjacency in order to select 
one from multiple logical but potentially contradictory possibilities. To use Freeden’s 
example: ‘the cultural translation of the concept of rights into civil and political rights 
is only one logical possibility, but in the Western political tradition it would be 
inconceivable not to include them in any reasonable discussion of the term’ (ibid.: p. 
70). Secondly, it serves to introduce elements which do not follow logically from the 
ineliminable component. These additional elements are the products of ‘specific 
historical and socio-geographical phenomena’ (ibid.: p. 72). They may appear to 
contradict the core, but their usages are nevertheless regarded as legitimate in a 
specific time and place. Hence, ‘some versions of liberty will allow for force to be 
used in order to attain the behaviour considered consonant with non-constraint’ 
(ibid.: p. 71). 
To reiterate: the morphology of a political concept is comprised initially of an 
ineliminable component which is integral to all known uses of that concept. It is 
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elaborated by additional features which are selected by processes of logical and 
cultural adjacency. This selection process provides the basis for concepts’ essential 
contestability, since different usages of a concept select or emphasise different 
features. This is why the seemingly fixed meaning of a concept can alter from one 
usage to the next. 
The morphology of ideologies and ‘decontestation’ 
Ideologies – our ways of thinking about and understanding political life (ibid.: p. 3) – 
are made up of essentially contested political concepts. As such, concepts often take 
on different meanings when deployed within different ideologies, since each ideology 
gives priority to different components within them. Thus equality to a socialist is not 
the same as equality to a liberal, just as a liberal’s version of liberty is likely to be 
quite different from that of an anarchist. We are able to observe a shift in meaning 
between one usage of a concept and the next; concepts’ meanings are dependent 
on their context. 
According to Freeden, the contexts of political concepts equate to the ‘idea-
environment in which they are located’ (ibid.: p. 73). Put differently, the meaning of a 
concept is determined largely by its location in relation to other political concepts. 
Relationships between concepts occur when they are arranged in a system of 
concepts, or an ideology. Ideologies, according to Freeden, are ‘characterized by a 
morphology which displays core, adjacent and peripheral concepts’ (ibid.: p. 77). 
Taking liberalism as an example, he suggests that one might observe liberty within 
the core, with human rights, democracy and equality adjacent to it, and nationalism 
on the periphery. In the same way that the communicability of individual political 
concepts depends on the existence of certain features which are additional to the 
ineliminable component, ‘the existence of concepts adjacent to the ideological core 
is essential to the formation of an ideology’ (ibid.: pp. 77-78). Furthermore, the 
processes of logical and cultural adjacency which occur within singular concepts are 
equally active within the framework of the ideology. Within the morphology of 
liberalism, for instance: 
it would be evident that liberty would be given a particular meaning – self-
determination – because of its close association with democracy, while conversely, 
democracy may be given a particular meaning – limited popular government – 
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because of its structural interlinkage with liberty. So while the concepts of democracy 
and of liberty each have their ineliminable cores, they are filled out in a distinctive 
way due to their mutual proximity. (ibid.: p. 78) 
In this way, ideologies seek to ‘decontest’ the meaning of concepts so that they are 
attached to singular, preferred meanings. This is a primary function of ideologies: to 
win control over the meanings of key political terms in order to legitimise a certain 
political agenda. Ideologies achieve decontestation by negating other logically 
possible meanings. To borrow an example from Freeden, in J. S. Mill’s On Liberty, 
the mutual proximity of the core concepts of liberty, individualism and progress 
ensures that they hold each other in check, that their meanings remain fixed. While 
they co-exist, liberty, for instance, is prevented from ‘gravitating towards licence’, and 
individualism from ‘signifying vicious and anti-social competition’ (ibid.: p. 145). 
Further decontestation of the core is eventuated by way of its relationship with the 
adjacent and peripheral concepts, which serve to give further shape to the ideology 
as a framework for thinking about and acting out political life. 
This leaves the question as to how we identify an ideology’s core, adjacent and 
peripheral concepts. For a concept to be part of the ‘ineliminable core’, suggests 
Freeden, it must by its removal cause the core to collapse by changing ‘the peculiar 
pattern created by [the core concepts’] intermeshing’ (ibid.: p. 153). This qualification 
seems somewhat unsatisfactory, since it can, as one commentator has put it, be 
‘trivially satisfied by any idea defined in terms of its connection with others’ (Adams, 
1998: p. 816). Despite the lack of a specific and formulaic definition, however, we are 
able to glean from Freeden’s extended prescriptions a more operable definition of 
our own. A core concept constitutes a basis for an ideology’s fundamental political 
focus at a macro level. It provides the basic principles from which an ideology’s 
political objectives are derived, and is inextricable to it;2 its absence renders the 
ideology unrecognisable as that to which it pertains. One might argue, for instance, 
that a liberalism which does not make substantial appeals to the concept of liberty is 
in fact no liberalism at all – liberty thus represents a core concept within the 
morphology of liberal ideology. 
                                                          
2
 Strictly speaking, a concept can, under certain conditions, migrate from a core position, ‘either 
temporarily or in the course of historical and spatial change’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 83). Some core 
concepts, however – such as liberty in liberalism – remain fixed within the core. 
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Freeden asserts that the relationships between adjacent and core concepts are ‘vital 
to the articulation of an entire ideology’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 78); the adjacent 
concepts play a role in shaping the core. In fact, adjacent concepts within an 
ideology behave in much the same way as the additional features within an 
individual concept which serve to substantiate the ineliminable component. An 
adjacent concept, by way of its relationship to the core, gives the ideology ‘greater 
logical precision and cultural shape’ (Hazareesingh, 1997: p. 46) and makes 
prescriptions which allow for the core to be manifest as a practical political 
programme. The concept of democracy in nineteenth-century liberal ideology is a 
good example of an adjacent concept. Its adjacency is both logical, since it can be 
inferred from traditional liberal views on individuality and self-development, and 
cultural, insofar as the issues of enfranchisement and representation were very 
much characteristic of the political discourse at that time (Freeden, 1996: p. 154). 
Peripheral concepts serve to ‘add a vital gloss to [an ideology’s] core concepts’ (ibid.: 
p. 78). There are two types: marginal and perimeter. When a concept exists on the 
margin its importance to the core is ‘intellectually and emotionally insubstantial’ 
(ibid.). The margin relates to the level of significance of a political concept at a 
certain moment, as concepts may sometimes migrate from core to marginal 
positions (and vice versa). Analysis of the margin (in relation to the core) thus 
facilitates understanding of the nature of an ideology’s position at a particular point in 
time according to its varying emphases on different concepts. A marginal concept, 
though it in no way determines the central principles of an ideology, may come into 
play given specific conditions or circumstances. The notion of public ownership – 
especially in the financial sector – would usually be regarded as antithetical to 
neoliberal principles, for instance, yet in response to the global financial crisis of the 
late 2000s, many governments otherwise committed to a laissez-faire approach 
enforced temporary emergency measures which incorporated public ownership of 
banks and other financial institutions. 
The perimeter ‘reflects the fact that core and adjacent concepts are located in 
historical, geographical and cultural contexts’ and refers to ‘additional ideas and 
concepts that straddle the interface between the conceptualisation of social realities 
and the external contexts and concrete manifestations through which those 
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conceptualisations occur’ (ibid.: p. 79). Put differently, perimeter concepts constitute 
relatively concrete ideas which allow for ideologies to surpass the generality of core 
notions such as ‘liberty’ and enable them to ‘gain relevance for specific issues, to 
incorporate and identify significant facts and practices, to embrace external 
exchange, and to provide the greater degree of precision necessary to interpret the 
core and adjacent concepts’ (ibid.: p. 79-80). Accordingly, perimeter concepts often 
take the form of specific policy proposals rather than fully-fledged political concepts. 
The perimeter concept enables an ideology to relate to specific issues and events in 
real time; it gives concrete meaning to the abstract core concepts by way of 
providing practical policy proposals and political objectives. A socialist, confronted 
with the material problem of poverty, for instance, might advocate the redistribution 
of wealth through taxation as the principal method by which to achieve her goal of 
economic equality (ibid.: p. 431). 
Methodology in the history of political thought: the Cambridge School and 
Begriffsgeschichte 
Freeden’s work on ideologies is arguably the most innovative and important 
development in the field in recent decades. However, in order to gain an 
appreciation of the significance of ideological morphology, and of my reasons for 
utilising it in this study, it is important to locate Freeden’s framework in terms of the 
wider methodological debate on ideologies and the hermeneutics of political thought 
in general. These debates principally concern the legitimacy of the notion of the 
concept as the primary unit of analysis in the study of political thought, a thesis 
which has been the subject of some dispute but which is fundamental to Freeden’s 
work. My purpose here is to consider the various perspectives, to defend Freeden’s 
position and to demonstrate its suitability for the purpose of this project: to capture 
an anarchist concept of solidarity. 
Contextualist historians of political thought such as Quentin Skinner insist that, 
rather than political concepts, it is the aspect of authorial intention – ‘what a given 
agent may be doing in uttering his utterance’ (Skinner, 1969: p. 61) – on which we 
should focus in order to properly understand a text. According to Skinner, to focus 
on a concept as a basic unit of analysis is to allow for the statement or utterance to 
be removed from the very specific context in which it was produced and therefore to 
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potentially skew the author’s intended meaning. All concepts are speech-acts which 
take place within specific, non-replicable linguistic contexts. To write a history of a 
concept, or even to attempt to study multiple usages of it, is therefore impossible, 
since a concept really occurs only once. A concept is not a timeless, homogeneous 
idea which can be traced through long periods of human thought, but rather a 
temporal action limited absolutely by its linguistic context and which bears 
resemblance to nothing but that to which its creator may possibly have been 
referring. Analysis of concepts – or ‘speech-acts’ (see Austin, 1962) – must therefore 
be conducted at a synchronic level only, according to their particular usage at one 
point in time. Skinner’s approach is, amongst others’ (see Pocock, 1972), one of the 
definitive – and certainly the most explicit – statements of methodological procedure 
to emerge from the so-called ‘Cambridge School’ of the history of ideas. 
However, there are those who defend the idea of the concept as the basic unit of 
analysis. Whilst Skinner maintains that the context in which a concept is used is fixed 
and that to abstract it from that context therefore serves to obscure the meaning, 
Reinhart Koselleck, pioneer of the German method of Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual 
history), contends that, despite deviations between one usage and the next, 
‘linguistic recycling ensures at least a minimum degree of continuity’ (Koselleck, 
1996: p. 63). In contrast to Skinner’s preferred approach, Koselleck argues that 
synchronic analysis should be conducted in tandem with a diachronic approach 
which locates concepts in terms of the ways in which they have developed over an 
extended period of time. The analyst must marry an exploration of the criteria that 
impel a writer to use concepts in one way rather than another (the synchronic) with 
an appreciation of the fact that some concepts’ applications are largely unchanged 
while others carry difficulties for new users because of conflicting meanings in 
previous uses (the diachronic). The most important lesson to be learned from 
Koselleck’s work is that some ideas and concepts are, contrary to Skinner’s 
argument, long-lasting, since ‘no author can create something new without reaching 
back to the established corpus of the language, to those linguistic resources created 
diachronically in the near or more remote past and shared by all speakers and 
listeners’ (ibid.).  Prior knowledge of language uses is a prerequisite for 
understanding any form of linguistic communication. To create a new use is 
therefore to push against the ‘diachronic thrust’ of a word, term or concept. Even so, 
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what is new can only be understood in terms of what is not; there must be some 
recurring feature or accepted meaning which enables the user and her audience to 
talk about the new usage. There are therefore ideas and concepts which are long-
lasting, which do have diachronic lives and, as such, the notion of ‘the concept’ as 
the basic unit of analysis represents a legitimate premise on which to base a 
methodological approach.  
Freeden’s approach is based on exactly this premise. Though he acknowledges the 
importance of concepts’ synchronic meanings, he does so with an appreciation that 
concepts ‘exist in the “real world” of time and space and [that] their meanings derive 
in part, though not completely, from that world’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 51). As for the 
diachronic aspect, he stresses that political concepts are ‘notable for their strong 
historical grounding’, and that ‘historical continuity plays an important role in 
organizing the political thinking of the members of a society’ (ibid.: p. 52). Thus, as 
Freeden himself argues, ‘Skinner’s misgivings are unwarranted’, for not only do the 
meanings of concepts endure over extended periods of time, further, ‘we may 
deliberately wish to apply current perspectives and concerns to previous societies in 
order to tease out aspects of their thought and behaviour about which they could 
have had no way of knowing’ (ibid.: p. 102). 
Freeden’s critics 
Appreciation of the wider debate on the epistemological and hermeneutic aspects of 
the study of political thought helps us to locate Freeden’s contribution in relation to 
other methodological schools in the discipline. However, within the more specific 
field of ideology studies, Freeden’s work has been subject to more direct critique. 
Here, in order to pinpoint some of the more specific potential weaknesses in the 
morphological approach, I will consider a range of criticisms which have been aimed 
specifically at Freeden’s methodological procedure. In doing so, I hope to 
demonstrate an appreciation of some of the potential pitfalls involved in the process 
of operationalising a morphological framework for analysis in this study. 
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A recurrent criticism of ideological morphology has stemmed from its comparison 
with Marxisant conceptions of ideology3 which have generally viewed the 
phenomenon as a ubiquitous set of false ideas which dominates social and 
economic life in capitalist society. Broadly put, according to critical conceptions, 
ideology is a tool wielded by the ruling class in order to distort the masses’ view of 
the world and consequently to legitimise the capitalist mode of production and its 
corresponding political system. Following these assumptions, the study of ideology 
should therefore consist in a critical examination which seeks to expose the falsities 
and deceptions inherent to ideology. Freeden’s conception, on the other hand, offers 
a more neutral reading of ideologies, viewing them as varied and distinct 
assemblages of political concepts used to interpret and shape the political world. In 
Freeden’s scheme, the student of ideologies should operate from a more detached 
epistemological perspective (MacKenzie, 2003: p. 12). Matthew Humphrey 
characterises the morphological approach as stemming from an ‘inclusive’ or 
‘neutral’ conception of ideology, in that its scope is far broader than ‘restrictive’ or 
‘critical’ conceptions such as those which might be loosely designated as ‘Marxist’ 
(Humphrey, 2005: p. 237). Humphrey identifies in Freeden’s method, as have many 
critics, the lack of an evaluative capacity, the fact that it serves more as a descriptive 
framework than as a critical one. Whilst the critical theorist seeks to uncover the 
distortion she perceives as inherent to ideological thinking, the morphological analyst 
engages in interpreting and classifying ideologies according to their conceptual 
structures. Critics of the morphological approach have argued that, since it does not 
consist in the uncovering of falsehoods and relations of domination, it serves to 
distract us from important social problems and prevents the analyst from carrying out 
her ethical obligation ‘to make a liberating intervention by unmasking hidden forms of 
oppression’ (ibid: p. 238). A similar point has been raised by Manfred Steger, who 
argues that the analyst of ideologies must not attempt to detach analytic practice 
from political reality, since the process of analysis does not occur in a political 
vacuum but rather within a specific political context. In this sense, it is arguable that 
ideological morphology presumes to operate from some neutral theoretical plane 
which in reality is impossible to achieve.  As such, argues Steger, the researcher 
                                                          
3
 Note the use of ‘ideology’ in the singular (as opposed to Freeden’s preferred ‘ideologies’), which 
connotes an all-encompassing phenomenon, rather than one of a multitude of distinct patterns of 
political thinking. 
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need not, indeed should not, shy away from recommending ‘political action against 
what they identify as oppressive practices tied to particular ideational systems’ 
(Steger, 2005: p 26).4 
These concerns do hold some weight. It is true that the seeking of truth and the 
exposing of malign social and economic relations should be seen as important 
priorities by political theorists. However, although Freeden detaches his analytical 
project from the emancipatory intentions propounded by critical theorists, it is not 
clear that his morphological framework entirely inhibits the discovery of ‘truth’, albeit 
a notion of truth which operates at a higher level of abstraction. For, as Humphrey 
points out, although it is not an explicitly stated goal of the morphological analyst to 
uncover oppression, domination or injustice, the ‘truth’ revealed by conceptual 
morphology is one which concerns ‘the nature and conceptual architecture of 
political thought’ (Humphrey, 2005: p. 240). It is not that morphological analysis does 
not reveal a ‘truth’ as such; it is simply that it reveals a different kind of truth to that 
which is sought by many critical theorists. In this sense, Freeden’s approach can be 
said to display a ‘critical’ aspect in that it seeks to ‘dig beneath the surface 
manifestations of political thought in order to reveal the underlying conceptual 
structure’ (ibid.). Despite this, the fact remains that in following Freeden’s approach 
the analyst does not find herself in a position to make the kind of liberating 
intervention prescribed in expressly critical frameworks – ideological morphology is 
just not that kind of practice. It is not and was never intended for such a purpose. It 
does not follow, however, that morphological analysis is of no use as an explanatory 
framework. Indeed, Freeden’s approach directly addresses the interface between 
political ideas and action, an enterprise which remains integral to aiding our 
understanding of the political world. Although the juxtaposition with critical theory 
serves well to highlight some of the potential weaknesses of conceptual morphology, 
it is difficult not to conclude, as does Humphrey, that the disparities between critical 
approaches to ideology and inclusive conceptions such as Freeden’s are such that 
the two are all but incomparable. Indeed, ‘it may be more fruitful to consider them as 
                                                          
4
 The notion that the researcher has an ethical responsibility to recommend certain courses of political 
action is one which Freeden explicitly rejects: ‘While the function of ideologies is to guide practical 
political conduct, the analysis of ideologies … is not geared to directing or recommending political 
action’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 6). 
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two separate concepts (rather than different conceptions of the same concept) and 
accept that the two are engaged in radically different exercises’ (ibid.: p. 243). 
Another common criticism of Freeden’s morphological approach is directed at his 
apparent analytical preference for political thought in the form of written texts at the 
expense of other, equally important manifestations of politics. Kevin Gillan notes 
that, despite his insistence on the action-oriented nature of ideological thinking, 
Freeden concentrates almost exclusively on the grand ideologies of liberalism, 
socialism and conservatism as represented by the works of their respective major 
thinkers, and does little in the way of analysing the ideas of political activists or the 
political thinking which emerges from social movements. Gillan terms these forms of 
thinking ‘orientational frames’ – close relatives of ideologies which serve specifically 
to make sense of political thought within and emerging from social movements 
(Gillan, 2008: p. 248). Furthermore, he contends that Freeden’s theory of 
decontestation may not hold when applied to orientational frames, since more often 
than not they are created in ‘collective situations within which structures of authority 
are quite loose’ (ibid.: p. 258). As such, the patterns of thought which are produced 
are not always made up of concepts whose meanings have been fixed absolutely 
(decontested); they may consist of an ‘accumulation of ideas that are more or less in 
tension’ (ibid.). The thesis of decontestation holds true in relation to established 
ideologies such as liberalism and socialism because they have been subjected to 
prolonged philosophical development over several generations; they resemble highly 
evolved forms of political thinking. This characteristic is largely absent from ideas 
which emerge from social movements, on the other hand, since they tend to be 
more spontaneous and less strongly rooted in established traditions of political 
thought. 
Other commentators have identified further areas for which Freeden’s approach 
supposedly does not account. Both Aletta Norval and John Schwarzmantel have 
emphasised the failure of Freeden’s morphological conception of ideologies to 
account for the more everyday instances of ideological thinking. In a similar vein to 
Gillan, Norval notes Freeden’s tendency to focus on ‘the complex “thought-text” of 
ideology, rather than on objects, institutions, symbols and identities’ (Norval, 2000: 
p. 327), whilst Schwarzmantel observes how, to a large extent, the morphological 
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conception ‘leaves out, or at least underplays … the intensely practical, or 
institutional, side of ideologies’ (Schwarzmantel, 2008: p. 26). Indeed, according to 
Schwarzmantel, the fact that the central purpose of political ideologies is to mobilise 
support for a certain set of normative ideas about the constitution of the good society 
implies that they cannot be set apart from the political actors (political parties, social 
movements, etc.) which constitute their empirical manifestations. In this way an 
ideology is different to an abstract philosophy; it is not merely a set of ideas devised 
by an individual, but something whose function is to make a link between such ideas 
and political action in the real world (ibid.: p. 27). This leads Schwarzmantel to 
conclude that Freeden’s definition of ideology is not sufficient, since ideologies are 
not simply clusters of political concepts but rather are necessarily ‘embodied or 
realised in mass political movements, in political institutions of a governmental or 
oppositional kind’ (ibid.). As such, Schwarzmantel endorses the Gramscian 
conception of ideologies, which emphasises the link between abstract philosophy 
and empirical politics (see Gramsci, 2007). So whilst it remains admissible to 
attempt to understand ideologies in terms of their conceptual morphology, for 
Schwartzmantel, Freeden’s approach accounts for only one part of what constitutes 
ideologies and fails to appreciate them in practical terms as well.  
Against this charge, Freeden’s position warrants defence. Schwartzmantel’s criticism 
is somewhat misplaced, for it assumes that Freeden conceives of the process of 
ideologies’ development as detached from the ‘real world’ of politics. Contra this 
accusation, for Freeden, ideologies engage in conceptual contestation precisely so 
that they may mobilise political language in favour of a preferred agenda. As 
Freeden himself puts it, ideologies’ ‘competition over plans for public policy is 
primarily conducted through their competition over the control of political language’ 
(Freeden, 2003: p. 55). Further, he gives ample allowance for the possibility – 
necessity, even – of (a) the mass or popular (re)production of ideologies, and of (b) 
framing such manifestations in morphological terms. The observation that Freeden’s 
own analyses of ideologies (particularly in Ideologies and Political Theory) depends 
largely on textual interpretation of their grand exemplars (liberalism via Mill, 
conservatism via Burke, etc.) does little to support the conclusions that he sees 
abstract theory as the sole crucible of ideologies’ manufacture, or that he ignores 
their bases in popular movements. Rather, it suggests that Freeden views certain 
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classical documents of ideological thinking (Mill’s On Liberty, for instance) as but 
one of multiple types of source material that may be examined in attempting to 
capture the conceptual essence of particular instances of ideologies. Indeed, 
elsewhere (see Freeden, 1999), Freeden’s use of New Labour as a case study for 
ideological analysis gives lie to the notion that he overlooks ideologies’ real-world 
manifestations. Moreover, he explicitly stresses the everyday nature of ideologies’ 
mass production and consumption, insisting that they are ‘produced by, directed at 
and consumed by [social] groups’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 22). Indeed, according to 
Freeden, ‘we are all ideologists’, in that we all necessarily form interpretations and 
understandings of the political world – however sophisticated or otherwise, however 
conscious and deliberate or otherwise. Thus, merely by virtue of our involuntary 
presence within a political environment, we all ‘produce, disseminate and consume 
ideologies’ (Freeden, 2003: pp. 1-2). 
A third point of criticism to be levelled at ideological morphology concerns the 
narrowness of Freeden’s criteria for determining whether or not a body of political 
thought can be properly considered an ‘ideology’. Both Norval and Humphrey, along 
with Duncan Bell and Jason Glynos, argue that Freeden’s standard requires 
ideological thought patterns to display a level of conceptual complexity which 
excludes important instances of political thinking (Norval, 2000; Humphrey, 2001; 
Bell, 2002; Glynos, 2001). Humphrey takes Freeden to task for classifying Green 
political thought as a ‘thin’ ideology, an ideology which consists of just a few core 
concepts and which lacks the complexity of its ‘full’ counterparts (Humphrey, 2001).5 
He argues that Freeden fails to acknowledge the true level of complexity of Green 
political thought and that, contrary to Freeden’s categorisation, ecologism warrants 
the status of a fully developed ideology. This may well be a valid observation. 
However, Humphrey’s example of Green ideology refers only to one very specific 
instance of alleged misanalysis on the part of Freeden. It is therefore important to 
consider that Freeden’s analysis of ecologism is not necessarily indicative of 
fundamental mechanical flaws within ideological morphology which precipitate the 
exclusion of important strands of political thought. Indeed, a more likely conclusion is 
                                                          
5
 To qualify as a ‘full’ ideology, the –ism in question must ‘provide a reasonably broad, if not 
comprehensive, range of answers to the political questions that societies generate’. A ‘thin’ ideology, 
meanwhile, displays a ‘restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts’ (Freeden, 
1998: p. 750). 
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simply that Freeden’s interpretation of ecological thought differs to that of Humphrey 
and those others who promote a ‘thick’ or a ‘full’ reading of Green ideology. After all, 
as Humphrey’s paper demonstrates, it is quite possible to analyse ecologism within 
a morphological framework and yet draw positive conclusions as to its ideological 
‘fullness’. 
Even so, the ‘full’/’thin’ distinction has been further scrutinised by Bell, who sees it as 
deriving from a false assumption on the part of Freeden concerning the notion of 
ideological ‘fullness’. Bell contends that Freeden’s conception of ideology and 
politics in general is overly state-centric, in that it is limited to ‘that which is cultivated 
within and functions inside the limits, either normative or legal-juridical, of the 
contemporary state’ (Bell, 2002: p. 224). As such, argues Bell, Freeden displays a 
tendency to downplay global and transnational thought-structures. As a 
consequence, Freeden tends to presume upon the fullness of ‘vertical’ (state-bound) 
ideologies, whilst misclassifying ‘horizontal’ (global/transnationally-oriented) 
ideologies as ‘thin’. According to Bell, the flaw in Freeden’s demarcation criterion is 
that it does not accord with the notion that ‘political totality and generality must surely 
embrace more than that which can be found within the state’ (ibid.: p. 226). An 
extension of the morphological approach should, asserts Bell, emphasise the 
distinction between the realms of the domestic and the transnational. Subsequently, 
when we consider the ideology in question afresh, in accordance with its own 
particular political remit, then it is possible to conceive of both vertical and horizontal 
ideologies as full ideologies. 
Norval cites the work of post-Marxist theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe as 
providing an alternative approach which she claims avoids the exclusion of less 
complex patterns of thought (see Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). In accounting for the 
‘discursive constitution of political identities’, argues Norval, the theory of Laclau and 
Mouffe enables us to ‘focus on the manner in which ideologies that do not 
necessarily display the conceptual complexity of the core political concepts analysed 
by Freeden … may operate’ (Norval, 2000: p. 330). Whilst some aspects of the 
morphological approach may apply only to highly-evolved ideological forms, the 
post-Marxist approach goes beyond a merely conceptual analysis and, as such, can 
be used to understand less complex ideational and discursive formations. 
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Glynos repeats Norval’s concern that Freeden’s methodology requires ideologies to 
have an unusually high degree of stability and complexity. However, according to 
Glynos, whilst Freeden’s strict criteria for ideological status can appear exclusionary, 
to relax his criteria would render the classification ‘ideology’ meaningless, since it 
could then be applied to meaning systems of all kinds (Glynos, 2001: p. 194). 
Relying heavily on the work of Laclau and Slavoj Žižek (see, for instance, Laclau, 
2000; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Žižek, 1994; 1997), Glynos promotes a ‘Lacanian’ 
approach to ideology which seeks to move beyond mere description of content, 
construction and socio-historic contexts. Analysis of ideology, according to Glynos, 
should seek to explain ‘how ideology grips its subjects … how ideology exerts its 
hold over us, given the specificity and contingency of socio-historical traditions and 
their systems of meaning’ (Glynos, 2001: p. 195). Clearly this echoes 
aforementioned criticisms of the morphological approach in that it emphasises the 
lack of a critical faculty. However, it also suggests a preference for something akin to 
the Marxist conception of ideology – the very conception that Freeden endeavours to 
circumvent. 
A final direct criticism of Freeden’s morphological approach is one which bears some 
resemblance to the more general hermeneutic pitfalls outlined by Quentin Skinner. 
Mark Bevir characterises conceptual morphology as a ‘reified’ model of ideology, a 
conception which encourages the mapping of existing ideological instances onto the 
unchanging cores of established ideological traditions. (The parallel with Skinner lies 
in the similarity between Bevir’s notion of ‘reification’ and Skinner’s ‘mythology of 
prolepsis’ – see Skinner, 1969: p. 44.) While this process of matching different 
aspects of an instance of political thought with various ideologies and traditions 
provides the basis for ‘subtle and complex description’, explains Bevir, ‘the problem 
of explanation remains unresolved’ (Bevir, 2000: p. 281). Citing the example of New 
Labour as an ideological vehicle, Bevir argues that we cannot simply assume the 
relevant agents to have cherry-picked the party’s various ideological components 
from the established traditions of socialism, liberalism, etc. Even if we were to take 
this as given, we would remain ignorant as to why one particular conceptual 
‘amalgam’ was given preference over other possible combinations. Bevir goes on to 
claim that reified models such as Freeden’s see ideologies as fixed constructs 
comprised of static, unchanging political concepts. As an alternative, he proposes a 
27 
 
‘decentred’ model, which focuses on how ideologies are inherited and modified over 
time – an aspect he claims is left unaccounted for by conceptual morphology (ibid.). 
This seems a somewhat unfair criticism. Although in Freeden’s scheme, the possible 
number of conceptual combinations is necessarily limited, the process of 
decontestation works in such a way that the limits are relatively loose; there are in 
fact myriad ways in which ideologies can combine different concepts in a 
morphology. Bevir also seems to ignore Freeden’s point concerning conceptual 
migration, which can, under certain circumstances, allow for concepts to move 
across an ideology’s morphology. This contradicts his claim that Freeden’s model 
relies on the notion that ideologies display cores which comprise sets of protected or 
fixed concepts. 
As I have demonstrated in the literature review above, there are numerous potential 
difficulties in the operationalisation of Freeden’s ideological morphology as a 
framework for analysis. First, we must be aware of the limitations of the 
morphological approach in terms of its critical capacity. Despite Humphrey’s 
suggestion that, viewed in a certain light ideological morphology does display critical 
elements (Humphrey, 2005: p. 240), as a morphological analyst one must appreciate 
that one is inhibited from making pro-active recommendations for political action. 
Second, regarding the issue of conceptual complexity and ideological ‘fullness’, I 
would reiterate that the criticisms raised over Freeden’s classifications are 
concerned more with application than with fundamental methodological robustness. 
We must also consider the potential difficulties – identified by several commentators 
– in applying morphological analyses to the more empirical manifestations of 
ideologies and to less complex or less well-established forms of political thought. 
However, as we have seen, although Freeden himself has not yet offered thorough 
analyses of such instances, it has not been properly demonstrated that his 
framework is unsuitable for that purpose – quite the opposite, in fact, if we look, for 
instance, to Humphrey’s work on Green ideology (Humphrey, 2001). In any case, for 
the purposes of the current project, which, in precisely the same way as 
demonstrated by Freeden in Ideologies and Political Theory, focuses specifically on 
political thought in the form of major textual works, the non-inclusion of activists’ 
political thought, or of the practical aspect of ideology highlighted by Schwarzmantel, 
is inconsequential. This is not to say that serious analysis of anarchist activists’ 
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ideologies does not constitute an important enterprise. On the contrary, particularly 
in their contemporary incarnations, anarchist ideologies – perhaps more so than 
most others – are subject to continuous and significant processes of ideational 
development and redevelopment courtesy of movement actors. Indeed, significant 
work on the global activist movement has been undertaken by numerous scholars 
(see Graeber, 2002; Day, 2005; Gordon, 2007a). Nevertheless, despite tendencies 
to characterise it as such (see Neal, 1997), the contemporary anarchist movement is 
not entirely ideologically detached from the tradition of classical anarchist thought. 
Indeed, Ryan Knight highlights the importance of ‘recognising the continuity of 
anarchism as a body of thought and practice’, arguing that the work of Bakunin in 
particular provides ‘insight into how [contemporary anarchists] might strengthen 
[their] … social movements, using theory, not jettisoning it’ (Knight, 2013: pp. 187, 
186). Thus, in concerning itself specifically with the work of canonical anarchist 
thinkers, this study does not seek to play down the significance of recent and current 
anarchist practice. Rather, it operates from the assumption that anarchist ideologies 
generally display sufficient continuity with an established tradition of thought that we 
might look to said tradition for the purposes of ideological analysis. Further, it should 
be reiterated that the primary aim of the current work is not to present a 
morphological analysis of anarchist ideologies. It does not claim that the thinkers 
studied here are in any way representative of anarchist ideologies generally. If the 
research produces results which point to certain conclusions as to the conceptual 
composition of anarchism as such then they are of only secondary importance and, 
given the necessarily limited selection of source material analysed, must be treated 
with caution. The principal object of the work remains thus: to contribute to the 
contemporary scholarly debate on the nature and potentials of the concept of 
solidarity through the retrieval and reconsideration of anarchist conceptions. With 
this in mind, the analysis of four key thinkers presented here should be considered 
an initial contribution to this process of reappraisal, rather than an exhaustive or 
comprehensive account of anarchist solidarities. 
Ideological morphology in this study 
Appreciation of the above criticisms provides a robust platform from which to 
conduct a methodologically sound analysis. Despite the weaknesses highlighted, 
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Freeden’s typology of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts, in addition to his 
notion of morphology and his dissection of the internal workings of political concepts 
themselves, provides the methodological grounding for a workable framework within 
which to conduct a thorough and precise analysis of concepts, ideologies and 
political theory in general. As such, ideological morphology seems infinitely 
compatible with the purposes of the present work. Freeden’s is a bespoke 
framework designed specifically for the analysis of political concepts and the 
systems of thought in which they operate and is therefore well-suited to an analysis 
of the concept of solidarity in anarchist thought. Although Freeden’s work explicitly 
references ‘ideologies’ rather than ‘theory’ or ‘thought’, his analytical framework 
remains applicable to the latter two, since ideology is not separate from political 
theory but a part of it, its everyday manifestation. Indeed, Freeden’s own analyses of 
liberalism, conservatism and socialism rely on ‘a selective use of sources’, namely 
case-studies of the work of prominent thinkers which comprise ‘clusters of thought’ 
(Freeden, 1996: pp. 139, 142), rather than on the views of everyday practitioners of 
ideologies. As we have seen, the method of ideological morphology encourages an 
analysis which takes place on multiple levels, examining the components of 
concepts, individual concepts, and systems of concepts. In the case of the present 
work, this would enable one to gain an understanding of both the sub-conceptual 
features from which the concept of solidarity is made up and the way in which 
solidarity can be located in terms of its relationship with other concepts within the 
morphology of anarchist thought. 
The aim of my analytical project is ultimately to determine whether or not there is a 
distinctive ‘anarchist’ concept of solidarity. In order to reach a conclusion either way, 
it will be necessary to collate the results of the analysis and to observe the extent to 
which the selected ‘anarchist’ thinkers have attempted to communicate a consistent 
and coherent concept and the ideational shifts that occur between one and the next.  
The enquiry is naturally focused specifically on each thinker’s concept of solidarity, 
but also attempts to locate each thinker’s concept in relation to its wider idea-
environment. The analysis therefore takes place on two levels: first, at the sub-
conceptual level, seeking to determine the internal components of each concept; 
second, at the ideological level, seeking to determine the way in which each concept 
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operates within its ideological morphology. In order to visualise this analytical 
process, it is useful to borrow Freeden’s analogy of the map (Freeden, 1996: p. 167). 
According to Freeden, an investigation of an ideology’s entire ideational structure 
can be thought of as a map of a very large area, but one which does not exhibit a 
highly detailed exposition of every inch of the morphological terrain. Indeed, it is 
simply not possible – at least not for the lone analyst – to construct an exhaustive 
topography of such a wide expanse of conceptual ground. If the analyst chooses to 
‘zoom in’, however, and concentrate on a specific region of an ideology’s 
morphology, she is able to study individual concepts at a ‘higher level of 
magnification’ (ibid.). So, in the same way that an atlas of the world does not display 
the same level of detail as, say, an Ordnance Survey map of a small locality in rural 
England, the scope and depth of analysis enabled by the morphological method 
depends on the overall size of the conceptual area in question. One can either 
produce a general overview of the entire picture, or opt for a larger magnification and 
engage at close quarters with a specific concept and the particular processes of 
decontestation to which it is subject. It is not possible to conduct full analyses on 
both levels, argues Freeden, without devoting at least an entire volume of analysis to 
each instance of ideological exposition (ibid.). Nevertheless, I will attempt to 
incorporate some degree of triangulation here. For although in placing its focus on a 
singular concept (solidarity) this study is engaged primarily in a ‘high magnification’ 
approach, it will also be necessary to cover to some extent the wider morphology of 
each thinker’s work, specifically where certain concepts impact upon the 
decontestation of solidarity. 
It is also important to note that there are certain practical issues, some of which are 
general and others which are specific to certain of the selected writers, which need 
to be flagged up before commencing the analysis. The most obvious of these relates 
to translation: Bakunin and Kropotkin were not principally Anglophonic authors. 
Although some of Kropotkin’s key works were written and published in English, 
Bakunin never published in the English language. Indeed, during his lifetime the 
majority of his key publications appeared initially in French and only occasionally in 
his native Russian. Unfortunately, therefore, my own limitations as a linguist render 
my reading of Bakunin somewhat reliant on the English language translations of his 
work, raising the possibility that mistranslation, or at least inconsistent translation, 
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may cause confusion over key conceptual terms. That said, the translations from the 
French, at least, should pose little difficulty – one might reasonably expect that 
virtually all French-English translators would translate terms such as ‘solidarité’, 
‘liberté’ and ‘égalité’ invariably as ‘solidarity’, ‘liberty’ (or ‘freedom’) and ‘equality’ 
respectively. However, difficulties are perhaps more likely to arise in the event that 
quasi-synonymous words are equated to key conceptual terms. It is perhaps unlikely 
but certainly not inconceivable, for instance, that a translator may take ‘fraternité’ or 
‘unité’ to mean ‘solidarity’, or for ‘autonomie’ or ‘autodétermination’ to mean ‘liberty’. 
In an attempt to negate such confusion, therefore, the translations of key terms 
(‘solidarity’, ‘liberty’, ‘equality’) have, where possible, been checked with the original 
publication. That said, there may be discrepancies when it comes to the translation 
of Bakunin’s elaborations on such key terms. In his recent biography of Bakunin, for 
instance, Mark Leier notes that in one particular collection of Bakunin’s writings 
edited by Sam Dolgoff, ‘translations vary in accuracy’ (Leier, 2009: p. 335). As such, 
it will be necessary to exercise some caution in this respect. 
This issue of translation naturally leads us to consider the relationship between 
words and terms and abstract concepts or phenomena. This is an important issue for 
any scholar engaged in conceptual analysis. Furthermore it is an area with regards 
to which the work of Reinhart Koselleck may again be usefully consulted. Koselleck 
contends that concepts represent the links between language and real things or 
phenomena in the extra-linguistic world. Whilst concepts serve to indicate some form 
of external reality, they do so only by means which are provided by language 
(Koselleck, 1996: p. 61). Koselleck makes an important distinction between the 
semasiological (‘the study of all meanings of a term, word, or concept’) and the 
onomasiological (‘the study of all names or terms for the same thing or concept’) 
(ibid.: p. 64). For obvious reasons, it is important to consider the fact that one word 
may refer to multiple concepts, just as a single concept may be expressed by a 
number of different words, terms or phrases. With this in mind, the ‘heuristic 
challenge’, notes Freeden, becomes one of ‘deciding when a particular concept is 
being used at a different time or place’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 119). This study is 
necessarily engaged in an enquiry of a semasiological nature: its goal is to 
determine whether or not there is a distinctive ‘anarchist’ conception of solidarity, an 
enterprise which by definition must deal with the potentially multiple meanings 
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assigned to a single concept. The project’s onomasiological questions are less 
immanent, but equally important. For the sake of methodological rigour, it is crucial 
to anticipate the fact that various words or terms may bear close relation to the key 
term ‘solidarity’. As such, it is important from an analytical point of view to determine 
whether these quasi-synonymous terms – ‘fraternity’, ‘unity’, ‘interdependence’, for 
instance – are representative of discrete concepts in their own right or are in fact 
being used to indicate a concept of solidarity. Furthermore, whilst this endeavour 
necessarily involves the application of analytic attention to synchronic factors, in 
order to understand the variegated levels of meaning that are implied by concepts’ 
essential contestability it is also important to consider the historical development of 
concepts in terms of their ‘evolution from concrete to more abstract referents and 
consequently to greater open-endedness’ (ibid.: p. 120). Of course, it is this aspect 
of conceptual development which enables concepts to be used across multiple 
ideologies, albeit with a more pronounced reliance on perimeter concepts which then 
function to link them to specific political realities. Indeed, for two reasons, Freeden is 
perpetually inclined to stress the importance of the analytical marriage between the 
synchronic and the diachronic. First, because the existence of ideological thought is 
inevitably a temporal one; second, simply because a comparative approach lends 
itself so fittingly to the analysis of ideologies merely by virtue of the richness and 
variability of the ideological universe (ibid.: pp. 120-121). 
To return the focus to solidarity: how are we to know whether or not the writer in 
question is consciously dealing with the concept? More broadly, does it matter 
whether a thinker is deliberately expounding a sophisticated political concept, or 
simply using or making reference to a particular word or term for other reasons? This 
question leads us to consider the relationships between ideology and unconscious 
and potentially rhetorical aspects and, further, how this relationship may impinge 
upon the analytic enterprise. It is a question which, helpfully, is directly addressed by 
Freeden, who insists that the study of ideologies must ‘apply both to the intentional 
and the unconscious’ (ibid.: p. 34). On rhetoric, Freeden emphasises the importance 
of the processes of both ideological production and consumption. The producers of 
ideology, he says, are commonly ‘assumed to use rhetoric as an inauthentic 
rendering of beliefs to which they subscribe cynically or not at all’ (ibid.: p. 35). This 
assumption does not necessarily hold true, he continues, since there is always the 
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likelihood that a rhetorical speech-act is in fact representative of more complex 
ideological positions which are actually held. For instance, rhetoric may often be 
used as a device to simplify such patterns for the sake of public presentation and 
consumption. Further, if the recipients of rhetoric are unable to distinguish between 
genuine political beliefs and the rhetorical, then each is likely to be equally significant 
in the process of opinion formation. Since the mass consumption of ideologies is of 
equal analytical importance as is their (largely concentrated) production, ‘the 
question of the sincerity of those beliefs, the motives and intentions behind their 
enunciation, the propaganda roles they are designed to play, are not directly 
pertinent to comprehending their effective function’ (ibid.: p. 36). There are others, 
too, that are loath to dismiss the significance of the rhetorical in the analysis of 
ideologies (see Geertz, 1993; Ricoeur, 1986), and Freeden’s position appears to be 
roughly consonant with that of Michael Billig, who argues that ideological thinking is 
itself inherently rhetorical and consequently that ‘the use of rhetoric will itself reflect 
the patternings of ideology’ (Billig, 1991: p. 3). Therefore, if we subscribe to this 
assumption, we need not be concerned with questions concerning the degree to 
which a speech-actor is conscious of or sincere about the speech-act in question; we 
can treat the potentially rhetorical and the unconscious as expressions of ideological 
beliefs. 
This chapter has outlined in some detail the fundamental premises of Freeden’s 
methodology of ideological morphology. In conceiving of ideologies as distinctive 
configurations of political concepts, Freeden’s approach allows for an analysis which 
focuses on both the internal components of those concepts and the way in which 
they are shaped by their interlinkages with neighbouring concepts. This study will 
investigate both of these aspects in relation to the concept of solidarity in anarchist 
thought; in other words, in seeks to establish the sub-conceptual make-up of 
anarchist conceptions of solidarity and the way in which those conceptions are 
impacted by other concepts within the anarchist morphology. The next chapter 
consists in such an analysis of the concept of solidarity as expressed in the political 
thought of Bakunin.
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3. Bakunin’s concept of solidarity 
Rise like lions after slumber 
In unvanquishable number 
Shake your chains to earth like dew 
Which in sleep had fallen on you – 
Ye are many – they are few. 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, The Mask of Anarchy 
(Shelley, 2015) 
Of the many pages of scholarship dedicated to the life and work of Michael Bakunin, 
more than a few have served to reinforce a quite distinct and not entirely 
complimentary caricature. More often than not, Bakunin is portrayed as a ceaseless 
rebel, as a revolutionary doer rather than thinker for whom the end of an organised 
and rigorously theorised anarchist society became obscured by the seemingly 
irresistible means of political agitation. For instance, on George Woodcock’s 
account, Bakunin’s frequent ‘extremities of act and speech produced passages of 
pure comedy’, whilst his contribution to anarchist thought is noticeably played down 
on the alleged grounds of ‘the thinness of his literary and theoretical claims’ 
(Woodcock, 1986: p. 122). Similarly, the great liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin 
assessed Bakunin’s thought as replete with ‘glib Hegelian claptrap’ and ‘almost 
always simple, shallow, and clear’, concluding that there are ‘no coherent ideas to be 
extracted from his writings of any period’ (Berlin, 1978: pp. 107, 108, 111). 
Meanwhile, David Morland accuses Bakunin of purveying ‘an increasingly 
authoritarian brand of politics’ (Morland, 1997: p. 117), and Aileen Kelly goes so far 
as to condemn Bakunin as an ‘intellectual apologist for despotism’, whose rhetorical 
talents only invited his audience ‘to share in his self-deception’ (Kelly, 1987: p. 293). 
Given the nature of such coverage, it is no surprise that Bakunin’s popular image is 
at best one of a haphazard if heroic rebel; at worst of a delusional, instinctive and 
imperious fanatic with a predisposition for violence. Either way, the enduring 
perception is one which has served to distract quite sharply from his ideas, analysis 
of which, as Ruth Kinna confirms, has ‘too often given way to testimony of his 
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domineering, overblown, charismatic and childlike personality … in order to bolster 
claims about his, indeed anarchism’s, naive and illiberal tendency to utopianism and 
fondness for vanguards’ (Kinna, 2014: p. 19). It seems that the over-emphases on 
Bakunin’s character and his somewhat chaotic involvement in various revolutionary 
movements throughout his lifetime has served not only to discredit his own ideas, but 
also to encourage the stereotypical association of anarchism and anarchists with 
bomb-throwing, insurrectionary mayhem. 
There have been attempts to remedy this trend. A number of serious, scholarly 
studies of Bakunin’s thought have been undertaken (most notably Pyziur, 1955; 
Saltman, 1983; Morris, 1993 and McLaughlin, 2002), and they have had some 
success in extracting a political theory which, although by no means systematic, is 
nevertheless discernible, original and important in terms of the development of 
anarchist ideas generally. Indeed, Bakunin was, in the words of socialist historian G. 
D. H. Cole, the ‘outstanding leader’ of the first international anarchist movement 
(Cole, 1954: p. 213), and whilst he may not have been the intellectual founder of 
modern anarchism (it is a matter of scholarly debate as to whether that title belongs 
to William Godwin or Pierre-Joseph Proudhon), his writings on anarchist theory were 
and remain exponentially more influential than his detractors would have one 
believe. As Eugene Pyziur has argued, the general view of Bakunin as having 
contributed little of any value to anarchist doctrine is misplaced, though it is worth 
noting that Bakunin himself was known to eschew pretence to any great 
philosophical prowess (Pyziur, 1955: pp. 15-16). Nevertheless, it is true that 
Bakunin’s writings are fragmentary, inconsistent, often incomplete and nearly always 
fiercely polemical. Whilst these traits have doubtless done much to bolster his image 
as an inferior thinker, as Pyziur points out, they do not necessarily ‘deprive him of the 
right to be considered as … an outstanding exponent of political theory’ (ibid.: p. 20). 
As Peter Marshall has indicated, Bakunin is prone to appeal ‘to abstract concepts … 
without properly defining them’, and he often falls back on crude clichés which 
reinforce ‘binary opposites of good and evil, life and science, State and society, 
bourgeoisie and workers’, and so on (Marshall, 1993: p. 265). Despite this, and 
although his tone is frequently rhetorical, that is not to say that Bakunin’s treatment 
of various political concepts is in any way unconscious, unsophisticated or insincere. 
Indeed, ‘for all the fragmentation, repetition and contradiction’, argues Marshall, 
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‘there emerges a recognisable leitmotif’ within Bakunin’s work that justifies his being 
considered a ‘profound and original thinker’ (ibid.: pp. 265, 263). Further, it is almost 
certain that Bakunin’s writing style is symptomatic of his roles as activist and 
propagandist, as well as that of political theorist. Anyhow, as was discussed in 
Chapter 2, rhetorical expression and ideological articulation are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive forms of political communication. In fact, it is perfectly possible for 
the former to be indicative of the latter, for instances of political rhetoric to signal 
more complex ideological forms. Moreover, it might be suggested that consideration 
of Bakunin’s work within a morphological framework brings into sharper focus a 
coherent system of thought. As the analysis demonstrates, it is certainly possible to 
decode from Bakunin’s frequent pronouncements on solidarity a full concept which, I 
argue, is integral to his political theory. The aim in this chapter is to ascertain 
precisely how Bakunin decontests that concept and the way in which it operates 
within the wider morphology of his ideology. 
As the following analysis demonstrates, Bakunin’s concept of solidarity comprises 
one ineliminable component (as do all political concepts) and four additional, quasi-
contingent components. These additional components serve to flesh out Bakunin’s 
concept of solidarity and they take on varying degrees of significance depending on 
the specific context in which the concept is used at any one time. This context is 
invariably coloured by a number of political, cultural, historical and/or theoretical 
factors which may cause certain components to migrate from less prominent to more 
prominent positions within the concept (or vice versa), allowing for its coherent 
application in a variety of empirical and ideational settings. This process of migration 
is aided by a similarly fluid movement of adjacent concepts within Bakunin’s 
ideology, which by their proximity to solidarity highlight certain of the latter concepts’ 
components so as to shift the emphasis of the concept as a whole. 
The ineliminable component of Bakunin’s concept of solidarity (indeed, by definition, 
of all concepts of solidarity) refers to a bond between the individual and the 
collective. The four additional, quasi-contingent components are as follows: (i) 
mutual recognition; (ii) cohesion; (iii) fraternity and (iv) collective responsibility. As I 
have said, each of these components may take on greater or lesser importance 
depending upon the particular setting in which the concept is used at any one time. 
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Bakunin uses the concept of solidarity in two quite distinct ways. The first refers to 
his designation of solidarity as a ‘natural law’. Natural law is an important adjacent 
concept within Bakunin’s morphology. It concerns the identifiable patterns that are 
produced by the continual interaction of all things in the natural and social worlds. 
Bakunin frequently refers to solidarity as a natural law, as a clearly discernible 
pattern of human beings’ social behaviours. I have labelled his use of solidarity in 
this sense as ‘natural solidarity’, which in Bakunin’s scheme is produced by the 
social interdependence wrought by the need of individuals within a community to 
establish mutual recognition (a notion Bakunin borrows from Hegel). When Bakunin 
uses solidarity in this way, the morphological link between solidarity and natural law 
becomes increasingly important to the articulation of Bakunin’s ideology and to the 
decontestation of his concept of solidarity. Let us imagine for a moment Bakunin’s 
morphology as comprising various towns and cities interconnected by a network of 
roads. The towns and cities are representative of political concepts; the roads of the 
interlinkages between them. According to the analogy, Bakunin’s use of natural 
solidarity corresponds to an increase in the volume of traffic between the concepts of 
solidarity and natural law – specifically in a centripetal direction, from the adjacent 
concept to the core (from natural law to solidarity). The effect of this increased 
interconnection is that Bakunin’s concept of solidarity becomes subject to a 
proportionally greater ideational influence from his concept of natural law than it is 
from other concepts. This increased influence serves to promote certain components 
within Bakunin’s concept of solidarity to more prominent positions, which affects the 
decontestation of the concept accordingly. In the case of his use of natural solidarity, 
the component of mutual recognition is emphasised and the other components 
temporarily play a less prominent role in helping to make sense of the concept’s 
ineliminable component. So, when Bakunin invokes the ‘natural and social law of 
human solidarity’ (Bakunin, 1964: p. 264), at a conceptual level solidarity and natural 
law become more proximate. As a result of this proximity, solidarity’s internal 
components are configured in a certain way and the concept takes on a quite 
specific appearance – that of natural solidarity decontested as mutual recognition. 
Although Bakunin does himself refer to solidarity as a ‘natural law’, he does not 
always use the term ‘natural solidarity’ when deploying the concept in this way. For 
the sake of conceptual clarity, it must be stressed that ‘natural solidarity’ is a label 
that I have used to signal Bakunin’s use of solidarity as a natural law, as an 
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inevitable product of social development. The second section of the chapter is 
devoted to a thorough investigation into the way in which this concept is fleshed out 
through the Hegelian dialectic of mutual recognition. 
Bakunin’s second usage of solidarity I have labelled ‘class solidarity’, which refers to 
the solidarity of the masses in their struggle against the bourgeoisie. In the third 
section, this usage of solidarity is framed with reference to Shlomi Segall’s notion of 
group-solidarity, or those solidarities which characterise oppositional and exclusive 
groups (Segall, 2003). This allows for an analysis which locates within Bakunin’s 
concept of solidarity the three further components mentioned above: cohesion, 
fraternity and collective responsibility. When Bakunin uses solidarity in this way, he 
conceptualises it with reference to a notion of class struggle which has quite specific 
permutations in terms of the decontestation of solidarity. Indeed, in the same way 
that his concept of natural law influences the decontestation of natural solidarity, 
Bakunin’s concept of class struggle plays a key role in that of class solidarity. When 
Bakunin uses solidarity in this sense, the adjacency of class struggle shapes the 
configuration of the former concepts’ components so as to emphasise notions of 
cohesion, fraternity and collective responsibility, and the concept takes on the 
distinctive appearance of class solidarity. Bakunin’s concept of class struggle does 
not require the detailed exposition that does his concept of natural law, since it is not 
nearly as peculiar to his own ideology. Suffice to say here that, for Bakunin, as for all 
socialist anarchists (and indeed Marxists), ‘class struggle’ corresponds to the 
‘irreconcilable antagonism’ between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie which ‘results 
inevitably from their respective stations in life’ (Bakunin, 1992: p. 97). Put differently, 
it refers to the ‘struggle over exploitation and thereby the extraction of surplus value’ 
between capitalists and workers (Fraser and Wilde, 2011: p. 52). 
In the final section, I locate Bakunin’s concept of solidarity within his wider 
ideological morphology, drawing upon a secondary literature in order to explore the 
way in which solidarity is interlinked with other concepts and the impact of those 
inter-conceptual relationships on both Bakunin’s notion of solidarity and his ideology 
more generally. This section of analysis is confined to an exploration of the 
interlinkage of solidarity with Bakunin’s other core concepts of liberty and equality, 
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for the relationship between the three is most crucial to the articulation of Bakunin’s 
ideology. 
The first section of the chapter is given over to an exposition of Bakunin’s natural law 
theory, which is key to understanding his concept of natural solidarity.  
Natural law 
Bakunin conceives of solidarity as a ‘natural law’, as an innate human capacity for 
sociability and thus an inevitable form of social interaction that results from the 
material process of natural evolution (Bakunin, 1970: p. 43n). The concept of natural 
law is vital to the decontestation of Bakunin’s core concepts, particularly that of 
solidarity. By way of its proximity to the core of Bakunin’s morphology, natural law 
provides the core concepts with a greater degree of precision. As such, it constitutes 
an adjacent concept within the morphology of Bakunin’s ideology. Given his 
classification of solidarity as a natural law, some exploration of Bakunin’s natural law 
theory is required in order to properly ascertain the way in which he understands 
solidarity. 
Like that of Marx, Bakunin’s conception of reality is ‘dialectical, materialist and 
deterministic’ (Morris, 1993: p. 78). For him, the social world of human beings is 
viewed simply as the most sophisticated known development, as ‘the last great 
manifestation or creation of Nature upon this earth’ (Bakunin, 1964: p. 144). 
Bakunin’s philosophy seeks to emphasise the universal oneness of nature, to stress 
the inevitable direction of natural development ‘from the simple to the complex, from 
the lower to the higher, from the inferior to the superior’ (ibid.: p. 60). In God and the 
State (1882), he wholly rejects the idealist conception of the universe, condemning it 
as irrational and illogical and linking it to a religious or metaphysical political 
authoritarianism which ‘starts from divinity to establish slavery and condemn the 
masses to an endless animality’ (Bakunin, 1970: p. 48). For Bakunin, the materialist 
account not only provides the only framework within which to understand natural 
evolution and human social development; it also offers a philosophical basis for ‘the 
establishment of liberty’, and for ‘the full humanisation of society’ (Bakunin, 1970: p. 
48; Bakunin, 1964: p. 68). In essence, Bakunin’s notion of natural law is founded on 
the fundamental assumption that the universe – comprising both the physical and 
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social worlds – is played out according to an inevitable pattern of events caused by 
the convergence of each and every natural force which occurs within it. ‘Nature’ thus 
constitutes an omnipotent force within the universe that dominates every aspect of 
existence; it is ‘the sum of the actual transformations of things that are and will be 
ceaselessly produced within its womb’ (ibid.: p. 53). More precisely, for Bakunin, 
each entity and being within the universe is engaged in a multidirectional relationship 
of interaction whereby it influences and is in turn influenced by every other entity or 
being. All things, argues Bakunin, ‘necessarily and unconsciously exercise upon one 
another, whether directly or indirectly, perpetual action and reaction’ (ibid.); there 
exists a constant process of cause and effect between them. For Bakunin, the 
summation of all of these interactions is equal to the dominant force in the universe; 
it constitutes nature itself. The level of interdependence perceived by Bakunin is 
such that he is led to conclude that nature itself can be fundamentally characterised 
by a form of solidarity: ‘All this boundless multitude of particular actions and 
reactions, combined in one general movement’, he argues, ‘produces and 
constitutes what we call Life, Solidarity, Universal Causality, Nature’ (ibid.). Order 
and harmony within the universe are ensured by the free functioning of natural laws, 
which ‘are not real except in so far as they are inherent in nature, that is to say they 
are not fixed by any authority’ (Bakunin, 1973: p. 208). ‘These laws’, says Bakunin, 
amount to ‘simple manifestations or else continual fluctuations of the development of 
things and of combinations of these very varied, transient, but real facts’ (ibid.). 
Further, Bakunin claims, ‘Universal Solidarity, Nature viewed as an infinite universe, 
is imposed on our mind as a rational necessity’ (Bakunin, 1964: p. 53). Solidarity is 
not a ‘first cause’, therefore, but rather a product of the universal causality which 
represents the natural way of things (ibid.: p. 53-54). It follows from Bakunin’s 
materialist understanding of the universe that the patterns which arise from the 
perpetual process of mutual interaction (or ‘universal causality’) constitute ‘natural 
laws’. Each thing, according to Bakunin, has ‘its own peculiar form of transformation 
and action’, which is characterised by ‘a succession of facts and phenomena which 
invariably repeat themselves under the same given conditions’ (ibid.: p 54). In other 
words, the existence and development of all things and beings will inevitably 
undergo certain characteristic processes which are bound to be repeated in a regular 
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way. These patterns represent the laws which govern nature, and they apply to the 
social world just as they apply to the physical and natural worlds. 
For Bakunin, human society, itself a component of the natural world, represents ‘the 
basis and natural starting point of man’s human existence’ (Bakunin, 1973: p. 145); it 
embodies human beings’ natural and inevitable mode of living. As such, just as the 
natural world as a whole is governed by a series of immanent laws, in the social 
sphere, in the realm of human society, natural laws rule. Indeed, Bakunin tells us, 
natural laws are ‘inherent in the social body, just as physical laws are inherent in 
material bodies’ (Bakunin, 1964: p. 166). Of these laws, solidarity is of particular 
significance. Indeed, according to Bakunin ‘the natural and social law of human 
solidarity’ represents the very essence of society itself, ‘for all social life is but the 
continuous mutual interdependence of individuals and masses’ (ibid.: p. 167). 
Bakunin’s conception of reality as a process of natural evolution, and of human 
beings and human society as natural developments of that process lead him to the 
logical conclusion that as a part of nature, it is not possible for human beings to rebel 
against it. Indeed, he argues that ‘Man is not free in relation to the laws of nature, 
which constitute the first basis and the necessary condition of his existence’ (ibid.: p. 
339). These laws, Bakunin writes, ‘pervade and dominate him, just as they pervade 
and dominate everything that exists. Nothing is capable of saving him from their 
fateful omnipotence; any attempt to revolt on his part would simply lead to suicide’ 
(ibid.). In Bakunin’s scheme, human beings are helpless to resist natural laws and so 
the notion of human actions being determined by ‘free will’ is a nonsense. Indeed, 
Bakunin expressly rejects the notion of free will, arguing that a genuine socialism 
must instead recognise that ‘All individuals, with no exception, are at every moment 
of their lives what Nature and society have made them’ (ibid.: p. 155). Bakunin’s view 
that the behaviour of human beings is essentially determined by natural and social 
forces leads him to conclude that moral behaviour is dependent upon the moral 
organisation of society, that in order ‘to make men moral it is necessary to make their 
social environment moral’ (Bakunin, 1964: p. 155). However, the absence of free will 
does not render human beings entirely malleable; Bakunin is not necessarily 
questioning the existence of a human nature per se. On the contrary, he sees human 
beings as bound absolutely by a very particular set of inherent dispositions and 
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capabilities. But whilst humans can never be conceived in complete isolation from 
nature, there is a sense, argues Bakunin, that ‘Man has emancipated himself; he has 
separated himself from animality and constituted himself a man; he has begun his 
distinctively human history and development by an act of disobedience and science 
– that is, by rebellion and by thought’ (Bakunin, 1970: p. 12). For Bakunin, it is these 
qualities – the tendency for rebellion, to not submit to external authority, and the 
capacity for rational thought – that mark us out as distinctly human. 
It is noteworthy that Bakunin, in his holistic conception of nature, in his notion that 
human beings are an inextricable part of the natural world, pre-empts the concerns 
of later, ecological thinkers. Indeed, as Morris has noted, Bakunin’s writings on 
nature offer ‘in embryonic form, an ecological approach to the world, one that is 
materialist and historical, and stresses the essential continuity and organic link 
between humans and nature’ (Morris, 1993: p. 84). But although Bakunin recognises 
this fundamental continuity and insists upon the infallibility and all-pervasive 
character of natural law, he also accounts for the fact that humans are able to 
achieve a degree of control over the natural world. Whilst ‘nature’, or ‘universal 
causality’ is omnipotent by definition, the natural world conceived as human beings’ 
biophysical environment is of course amenable to a level of productive and creative 
interference (Morris, 2014: pp. 11-12). In fact, argues Bakunin (as does Marx), the 
attainment of a degree of control over the natural world is a pre-requisite of human 
freedom and development (Bakunin, 1970: p. 12). 
As we have seen, Bakunin is convinced that natural laws pervade all that unfolds in 
both the natural and social worlds. Contrary to the popular misconception, then, as 
an anarchist, Bakunin is not opposed to authority per se (Newman, 2001: p. 38). 
Indeed, natural authority, as embodied in natural laws, Bakunin argues, is in fact an 
essential condition of our existence. To obey the natural laws of human society is 
thus to realise one’s humanity, to constitute oneself as a human being – it is, in 
short, to live according to and hence to fulfil our own nature. Natural laws, argues 
Bakunin, exert an inevitable power on the social world, a power which we are 
helpless to resist. ‘Indeed, revolt against these laws is not only non-permissible, but 
even impossible’, he insists, for even if we are unaware of them or of their influence, 
‘we cannot disobey them, for they constitute the basis and the very conditions of our 
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existence’ (Bakunin, 1964: p. 239). Despite their pre-eminence and all-pervasive 
scope, however, for Bakunin, to obey natural laws is not to submit to a slave-like 
existence, or to subordinate oneself to another. Although we are ‘unconditionally the 
slaves of these laws’, Bakunin writes, ‘in such slavery there is no humiliation, or 
rather it is not slavery at all’ (ibid.: p. 239). For slavery, argues Bakunin, 
‘presupposes the existence of an external master … while those [natural] laws are 
not extrinsic in relation to us: they are inherent in us, they constitute our nature, our 
whole being’ (ibid.). The distinction between natural authority and artificial authority 
thus rests on the presence of an external actor who serves to impose their own will 
on another. The exercise of artificial authority must involve both a legislator/enforcer 
and an obeyer; it is an oppositional and indeed a dialectical relationship which 
requires both a master and a slave. Put differently, artificial authority necessarily 
entails hierarchical social relations. As such, we are able to distinguish natural laws 
from laws of a political, juridical, civil or religious nature, or, put differently, those 
which are artificially constructed and enshrined in hierarchical institutions such as the 
church and the state. For Bakunin, the latter represent the edicts of arbitrary, 
illegitimate powers which are external to the human essence and which therefore 
impede the flourishing of human nature and the full development of human beings’ 
natural capacities. It follows that the institutions of government and the state are 
inevitably ‘hostile and fatal to the liberty of the masses, for they impose upon them a 
system of external and therefore despotic laws’ (ibid.: p. 240). To submit to the 
authority of natural laws, on the other hand, is to live according to the laws that 
reside within us as consequences of our peculiarly human existence. 
The concept of natural law is of great importance to the configuration of Bakunin’s 
morphology. However, it is not a core concept, since it does not provide a basic 
principle from which Bakunin’s key political priorities are derived. Rather, natural law 
resides in an adjacent position, as it functions to place certain constraints on various 
concepts within the core so as to substantiate them and furnish them with a 
conceptual precision that readies them for practical application. Indeed, the 
interlinkage of natural law to Bakunin’s core concepts is vital for the decontestation 
of those concepts and thus to the articulation of his ideology generally. The notion of 
natural law is particularly relevant to solidarity, as the following discussion makes 
clear. 
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Natural solidarity: solidarity as mutual recognition 
According to Bakunin, amongst the most important natural laws is that of solidarity: 
The inherent principles of human existence are summed up in the single law of 
solidarity. This is the golden rule of humanity, and may be formulated thus: no person 
can recognise or realise his or her own humanity except by recognising it in others 
and so co-operating for its realisation by each and all (Bakunin, 1972: p. 19) 
For Bakunin, solidarity constitutes one of the most fundamental concepts on which 
human society is founded. He sees solidarity as the inevitable outcome of the need 
of human beings to identify their own distinctly human existence by identifying it in all 
others belonging to a community. As such, the above quotation clearly betrays the 
vivid Hegelian stripe throughout Bakunin’s writings;6 he can be seen to conceive of 
solidarity broadly in accordance with Hegel’s dialectic of mutual recognition (or the 
‘master-slave dialectic’), whereby self-conscious beings recognise one another and 
subsequently themselves as self-conscious. 
According to Hegel, ‘Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact 
that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged’ (Hegel, 
1977: p. 111). As such, the self and the other ‘recognise themselves as mutually 
recognising one another’ (ibid.: p. 112). For Hegel, genuine self-consciousness and 
self-value is not possible but for this moment of mutual acknowledgement; as Simon 
Blackburn puts it, we are only able to truly ‘understand ourselves for who we are by 
incorporating our understandings of how we are regarded by others’ (Blackburn, 
2008: p. 309). In other words, there needs to be an instance of mutual recognition; 
each person needs the other in order to establish awareness of themselves. In order 
to achieve a proper sense of self, individuals must become conscious of both their 
particular characteristics and their universal ones that are held in common with all 
other individuals. Or, to borrow Tony Burns’ description, ‘Hegel maintains that to be 
conscious of one’s self in one’s particularity, or as possessing a determinate social 
identity, is a necessary precondition for seeing oneself in one’s own universality; and 
vice versa’ (Burns, 2006: p. 95). Only by seeing oneself from the perspective of a 
self-realising other – or from the perspective of society generally – is one able to truly 
                                                          
6
 Along with Proudhon, Feuerbach and Marx (and later Comte), Bakunin’s chief philosophical 
influence was undoubtedly Hegel (whom he considered ‘unconditionally the greatest philosopher of 
the present time’ – Bakunin, 1973: p. 47), or, more properly, the ‘Left’ Hegelianism associated with the 
young Marx and others which sought to mobilise Hegel’s dialectic against the bourgeois social order. 
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recognise one’s individuality; simultaneously, only by seeing oneself as a particular, 
unique individual is one able to recognise one’s place in a community. As Nathan 
Jun explains, for Hegel, this dialectical moment produces an ‘ethical substance’ 
which is shared by self-conscious beings in a community (Jun, 2014: p. 34). In 
Bakunin’s scheme, as we have seen, this very substance constitutes solidarity itself 
and it should be seen as both a necessary condition and a product of mutual 
recognition. Indeed, the two components are ‘symbiotic’, as Jun puts it: ‘ethical 
substance is constituted by the mutual recognition of self-conscious beings, and 
mutual recognition by self-conscious beings is made possible by their sharing ethical 
substance’ (ibid.). Consequently, as Gary Browning observes, ‘Hegel’s political 
theorising is intimately connected with an account of consciousness and the role of 
social recognition in its development’ (Browning, 1997: p. 144). In other words, 
solidarity is cultivated by the universally held need of individuals to achieve 
recognition from the perspective of the other; simultaneously, that same solidarity 
produces the very conditions in which that dialectical moment – mutual recognition – 
is made possible. 
Bakunin’s concept of solidarity thus draws heavily on this aspect of Hegel’s thought, 
since in his view solidarity is produced by the process of mutual recognition. The 
notion of solidarity as mutual recognition also impacts upon Bakunin’s concept of 
freedom, via the morphological linkage between solidarity and freedom. Mutual 
recognition serves as the foundation of Bakunin’s claim that one is free only to the 
extent that all others about one are also free. ‘I myself am human and free’, he 
insists, ‘only to the extent that I acknowledge the humanity and liberty of all my 
fellows’ (Bakunin, 1973: p. 147). As such, he continues, with a firm nod to Hegel, a 
‘slavemaster is not a man but a master’, and by ‘ignoring his slave’s humanity he 
ignores his own’ (ibid.). The realisation of genuine humanity and freedom depends 
upon this moment of recognition (or ‘acknowledgement’, as Bakunin sometimes puts 
it), which inevitably produces a natural solidarity since it creates interdependence 
between individuals. In a pamphlet titled ‘Solidarity in Liberty’ (1867), Bakunin writes 
that ‘thanks to the law of solidarity, which is the natural basis of all human society, I 
cannot be, feel, and know myself really, completely free, if I am not surrounded by 
men as free as myself’ (Bakunin, 1972: p. 21). Given this, he insists, the ‘true, 
human liberty of a single individual implies the emancipation of all’ (ibid.). In other 
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words, as Chiara Bottici has observed, according to Bakunin’s concept, ‘freedom can 
only be a freedom of equals’ (Bottici, 2014: p. 183). The interrelationship between 
Bakunin’s concepts of solidarity, freedom and equality is discussed in more detail 
later on in the chapter. 
The dialectical method and the theory of mutual recognition are both clear and 
present features in Bakunin’s writings. The impact of ‘Left’ appropriations of 
Hegelianism on Bakunin’s ideas are self-evident, most obviously so in his 1842 
pamphlet ‘The Reaction in Germany’ (see Bakunin, 1973: pp. 37-58). However, 
Hegel’s influence on Bakunin has, until now, only been drawn out in relation to his 
usage of the dialectic generally. This refers to the dialectical process of negation, 
encapsulated by Bakunin in his (in)famous formulation that ‘The passion for 
destruction is a creative passion, too’ (Bakunin, 1973: p. 58). Bakunin applied this 
theoretical process in a very practical sense; for him, statism amounted to the thesis, 
destruction or ‘amorphism’, as Pyziur puts it, to the antithesis, and federation in a 
new anarchist society to the synthesis (Pyziur, 1955: p. 126). Although Bakunin’s 
reliance on the Hegelian dialectic is made clear in much of the secondary literature, 
little scholarship has elaborated on the way in which Bakunin understands and 
deploys notions of mutual recognition, at least not in relation to his concept of 
solidarity. Morris notes that Bakunin ‘saw the relationship between individual and 
society as a “dialectical” one’, and that this relationship entailed ‘a unity-in-
opposition’ (Morris, 1993: p. 93), but he does not refer to the relationship explicitly in 
terms of a concept of solidarity, as such. Accordingly, it is worth reiterating the point 
that Bakunin decontests solidarity in terms which explicitly denote a dialectical 
moment of mutual recognition. For Bakunin, solidarity between individuals – and 
between individuals and the wider collective – is forged when the individual comes to 
recognise his or her own identity and subjectivity as inextricable from that of other 
individuals and that of the community generally. At the same time, solidarity provides 
the necessary social conditions for that realisation to occur. In Bakunin’s writings, 
solidarity constitutes a natural law, since it is an inevitable product of the naturally 
human tendency to strive for the recognition of self in others and in an ethical 
community. Mutual recognition thus constitutes a key component of Bakunin’s 
concept of solidarity. 
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To place this component within the context of the discussion of his theory of natural 
law, one can suggest with some conviction that solidarity, in Bakunin’s scheme, 
operates as a natural law. It is only through our obeying natural laws that we truly 
realise our own nature – that we achieve humanity – and solidarity is both the 
necessary product of and precondition for the inevitable quest for mutual recognition. 
So, for Bakunin, the realisation of our nature as human beings rests on a concept of 
solidarity. However, he insists that it is also embodied in individual freedom, without 
which human beings are unable to fulfil their inherent potentialities, and which is 
attained by the person who ‘obeys natural laws because he has himself recognised 
them as such, and not because they have been externally imposed upon him by any 
extrinsic will whatever, divine or human, collective or individual’ (Bakunin, 1970: p. 
30). Bakunin’s notion of freedom is complex, and, like solidarity, it is a core concept 
within his ideological morphology. Given its proximity to solidarity, it plays an 
important role in the process by which that concept is decontested (as, 
simultaneously, does solidarity play a role in the decontestation of freedom). As 
such, the morphological relationship between these two core concepts requires 
some exposition and is explored later on in the chapter. Whilst this section has 
sought to capture Bakunin’s use of solidarity as a natural law (natural solidarity), the 
following section is devoted to an investigation into his second usage of the concept: 
class solidarity. 
Class solidarity 
As we have seen, Bakunin’s first usage of the concept of solidarity refers to ‘natural 
solidarity’, the notion that solidarity constitutes an inevitable characteristic of human 
societies because of the way in which human beings’ essential nature is constituted. 
We saw how Bakunin, following Hegel, identified the peculiarly human need for 
mutual recognition as the source of a genuinely social solidarity which provides the 
foundation for an ethical community of self-conscious and free individuals. For 
Bakunin, the scope of such a notion of solidarity is necessarily universal since all 
human beings are subject to the fundamental need for recognition. This form of 
solidarity is, in theory, the property of society as a whole; it contributes to the 
cohesion and collective purpose of ‘the community’ in the broadest possible sense of 
that term (i.e. a ‘global’ or ‘human’ community). 
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Shlomi Segall offers a typology of two forms of solidarity which allows us to make 
sense of the distinction between this – Bakunin’s first usage (‘natural solidarity’) – 
and his second usage, which I will refer to as ‘class solidarity’. The first of Segall’s 
types of solidarity exists between individuals who belong to the same relatively 
exclusive group; he refers to this type as ‘group-solidarity’ (Segall, 2003: p. 13). By 
contrast, the second type may consist in relations that are extended ‘between 
individuals (or a group of individuals) and a collective to which they do not belong’. 
Segall refers to this type as ‘solidarity as sympathy’ (ibid.). Bakunin’s notion of 
natural solidarity is much closer to the second of Segall’s types, to solidarity-as-
sympathy, for in its universality it allows for individuals to form solidaristic bonds that 
transcend traditional or existing social and cultural barriers. As such, it may involve – 
or rather, it probably or even necessarily will involve – some instance(s) of 
individuals seeking to establish and maintain solidarity with others who do not have 
membership of the same group(s) – ‘groups’ being understood as collections of 
individuals practicing a degree of cooperation in pursuit of their collective goals 
(Mason, 2000: p. 21). In fact, I would suggest that Bakunin’s notion of natural 
solidarity is even broader in scope than Segall’s notion of solidarity-as-sympathy, 
which, of course, may still exist between certain relatively exclusive groups that are 
nevertheless opposed by a further group or coalition of groups (such as allied 
groups/nations on either side of a military conflict). Rather, Bakunin’s universal 
notion of solidarity is entirely non-oppositional, it necessarily consists in an 
expression of oneness that does not correspond to a form of group unity that can be 
defined (or strengthened) by the presence of an antagonistic relation to another 
group or social entity. In fact, this non-oppositional quality is achieved not by forging 
bonds of social unity between groups necessarily, but rather by the dissolution of 
groups as such, by establishing one universal group, or at least by attempting to 
subordinate the attachments individuals have with smaller groupings and identities to 
those they have with the wider collective. Indeed, this aspect of Bakunin’s notion of 
solidarity constitutes a significant development of Hegel’s initial theory of mutual 
recognition, for, as Chiara Bottici has noted, it extends it ‘to humanity as a whole, a 
whole that transcends social, political and even historical borders’ (Bottici, 2014: p. 
184). I have referred to solidarity in this sense, solidarity decontested as mutual 
recognition, as ‘natural solidarity’. 
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The second way in which Bakunin uses the concept of solidarity (‘class solidarity’, as 
I have called it) refers to that which is exercised by the proletariat in its historic 
economic struggle against the bourgeoisie. In fact, it should be noted that Bakunin’s 
use of class solidarity applies not just to the proletariat, but also to the peasantry and 
the lumpenproletariat (the unemployed, the homeless, common criminals, etc.). 
Bakunin consciously distances his own conception of the working class from that of 
Marx, for whom revolutionary agency lies solely with the urban, industrial, wage-
earning proletariat (Marx, 2000: p. 253). Indeed, as is well documented, Marx’s 
attitude towards the peasantry is, at best, ambivalent; at worst, scornful, and he sees 
the lumpenproletariat as ‘The “dangerous class”, the social scum, that passively 
rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society’, whose members are 
more susceptible to ‘reactionary intrigue’ than to revolutionary class-consciousness 
(Marx and Engels, 2002: p. 231). By contrast, Bakunin identifies both the peasantry 
and the lumpenproletariat as potential proprietors of revolutionary agency. He argues 
that, despite its cultural conservatism and general prejudice towards urban workers, 
the peasantry constitutes a potentially revolutionary force by virtue of its own 
structural exploitation under capitalism (Bakunin, 1964: pp. 203-204). As for the 
lumpenproletariat, Bakunin sees that social class as one which is ‘almost unpolluted 
by bourgeois civilisation, which carries in its inner being and in its aspirations, in all 
the necessities and miseries of its collective life, all the seeds of the socialism of the 
future’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 294). With this in mind, all subsequent references to the 
‘working class’ or the ‘proletariat’ in this chapter should be taken to signify Bakunin’s 
inclusive conception of the masses. 
‘The concrete, final solution to the social question’, Bakunin insists, ‘can only be 
realised on the basis of international workers’ solidarity’ (Bakunin, 1973: p. 175). 
Proletarian solidarity in class struggle is a necessary force of liberation, he argues; it 
enables ‘emancipation through practical action’ (Bakunin, 1992: p. 103). This action 
equates to ‘workers’ solidarity in their struggle against the bosses. It means trade-
unions, organisation, and the federation of resistance funds’ (ibid.). The 
decontestation of Bakunin’s use of solidarity in this instance is dependent on the 
adjacent concept of class struggle. By its proximity to solidarity, the notion of class 
struggle places certain constraints upon the former concept so as to affect its 
decontestation in a particular way. Through its interlinkage with the concept of class 
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struggle, solidarity takes on an instrumental value. By ‘instrumental’, I refer here to 
the interests of the group (i.e. the working class) and not to the private interests of its 
individual members. In other words, class solidarity is of instrumental value in 
relation to the pursuit of the collective goals of that group rather than individuals’ self-
interests, for instrumentality in relation to the latter is irreconcilable with solidarity by 
definition. As such, class solidarity constitutes the means by which progress towards 
certain political goals is to be attained. (Of course, it cannot constitute a final goal in 
itself, for Bakunin’s ultimate vision is one of a classless society.) Class solidarity for 
Bakunin is ultimately a revolutionary vehicle through which human emancipation is to 
be realised. The working class – or the exploited and oppressed masses more 
generally, when we include the peasantry and the lumpenproletariat – possess 
revolutionary agency because of their structural economic position under the 
capitalist mode of production; social transformation is in their material interests, 
relative to their current station. Within the context of a politics of class struggle, 
‘solidarity’, Bakunin insists, represents the ‘whole power’ and the ‘only strength’ of 
the masses (Bakunin, 2002: p. 173; Bakunin, 1992: p. 152), and in Bakunin’s view it 
is the only social force which has the potential to bring about the transformation of 
society. 
When deploying notions of class solidarity, Bakunin speaks of the same social 
phenomenon as does David Lockwood in his classic study of working-class identity, 
whereby he designates it as a defining characteristic of proletarian workers: ‘Shaped 
by occupational solidarities and communal sociability the proletarian social 
consciousness is centred on an awareness of “us” in contradistinction to “them” who 
are not a part of “us”’ (Lockwood, 1975: p. 18).  This form of solidarity is, of course, 
necessarily oppositional and exclusive, in that it belongs to a specific social group 
whose members (and non-members) are relatively clearly delineated. As such, it is, 
according to Segall’s typology, a form of ‘group-solidarity’, which is characterised by 
‘cohesion’, ‘fraternity’, and ‘collective responsibility’. Cohesion, for Segall, refers to 
the ‘willingness of group members to co-operate with other members in an effort to 
advance the common good of the group’ and, further, ‘the more cohesion a group 
enjoys the greater its capability to resist external pressure’ (Segall, 2003: p. 15). The 
second component of group-solidarity, fraternity, signals an unwillingness on the part 
of group members ‘to accept, or hold on to, a personal advantage or benefit if doing 
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so would undermine the collective effort’ (ibid.). The third component, collective 
responsibility, is defined by Segall as a ‘willingness to share responsibility for (some 
minimum level of) individual members’ well-being’ (ibid.). 
In the following sections I explore in some detail the morphology of Bakunin’s 
concept of class solidarity. In doing so, I demonstrate that Bakunin’s notion of class 
solidarity adheres broadly to Segall’s group-solidarity model, which provides us with 
an instructive perspective as to the internal morphology of Bakunin’s concept. This is 
not to say that Segall’s notion of group-solidarity is merely projected onto Bakunin’s 
writings. Rather, it is to suggest that the process of mapping Bakunin’s concept of 
class solidarity is facilitated somewhat by reference to Segall’s type, or that 
Bakunin’s is a concept of group-solidarity the like of which is subsequently formally 
classified by Segall. Whilst the conception of class solidarity is very much Bakunin’s 
own, my analysis of its inner morphology captures a concept which can usefully be 
understood as a form of group-solidarity comprising notions of cohesion, fraternity 
and collective responsibility. Indeed, it is by way of solidarity’s proximity to the 
adjacent concept of class struggle that these components take on greater 
importance in terms of the decontestation of the former. Accordingly, the discussion 
of Bakunin’s notion of class solidarity is structured with reference to cohesion, 
fraternity and collective responsibility. 
Cohesion 
Cohesion, as we have seen, (i) signals a willingness of group members to cooperate 
in pursuit of a common goal; and, (ii) allows for a greater resistance by the group to 
external pressures. In the case of Bakunin, the first aspect – cooperation – is 
identifiable in his insistence upon effective working-class organisation in trade 
unions. Bakunin put his faith in the International Working Men’s Association as the 
best way of organising this cooperation and thus of mobilising working-class 
solidarity. Indeed, he argued that cooperation between proletarians of all nations and 
occupations should constitute a core principle of the International’s political 
programme: 
There is only one law binding all the members, individuals, sections and federations 
of the International, a law which constitutes its one true basis ... it is the international 
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solidarity of workers in all jobs and all countries in their economic struggle against the 
exploiters of labour (Bakunin, 1973: pp. 236-237) 
Bakunin’s political vision is for the manifestation of class solidarity through a 
cooperative and international federation of workers’ organisations. The element of 
cooperation is crucial, since it allows for the effective organisation of ‘solidarity 
through the spontaneous action of the working classes’ and promotes the ‘absolutely 
free federation … of the working masses of all tongues and nations’ as opposed to 
their ‘unification by decree and under the aegis of any government’ (ibid.: p. 237). In 
other words, the aspect of cohesion entailed by class solidarity allows for that social 
group (the working class) to mobilise effectively in pursuit of their collective interests. 
Further, it is clear that the element of cohesion within Bakunin’s notion of class 
solidarity in theory renders the working class more resistant to external pressures. 
The more cohesive a group is, the more able it is to withstand coercion from without 
and fragmentation from within. This refers to the exclusive and oppositional 
character of Bakunin’s conception of class solidarity. In the context of a politics of 
class struggle, of course, this means that the more cohesion enjoyed by the 
proletariat, the more likely it will be able to resist structural economic exploitation and 
inevitable bourgeois hostility towards its own political agenda through collective 
action. Bakunin communicates the political importance of group cohesion at various 
points in his writings, and not least in those which lay out his proposed programmes 
for action for the International and other working class and revolutionary 
organisations. In a series of articles for L’Egalité on ‘The Policy of the International’ 
(1869), Bakunin outlines quite clearly both the central principles of the First 
International (which had been founded in London in 1864) and the nature of the 
bourgeoisie and its relationship to the working class. ‘[F]aced with the formidable 
coalition of all the privileged classes, all the capitalists, and all the states’, he writes, 
it is simply impossible for ‘an isolated workers’ association, local or national’ to 
mount a successful and genuinely revolutionary class struggle (Bakunin, 2002: p. 
162). Bakunin insists that ‘victory can only be achieved by a union of all the national 
and international associations into a single universal association which is none other 
than the great International Workingmen’s Association’ (ibid.). For class solidarity to 
constitute an effective bulwark against bourgeois exploitation, the aspect of cohesion 
contained within it must apply to the entire international proletariat and not be 
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confined to smaller regional or national groups or be subordinated to parochial 
solidarities based on narrower cultural, religious or even occupational identities, for 
instance. As such, Bakunin praises the founders of the International for ‘eliminating 
all religious and national questions from its programme’, since the differences 
between workers of different countries are ‘still too great for them to unite on the 
basis of one political and antireligious programme’ (ibid.: pp. 162, 163). Their aim, he 
states, is ‘to unite the oppressed and the exploited workers of the civilised world in 
one common effort’ (ibid.: p. 162) – an effort which would be undermined by a lack of 
cohesion so easily brought about by the forces of nationalism and religious or 
cultural sectarianism. This was a point on which he had been adamant before he 
joined the International in 1868. In his ‘Revolutionary Catechism’ (1866), he argued 
that ‘there should no longer be isolated revolutions, but a universal, worldwide 
revolution’, and that national rivalries and hostilities ‘must now be transformed into 
the unified, common, and universal interest of the revolution, which alone can assure 
the freedom and independence of each nation by the solidarity of all’ (ibid.: p.. 95-
96). 
Bakunin thus recognised that the more cohesion enjoyed by the international 
workers’ movement, the stronger and more effective it would prove in organising for 
workers’ rights in the short term and agitating for social revolution in the long term. 
However, Bakunin recognises that the aspect of cohesion alone is insufficient to his 
concept of working class solidarity. As we have seen, the willingness to cooperate 
that is embodied by the notion of cohesion naturally implies an obligation on the part 
of individual members not to undermine the collective effort for the sake of their own 
personal gain. And, indeed, whilst Bakunin accepts that nationalism and various 
other cultural factors could undermine the group-solidarity of the international 
proletariat, he is also at pains to warn against the dangers of tendencies towards 
individualism. 
Fraternity 
Fraternity and solidarity are often treated as onomasiologically interchangeable, as 
two terms which signify the same concept. Here, however, in order to analyse the 
internal morphology of Bakunin’s concept of solidarity, I will follow Segall’s assertion 
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that fraternity in fact constitutes a sub-conceptual component of the concept of 
group-solidarity (Segall, 2003: p. 22). 
Bakunin’s anti-individualism can be instructively framed as a notion of fraternity if we 
understand the latter as a reluctance (or even, one might suggest, a refusal) to 
accept any personal advantages which come at the expense of or may cause 
damage to the collective effort of the group. If we look again to Bakunin’s writings on 
‘The Policy of the International’, then the component of fraternity can quite clearly be 
identified within his concept of solidarity. When outlining the criteria for enrolment in 
the International, Bakunin insists that prospective members must pledge ‘to 
subordinate [their] personal and family interests as well as [their] political and 
religious beliefs to the supreme interests of our association’ and ‘never to 
compromise with the bourgeoisie for [their] own personal gain’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 
162). This requirement clearly constitutes an explicit commitment to refrain from 
undermining the collective effort through the pursuit of individual interests; as such, it 
amounts to a demand for fraternity. Bakunin goes on to reiterate this demand, 
insisting that members must never ‘satisfy [their] vanity by displaying [their] disdain 
for the rank and file’, for to do so would be characteristic of ‘the bourgeois’ who 
‘shuns the collectivity’, whilst, conversely, ‘the proletarian seeks only the solidarity of 
all who work and are exploited by capitalism’ (ibid.). Further, he argues, members 
must always ‘remain faithful to the solidarity of labour’, and that ‘The least betrayal of 
this solidarity will be considered by the International as the greatest crime that any 
worker could commit’ (ibid.). In this sense, fraternity constitutes a key component of 
Bakunin’s concept of solidarity, and whilst he hopes for its realisation by the 
international proletariat, he simultaneously laments its absence in bourgeois culture. 
In his ‘Three Lectures to Swiss Members of the International’ (1871), Bakunin argues 
for the collective ‘enjoyment’ of wealth on the basis of its collective production, a 
notion he insists is precisely ‘what bourgeois economy does not want, what it 
hatefully resists. It wants individuals to enjoy [the fruits of collective labour] 
separately’7 (Bakunin, 1992: p. 58). For Bakunin, a system whereby wealth in society 
(conceived as the product of collective labour) is seen as a prize for which 
individuals compete against one another is precisely the opposite of that which is 
                                                          
7
 Separately, but not equally, of course: ‘It grants [the enjoyment of wealth] to the powerful, the 
intelligent, the cunning, and the wealthy … the wealthy above all’ (Bakunin, 1992: pp. 58-59). 
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obtained by fraternity, which insists upon the negation of individual gain should it 
come at the expense of other members. As such, he condemns such individualism in 
no uncertain terms as ‘that tendency which considers all members of society, the 
mass of individuals, to be mutually unconcerned rivals and competitors’ and ‘which 
impels the individual to gain and erect his own well-being, prosperity and good 
fortune to the disadvantage of everyone else’  (ibid.: p. 57). Bakunin recognises the 
social damage that is inevitably wrought by such an ideology and, moreover, he 
does so in terms which pertain to the morphological importance of the notion of 
fraternity within the concept of solidarity, characterising bourgeois society as a 
‘fratricidal struggle’ that constitutes ‘a continuous crime against human solidarity’ 
(ibid.). To deliberately pursue one’s own enrichment and personal gain at the 
expense of others is the very antithesis of fraternity and, as such, it contributes to the 
erosion of group-solidarity more generally.  
Within the context of the politics of class struggle, the absence of fraternity is thus 
inevitably detrimental to the collective effort, which is why Bakunin places such 
emphasis on it in his writings on the International. Indeed, he conceives of fraternity 
as a guarantor of class solidarity, as an essential element of its realisation. In his 
address to Swiss members of the International, he praises his audience for their 
nobility and generosity: by joining ‘this vast association of labour which will liberate 
the workers of the entire world’, Bakunin says, members ‘prove thereby that [they] 
are thinking not just of [themselves] but of the millions of [their] brothers who are 
much more oppressed and less prosperous’ (ibid.: p. 61). Indeed, it is clear that 
Bakunin sees this subjugation of personal gain to the collective effort as an 
intrinsically fraternal act which in turn contributes to the solidarity of the group (the 
working class). He goes on to describe membership of the International as an ‘act of 
unselfish and fraternal solidarity’ (ibid.). 
Collective responsibility 
After cohesion and fraternity, the third component of group-solidarity is collective 
responsibility. Collective responsibility, as Segall understands it, involves a 
willingness to bear responsibility for the well-being of other group members. He 
rightly identifies two contrasting ways in which the notion of responsibility might be 
decontested in relation to group-solidarity: (i) forward-looking responsibility-as-task 
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(i.e. responsibility for ensuring that a certain state of affairs obtains, such as that of a 
parent for ensuring that their children are cared for); (ii) backward-looking 
responsibility-as-liability (i.e. responsibility for the consequences of the actions of 
another, such as that borne by a parent (financially) in the event that their child 
breaks an item for sale in a shop (Segall, 2003: pp. 16-17). Segall contends that, 
although the first type, responsibility-as-task, is ‘no doubt pertinent to solidarity’, it is 
the second type, responsibility-as-liability, that is essential to the concept of group-
solidarity, since a group’s solidaristic willingness ‘to share a mutual fate with fellow 
members’ implies that ‘they are also willing to be held collectively liable for certain 
undesired eventualities that may befall individual members’ (ibid.: p. 17). However, 
although it is clear that either or both of these decontestations of collective 
responsibility may constitute important components of a concept of group-solidarity, 
it is evident that in Bakunin’s writings, the former, forward-looking responsibility-as-
task, is heavily preferred. As such, I shall focus here solely on the way in which 
forward-looking responsibility-as-task contributes to the internal morphology of 
Bakunin’s concept of class solidarity. 
Referring again to Bakunin’s writings on the International, it is clear that the notion of 
collective responsibility is central to his thinking in relation to the way in which class 
solidarity should manifest itself within the organisation and amongst the proletariat 
more generally. Further, this notion refers both to the group-solidarity of the masses 
within the political context of class struggle and to a post-revolutionary strategy 
whereby class solidarity remains crucial for the consolidation of revolutionary 
principles and practices. In his 1868 pamphlet on ‘The Organisation of the 
International’, Bakunin locates the potential for social transformation at the 
intersection between, on the one hand, workers’ material oppression, and on the 
other, the development of ‘the new social philosophy’ based on the principles of 
‘equality, liberty and worldwide solidarity’ (Bakunin, 1992: p. 137). Bakunin argues 
that, due to their poverty as individuals, workers have naturally ‘always sought well-
being in solidarity’ (ibid.: p. 138 – emphasis added) and that the provision of welfare 
for all is a collective concern. Indeed, in his ‘Programme of the International 
Brotherhood’8 (1869), Bakunin insisted that the ‘welfare of each’ could only be 
                                                          
8
 The ‘International Brotherhood’ or ‘Secret Alliance’ was, according to Sam Dolgoff, formally 
dissolved early in 1869. Although Bakunin denied its existence, and despite the lack of any real formal 
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realised ‘through the solidarity of all’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 149), indicating a clear 
preference for a form of group-solidarity that prioritises collective responsibility for 
the wellbeing of individual members. In his pamphlet ‘Geneva’s Double Strike’ 
(1869),9 whilst arguing for the expansion of the International, Bakunin also reminds 
members of the importance of solidarity in relation to the practical measures implied 
by collective responsibility. ‘Let us build our solidarity in study, in labour, in public 
action, and in life’, he urges, ‘Let us become partners in common ventures to make 
our life together more bearable and less difficult’ (Bakunin, 1992: p. 148). Bakunin 
thus clearly recognised the central importance of collective responsibility to the 
realisation of group-solidarity and by urging for its practice in all areas of activity, his 
purpose was to ensure some degree of material improvement to workers’ everyday 
lives. Indeed, this emphasis on collective responsibility for the welfare of group 
members permeates Bakunin’s writings on the practical questions of social 
organisation. In his ‘Revolutionary Catechism’ (1866),10 whilst outlining the 
fundamental principles and programme of action for libertarian-socialist revolution, 
he draws up a series of ‘Individual rights’, the safeguarding of which is a matter for 
collective responsibility. They include: ‘The right of every man and woman, from birth 
to adulthood, to complete upkeep, clothes, food, shelter, care, guidance, education 
… all at the expense of society’ and ‘The equal right of adolescents, while freely 
choosing their careers, to be helped and to the greatest possible extent supported by 
society’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 79). Similarly, in his ‘Programme of the International 
Brotherhood’, Bakunin insists upon the collective responsibility of ‘the commune’ for 
the provision of ‘the strict necessities of life to all the individuals so dispossessed [by 
the expropriation of private property]’ (ibid.: p. 153). In Bakunin’s scheme the welfare 
and development of individual members of the group (constituted by the working 
class in the context of class struggle and by the commune in a post-revolutionary 
society) are matters for which the collective as a whole is responsible. Bakunin thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
organisation, there was, says Dolgoff, ‘undoubtedly an informal group of “advanced men” adhering to 
Bakunin’s ideas’ (in Bakunin, 2002: p. 148). 
9
 The two strikes to which Bakunin refers were staged by stonecutters and bricklayers in March 1869, 
over the failure of employers to honour a previously agreed pay-scale, and were supported by 
workers across the building trades. The strikes’ significance, argues Robert Cutler, ‘lies in the fact of 
solidarity, previously undemonstrated among the different trades, and in the support they received 
from the IWMA’ (in Bakunin, 1992: p. 212). 
10
 Along with the ‘National Catechism’, Bakunin’s ‘Revolutionary Catechism’ is considered by many to 
constitute, as his biographer H. E. Kaminski put it, ‘the spiritual foundation of the entire anarchist 
movement’ (Kaminski, 1938: pp. 213-214). 
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deploys a notion of forward-looking responsibility-as-task. It is the collective 
responsibility of the group to ensure that the wellbeing of all members is catered for. 
Although the scope of ‘wellbeing’ is not fully elaborated by Bakunin, he does suggest 
that it refers to more than the satisfaction of basic necessities; it concerns a full and 
rounded education and the provision of an environment conducive to individual 
flourishing. Of course, such a notion of collective responsibility is ‘forward-looking’, 
since it is a form of responsibility that refers to the process (or task) of ensuring that 
a particular set of circumstances obtains. 
Class solidarity as group-solidarity: conceptual morphology 
I have examined here in some detail Bakunin’s second use of solidarity (class 
solidarity). This analysis has shed light on a number of details concerning the way in 
which this concept operates within Bakunin’s ideological morphology and has also 
sought to capture the internal morphological structure of the concept itself. In the 
same way that natural solidarity is morphologically dependent upon the adjacent 
concept of natural law, class solidarity is reliant upon the proximity of the concept of 
class struggle. By its proximity to solidarity, class struggle affects the configuration of 
solidarity’s sub-conceptual components in a certain way which allows it to be 
deployed as class solidarity. Namely, it allows for an emphasis to be placed on the 
three components of cohesion, fraternity and collective responsibility, all of which 
facilitate the manifestation of Bakunin’s ideology into an (albeit tentative and 
imprecise) practical policy programme. As explained in the analysis, the notion of 
cohesion – the willingness of group members to cooperate in pursuit of a common 
goal – is crucial since it signals the strength-in-unity that allows for the effective 
organisation of and political agitation by working-class organisations such as the 
IWMA and, indeed, by the proletariat generally. The notion of fraternity – the 
unwillingness of members to accept personal advantages at the expense of the 
collective – serves to reinforce the collective effort of the masses in their struggle 
against the bourgeoisie. The notion of collective responsibility allows for group-
solidarity to be translated into a set of practical measures that specify the wellbeing 
of individual group members as a matter of communal concern. 
All three of these components are fundamental to the idea of group-solidarity; all 
three must be exercised by a group if it is to be considered ‘substantially solidaristic’, 
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as Segall puts it (Segall, 2003: p. 15). Whilst each characteristic can exist separately 
to the others, none is sufficient in itself to constitute group-solidarity. When a sense 
of group-solidarity is present the morphological interlinkage of the three components 
is self-evident. Solidarity inevitably implies some form of non-instrumental concern 
for the wellbeing of others; this concern gives rise to cohesion, or the willingness to 
cooperate with other group members in order to advance the common good. This 
willingness in turn signals a commitment to refrain from the pursuit of individual 
interests at the expense of the collective effort – fraternity. The mutual concern for 
the wellbeing of fellow members also produces a feeling of collective responsibility 
for the provision and maintenance of that wellbeing (ibid.). The above discussion 
captures the manner in which this interlinkage works in Bakunin’s ideology and the 
prominence of all three components – cohesion, fraternity and collective 
responsibility – indicates a clear preference for a group-solidarity of the working 
class. Whilst this form of solidarity is necessarily oppositional and exclusive within a 
context of class struggle politics, it retains importance in a post-revolutionary 
scenario in which the consolidation of libertarian-socialist principles is prioritised.  
Thus far we have examined the two uses of solidarity evident in Bakunin’s writings. 
We have seen how each of these uses is dependent upon solidarity’s interlinkage 
with a different adjacent concept: the first – natural solidarity – with natural law; the 
second – class solidarity – with class struggle. By virtue to solidarity’s proximity to 
either of these two adjacent concepts at any one time, the components that make up 
the concept take on a particular configuration. When deployed in conjunction with 
natural law, solidarity is decontested as mutual recognition and is identifiable as 
natural solidarity. When used with reference to the notion of class struggle, the 
components of cohesion, fraternity and collective responsibility attain prominence, 
and the concept is recognisable as class solidarity. Whilst the analysis has hitherto 
been concentrated on a very small area of Bakunin’s ideological morphology – on 
the internal morphology of his concept of solidarity – in the following section we shall 
consider the place that the concept occupies within that morphology on a wider 
scale. The intention is to establish the way in which Bakunin’s concept of solidarity is 
interlinked with his other core concepts, and remark upon how their mutual proximity 
affects the decontestation of each and the articulation of his ideology generally. 
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Liberté, egalité, solidarité? 
According to socialist historian G. D. H. Cole, Bakunin’s social theory ‘began, and 
almost ended, with liberty’ (Cole, 1954: p. 219). It is clear that, for Bakunin, liberty 
represents a value to prize above all else; it is a core concept that forms the central 
focus of his ideology. In ‘The Paris Commune and the Idea of the State’ (1871), 
Bakunin famously declares himself a ‘fanatical lover of liberty’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 
261) and, indeed, the attainment, preservation and affirmation of a genuine concept 
of human freedom11 characterises virtually all of his theoretical writings. But freedom 
constitutes only one corner of a conceptual triangle which serves as the 
morphological foundation on which Bakunin’s ideology is constructed. Within his 
ideological morphology, freedom sits in close proximity to the core concepts of 
solidarity and equality so that the decontestation of each is influenced heavily by the 
presence of the others. Indeed, these three concepts display a high degree of 
morphological interdependence and Bakunin himself is insistent that none can be 
realised in the absence of any one of the others. In 1871 he wrote that: 
Social solidarity is the first human law; freedom is the second law. Both laws 
interpenetrate and are inseparable from each other, thus constituting the very 
essence of humanity. Thus freedom is not the negation of solidarity; on the contrary it 
represents the development of, and so to speak, the humanisation of the latter 
(Bakunin, 1964: pp. 339-340) 
Bakunin asserts that, far from contradicting one another (as in the classical liberal 
conception), solidarity and freedom actually constitute necessary conditions for one 
another’s realisation. In his sprawling, mostly unpublished text ‘The Knouto-
Germanic Empire and the Social Revolution’ Bakunin insists that liberty is ‘an 
eminently social matter, which can only be realised by means of society and through 
the strictest equality and solidarity of each and everybody’ (Bakunin, 1973: p. 149). 
Bakunin himself is clearly well aware of the interdependence of these three 
concepts, and as a result their morphological interlinkage is plainly discernible in his 
writings. Further, the relationship between Bakunin’s core concepts has important 
implications for the peculiar ways in which each of them is decontested, so it is worth 
mapping out the pattern of the concepts’ interlinkage in some detail, paying particular 
                                                          
11
 I use the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ interchangeably throughout. 
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attention to the manner in which the decontestation of solidarity is affected, and the 
morphological impact of solidarity on the other concepts. 
Two concepts of freedom 
Bakunin offers both a negative and a positive conception of freedom. For him, 
‘freedom, from the positive point of view’, consists in ‘the development, as complete 
as possible, of all faculties which man has within himself’ (Bakunin, 1964: p. 271). By 
contrast, ‘from the negative point of view’, freedom is ‘the independence of the will of 
everyone from the will of others’ (ibid.). The latter refers to the non-interference with 
or non-coercion of individuals and therefore ‘consists in the rebellion of the human 
individual against all authority, whether divine or human, collective or individual’ 
(Bakunin, 1973: p. 149). The former, positive conception is expressed in ‘the full 
development and full enjoyment of all human faculties and powers in every man’ and 
is an ‘eminently social matter, which can only be realised through the strictest 
equality and solidarity of each and everybody’ (ibid.). It is clear that Bakunin deploys 
the concept of freedom in two quite discrete ways, and, as the above quotation 
demonstrates, he did so consciously and explicitly. Broadly speaking, Bakunin’s ‘two 
concepts of liberty’ accord to the eponymous typology advanced a century later by 
Isaiah Berlin (see Berlin, 1969). (Incidentally, Berlin does not acknowledge Bakunin’s 
contribution, despite having read him and written on him some years prior to 
developing his own formulation.) Bakunin’s negative concept of liberty naturally 
emphasises a freedom from external coercion or interference by a social body, 
rather than any positive notions concerning a substantive freedom to attain certain 
goals, realise certain potentialities or exercise certain social functions. Let us first 
examine Bakunin’s negative conception of freedom, expressed as follows: 
[Negative] Freedom is the absolute right of every man and woman to seek no other 
sanction for their acts than their own conscience and their own reason, being 
responsible first to themselves and then to the society which they have voluntarily 
accepted (Bakunin, 2002: p. 76) 
Although formulated in a positive manner (in the sense that it involves a process of 
positive decision-making on the part of the individual), this conception clearly 
expresses a preference for negative freedom, for the non-interference with the will of 
the individual by external agents. However, as George Crowder recognises, 
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Bakunin’s concept of negative freedom does not equate to an unqualified or 
complete absence of ‘any human impediment whatsoever’ (Crowder, 1991: p. 129). 
Indeed, for Bakunin such an extreme or absolute decontestation of negative freedom 
would carry deeply troubling social consequences, for it would effectively amount to 
the complete isolation of the individual and thus, given Bakunin’s conception of the 
individual as a product of society, to an absence of freedom as such. For life outside 
of society, completely free of social influences, argues Bakunin, ‘is tantamount to 
intellectual, moral and material death’ (Bakunin, 1964: p. 169). It is precisely such a 
notion of freedom that supports contractarian justifications of government such as 
that proposed by Rousseau, whereby the absolute enjoyment of individual freedom 
in the state of nature becomes restricted when individuals enter into society in 
exchange for the protection of some fundamental rights by the state. Of course, 
Bakunin repeatedly and vociferously opposes social contract theory, and in 
dismissing that which he sees as the myth of the state of nature he simultaneously 
rejects the notion of absolute negative liberty (essentially a theoretical fallacy) that 
upholds it and consequently the principal philosophical grounds for a freedom-
limiting state (Crowder, 1991: p. 129).  
As such, when Bakunin declares himself ‘a fanatical lover of liberty’, he is eager to 
distance his conception from those whereby negative liberty consists in absolute 
non-coercion in a state of nature, or as limited non-coercion by a political state. 
Bakunin expressly rejects ‘that freedom which is purely formal, doled out, measured 
and regulated by the State’, and he dismisses the Rousseauian and ‘bourgeois 
liberal’ conceptions of negative freedom as ‘individualistic, egotistical, malicious and 
illusory’ on the grounds that they consider ‘the so-called rights of everyone, 
represented by the State as the limit of the rights of each individual’ (Bakunin, 1973: 
p. 196). For Bakunin, the state constitutes a form of artificial authority that is 
fundamentally incompatible with his own negative conception of liberty and it is on 
this basis that his original and enduring anarchist critique of the state is founded. The 
state, by its very nature, argues Bakunin, ‘is the most flagrant, the most cynical, and 
the most complete negation of humanity’, which ‘shatters the universal solidarity of 
all men on the earth’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 133). The state, he asserts, constitutes not 
only a violation of individual liberty, but also undermines ‘the natural and inevitable 
solidarity … which binds all men together’ (Bakunin, 1970: p. 43n). For Bakunin, this 
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solidarity has not previously been fully manifest because social life has been based 
on ‘worship of divinity, not on respect for humanity; on authority, not on liberty; on 
privilege, not on equality; on the exploitation, not the brotherhood of men; on iniquity 
and falsehood, not on justice and truth’ (ibid.). 
In order to understand Bakunin’s negative conception of freedom, we must return to 
his theory of natural law. Whilst negative freedom for Bakunin does indeed consist in 
the non-coercion of the individual by external social agents (which amounts to 
artificial or political authority), it does not negate the influence of natural and social 
laws. It is important to reiterate at this juncture the fundamental distinction between 
natural and social laws on the one hand and political laws on the other. The former 
exist ‘independently of all human will’, constitute ‘the very life of Nature and society’, 
and impel our ‘involuntary and inevitable obedience’ (Bakunin, 1964: p. 168). 
Conversely, the latter comprise ‘authoritarian, arbitrary, political, religious, and civil 
laws’ which are created by the dominant classes in order to ‘enable exploitation of 
the work of the masses’ and which have ‘the sole aim of curbing the liberty of the 
masses’ (ibid.). So according to Bakunin’s concept of negative liberty, freedom 
consists in the absence of those artificial, political laws, not in the complete lack of 
laws or social restrictions per se. Indeed, as Richard Saltman observes, Bakunin’s 
conception of freedom rests upon his theory of mutual influence and natural law as 
the only legitimate forms of authority (Saltman, 1983: pp. 31-39). For Bakunin, 
Saltman rightly attests, ‘nature’ consists of the summation of all of the processes of 
cause and effect, all of the relationships which occur in the physical and social 
worlds (ibid.: p. 34). Society, as ‘the basis and natural starting-point of man’s human 
existence’ (Bakunin, 1973: p. 145) is, like the rest of nature, governed by natural 
laws. The ‘natural influence of society’ represents a legitimate authority, argues 
Bakunin, since society is the natural mode of human existence. To rebel against 
society – conceived, of course as a separate entity from the state – thus represents 
an absurd impossibility, since, in order to do so, one ‘must at least partially rebel 
against himself, for … he himself is only a product of society’ (ibid.: p. 150). The 
process of ‘mutual interaction’, as Saltman puts it, thus represents one of the key 
natural laws on which human society is founded and is therefore also a crucial factor 
in the production of individuals and of their liberty (Saltman, 1983: p. 36). The 
necessity of mutual influence, of interdependence in the production and maintenance 
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of the individual, he argues, ‘led Bakunin to refer to the “natural and social law of 
human solidarity”’ and to argue ‘that such influence was “the very basis” of human 
solidarity’ (ibid.: p. 37). 
Saltman’s observations point to significant patterns in Bakunin’s thought which 
should be considered important in relation to the present analysis. Earlier, we saw 
that Bakunin conceives of solidarity as a natural law – a characterisation supported 
by Saltman’s reading. In conceptualising solidarity as a natural law, Bakunin seeks to 
present it as an innate characteristic of human social behaviour. In contrast to those 
solidarities which are imposed by a central, arbitrary authority, or which come into 
conflict with the liberty of the individual, Bakunin is therefore able to claim – at least 
within a framework that acknowledges the separation of natural authority from its 
artificial counterpart (the state, church, etc.) – that his notion of solidarity represents 
a legitimate basis for a future anarchistic social order. As noted by Saltman, 
‘Through the application … of Nature’s central principle to human society, Bakunin 
believed he had generated a firm natural-law foundation for his conception of 
solidarity. Human solidarity, in turn, became the cornerstone of Bakunin’s 
understanding of human freedom’ (ibid.). Through its basis in natural law, Bakunin’s 
concept of natural solidarity is partially decontested in such a way that its interlinkage 
with the concept of liberty becomes both morphologically viable and necessary. 
Viable, because of the conceptual robustness acquired by solidarity through its 
grounding in natural law; necessary, because of the inter-conceptual reliance that 
occurs between the concepts of liberty and solidarity. For without liberty, in Bakunin’s 
view, there can be no solidarity, since the natural diversity of humankind, which 
constitutes a key harmonising factor in society cannot be fully realised. This diversity, 
Bakunin argues, makes ‘humanity … a collective whole in which the one individual 
complements all the others and needs them’ (Bakunin, 1992: p. 117). ‘As a result’, 
he continues, ‘this infinite diversity of human individuals is the fundamental cause 
and the very basis of their solidarity’ (ibid.).  In other words, in the absence of 
genuine personal and social freedom, individuals are unable to develop their unique 
potentialities which are fundamental to the cultivation of social interdependence and 
subsequently solidarity. Equally, without solidarity, there is no liberty, since the 
individual is only able to attain freedom, as Saltman puts it, ‘in and through the social 
collective’ (Saltman, 1983: p. 37). Indeed, as we saw earlier, freedom for Bakunin 
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necessarily occurs socially; it is attained only through the recognition of others: 
‘Being free for man means being acknowledged, considered and treated as such by 
another man, and by all the men around him’ (Bakunin, 1973: p. 147). Freedom must 
occur universally: ‘I am only properly free’, argues Bakunin, ‘when all the men and 
women about me are equally free’; it is therefore realised only through ‘the strictest 
equality and solidarity of each and everybody’ (ibid.: pp. 148-149). Bakunin’s notion 
of individual liberty through social solidarity is thus logical, rather than contradictory 
in nature (Saltman, 1983: p. 38). It is clear that Bakunin himself explicitly stresses 
the importance of the structural relationship between solidarity and liberty. Indeed, in 
Bakunin’s political thought, the two concepts are inextricable from one another and, 
morphologically speaking, they represent a crucial part of his ideological core. 
As we have seen, Bakunin emphasises the need to depart from the notion of 
coercive, top-down or state-sanctioned solidarity which by definition inhibits 
individual liberty. He stresses here that the natural condition is not – as in liberal 
conceptions – for the needs and interests of one individual to compete with and to 
impede those of others. Such divisions are artificial, a result of the perpetuation of 
material inequalities which are guaranteed under a capitalist economic system and in 
a society dominated by state power. In fact, argues Bakunin, it is more natural for the 
interests of individuals to correlate, to be characterised by solidarity. The aim of 
social revolution is therefore to ‘Make all needs really solidary, and cause the 
material and social interests of each to conform to the human duties of each’ 
(Bakunin, 1970: p. 43n). When the broad interests of each member of society are in 
accordance rather than in contradiction, the likelihood of social conflict is greatly 
reduced. As such, whilst social division is rooted in material inequality and 
exploitation, social solidarity is dependent upon a level of equality, which Bakunin 
sees as a precondition for freedom as well as solidarity. 
Indeed, Bakunin insists that ‘equality is an absolutely necessary condition for 
freedom’, going on to specify three types of equality: political, social and economic 
(Bakunin, 1992: pp. 48-49). As with liberty, Bakunin forwards a dismissive critique of 
the conception of equality as embodied in the French-revolutionary formula: liberté, 
egalité, fraternité. This form of equality, argues Bakunin, refers to a solely political 
equality (equality before the law and equality of political rights) which has no basis in 
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economic and social equality and thus amounts to no genuine equality at all (ibid.). 
For although all citizens are officially equal, whilst the lowliest and poorest in society 
technically have the same political rights as the most wealthy and most learned, they 
do not have the necessary means to fully exercise those rights. Equality in its truest 
sense, argues Bakunin, is inevitably a social and economic concept, which involves 
‘the equalisation of personal wealth’ and demands ‘a society so organised that every 
single human being will … find therein equal means, first for maintenance and 
education, and later, for the exercise of all his natural capacities and aptitudes’ 
(Bakunin, 2002: p. 88). It is only on the basis of a fundamental economic or material 
equality that equality in the social and political realms can become a reality. Further, 
as we have said, for Bakunin, equality constitutes an essential precondition of both 
liberty and solidarity. Whilst he insists that ‘freedom is only possible through equality’ 
(Bakunin, 1992: p. 48), he is equally adamant that ‘solidarity … has for its essential 
basis equality’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 285). He reasserts this interdependence in his 
‘Letter to the Comrades of the Jura Federation’, writing that without the ‘great and all-
embracing principle of the people’s liberty … equality and solidarity would be 
falsehoods’ (ibid.: p. 353).  
Solidarity, liberty and equality thus constitute a conceptual trio within the core of 
Bakunin’s ideology. Any one of those concepts would, by its removal, precipitate the 
collapse of Bakunin’s ideology, make it unrecognisable as the collectivist brand of 
anarchism with which his name has come to be associated. The three concepts are 
morphologically interlinked to the extent that the decontestation of each is shaped by 
the proximity of the other two. Accordingly, as we have seen, solidarity, liberty and 
equality display a high degree of morphological interdependence. As normative 
values, they are only realisable and able to flourish in the presence of one another, a 
notion of which Bakunin was patently aware himself. Specifically, the position of 
solidarity within his ideology is crucial. As we have seen, in Bakunin’s scheme, 
natural solidarity can only be manifest in conditions of perfect liberty and equality 
whereby individuals are able to develop their own peculiar potentialities and thus 
contribute to a natural interdependence through diversity. Equally, genuine liberty is 
unattainable without the social framework provided by natural solidarity, since we 
cannot be free in isolation. Neither can we be free in the absence of equality, since 
freedom is necessarily a freedom of equals. According to the principle of mutual 
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recognition, if one person is ‘freer’ than another, then neither can in fact be truly free. 
Equality enjoys a similar interrelationship with solidarity. Whilst equality cannot be 
preserved if we forgo solidarity in favour of individualism, solidarity itself is 
impossible but for the equalisation of individuals’ interests that is produced by an 
egalitarian distribution – or, more properly, a collective ownership – of resources, 
rights and opportunities.  
Conclusion 
I have presented in this chapter a detailed analysis of Bakunin’s core concept of 
solidarity. In doing so, I have characterised it as comprising four components in 
addition to the ineliminable core of the individual-collective bond: mutual recognition; 
cohesion; fraternity and collective responsibility. The morphology of Bakunin’s 
concept of solidarity is displayed in Figure 1: 
 
I have said that Bakunin uses solidarity in two distinct ways. The first usage, which I 
call ‘natural solidarity’, refers to a social relation produced by human beings’ 
fundamental need for recognition by others within their community. Heavily 
influenced by Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, Bakunin conceives of natural solidarity 
as the inevitable product of our innate need to be acknowledged as human beings 
and to acknowledge others as such. This need gives rise to a social 
interdependence which in turn provides the basis for an ethical community of self-
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Figure 1: Bakunin's concept of solidarity 
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conscious, free and equal individuals. Bakunin characterises solidarity in this sense 
as one of many natural laws which dictate all that persists in the natural and social 
worlds. When used in this way, solidarity is dependent upon the adjacent concept of 
natural law, and its sub-conceptual component of mutual recognition becomes 
prominent. Natural solidarity is universal in scope and thus non-oppositional, since 
all individuals are subject to the need for recognition. As such, it applies to society 
generally, to a global or human community, rather than to smaller social groups. 
Figure 2 displays Bakunin’s usage of solidarity as natural solidarity: 
 
I labelled Bakunin’s second use of solidarity ‘class solidarity’. Class solidarity is that 
which is exercised by the proletariat (or, rather, by the masses generally) in its 
historic struggle against the bourgeoisie. In contrast to natural solidarity, which is 
universal and non-oppositional, class solidarity is a form of group-solidarity that is 
both exclusive and oppositional. The morphological configuration of solidarity when 
used in this way is dependent upon the adjacent concept of class struggle, which 
emphasises three key sub-conceptual components within solidarity: cohesion, 
fraternity and collective responsibility. The former, cohesion, refers to group 
members’ willingness to cooperate in pursuit of a common goal and contributes to 
the group’s increased capacity for resistance of external pressures. In Bakunin’s 
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Figure 2: Bakunin's usage of solidarity as natural solidarity 
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scheme, this component is manifest in the organisation and mobilisation of 
international working-class solidarity and a preference for cooperation between 
workers’ organisations in all nations. For Bakunin, this cooperation is fundamental to 
the execution of an effective class struggle strategy. Bakunin also stresses the 
importance of fraternity, which consists in a refusal by group members to accept or 
retain advantages at the expense of the wider group. He insists in various writings, 
particularly in those on the policy of the International Working Men’s Association, 
upon the need for members to subordinate personal self-interest to the collective 
effort. The notion of collective responsibility for group members’ well-being is also 
key to the decontestation of class solidarity. Indeed, Bakunin consistently 
emphasises the point that individuals’ well-being and education should be provided 
for by the collective. Bakunin’s second usage of solidarity – as class solidarity – is 
displayed in Figure 3: 
 
The analysis also located Bakunin’s concept of solidarity in relation to his other core 
concepts of liberty and equality. These three concepts display a high level of 
interdependence, to the extent that none is able to flourish in the absence of the 
other two. Solidarity is dependent upon liberty, for without the latter individuals are 
unable to realise the unique potentialities which contribute to diversity and thus 
social interdependence. At the same time, solidarity is a necessary condition for 
individual liberty, since for Bakunin the individual can only achieve freedom through 
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Figure 3: Bakunin’s usage of solidarity as class solidarity 
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the recognition of his fellow human beings. Recognition necessarily occurs between 
equal individuals, for no one individual can enjoy more freedom than another without 
negating freedom as such. Both solidarity and liberty are thus also interconnected 
with and dependent upon the concept of equality. Indeed, the interdependence of 
these three core concepts is such that any one of them – not least solidarity – by its 
removal causes the collapse of Bakunin’s ideology. To paraphrase Bakunin himself: 
liberty without solidarity is privilege and injustice; solidarity without liberty is slavery 
and despotism.
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4. Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity 
‘The social animals … are guided almost exclusively … 
by special instincts in the aid which they give to the 
members of the same community’ 
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man 
(Darwin, 2004: p. 132) 
‘If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of 
nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin’ 
     Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the ‘Beagle’ 
(Darwin, 1969: p. 500) 
This chapter examines the concept of solidarity in the work of Peter Kropotkin. 
Kropotkin is seen, almost without exception, as ‘the foremost anarchist theoretician 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century’ (McKay, 2014: p. 1). His 
contribution, argues Peter Marshall, served to give anarchism ‘a philosophical 
respectability at a time when it was increasingly being associated in the popular 
press with mindless terrorism’ (Marshall, 1993: p. 308). However, that is not to 
downplay Kropotkin’s involvement in revolutionary activism. As Ruth Kinna has 
observed, his occasional representation as an ‘arm-chair revolutionary’ and as a 
‘thinker rather than doer’ is misleading: Kropotkin was heavily involved in the 
international anarchist movement throughout his life, and, despite being in his 
seventies at the time, returned from exile to his native Russia in support of the 1917 
revolution (Kinna, 2014: p. 19). Nevertheless, he is best remembered for his written 
contributions, particularly Mutual Aid (1902), a work of popular science which 
demonstrated that cooperation was as important a factor of evolution as individual 
competition. 
The main goals of the chapter are to identify the idea-components which make up 
the micro-structure of Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity and to investigate the way in 
which these and the conceptual combinations which help to shape them contribute to 
a distinctive decontestation of the concept. Accordingly, it identifies several 
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components which serve to substantialise solidarity from its ineliminable core. These 
refer to the subject of the ineliminable component, to an evaluation of its desirability 
and to notions of community, shared identity, common interest and the social 
production of individuality. Some of these categories are logical corollaries of 
solidarity’s ineliminable component. Evaluations of solidarity’s desirability, or the 
concept’s subject, for instance, are inevitably brought into play by any attempt at 
elaborating on the individual-collective bond. However, whilst these categories must 
in some way be addressed by any concept of solidarity, logic does not determine the 
peculiar ways in which those areas of meaning are filled. It is not possible to logically 
deduce the subject of solidarity, for instance; we know only that a coherent concept 
must clearly specify a subject. This meaning is culturally determined, and culture 
pertains partly to a concept’s ideational environment, which is shaped by temporal 
and spatial factors to do with influential discourses and human agency (individual 
preference). Additional components, which do not fill logically necessary categories, 
but are equally important in the concept’s decontestation, are incorporated by this 
same process. 
The logically necessary categories are satisfied in the following ways. First, we see 
that Kropotkin operates according to a universally inclusive conception of the 
collective: the subject of his concept of solidarity is not limited to a specific group 
within society but is applicable to a global or human community. Second, we seek to 
explain the reasons why Kropotkin places such value on the concept of solidarity, 
concluding that they lie in the part played by cooperation in the development of 
species generally and particularly in the evolution of human moral conceptions. 
Third, the analysis turns its attention to additional features of Kropotkin’s concept of 
solidarity, arguing that the decontestation of the collective as universal is enabled by 
his notion of community. The aspect of community also serves to support the 
development of solidarity by bolstering the idea of a common interest and facilitating 
close social interaction. Fourth, the analysis explores the way in which Kropotkin’s 
concept of solidarity incorporates the notion of the social production of individuality. 
Kropotkin concludes that the development of the collective is an essential 
precondition of that of the individual. 
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The analysis proper is preceded by an investigation into the linguistic and conceptual 
relationship between the terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘mutual aid’ in order to establish the 
extent to which the two are interchangeable. Although the terms are not 
synonymous, Kropotkin’s notion of mutual aid constitutes an empirical manifestation 
of the abstract concept of solidarity. Consequently, the nature of the relationship 
between the two terms is such that for analytical purposes we can treat Kropotkin’s 
references to mutual aid as indicative of – but not equatable to – his concept of 
solidarity. 
Mutual Aid, Ethics and solidarity 
Although this analysis draws on various texts from across Kropotkin’s oeuvre, the 
two major texts drawn on most heavily in this chapter are Mutual Aid: A Factor of 
Evolution (1902) and Ethics: Origin and Development (1921). They have been 
selected because together they give the fullest exposition of Kropotkin’s concept of 
solidarity. Whilst the essence of Kropotkin’s thought is perhaps most coherently 
represented by Mutual Aid and Ethics along with The Conquest of Bread (Harrison, 
1993: p. viii), the latter of those texts is of a more prescriptive leaning and does not 
engage with the concept of solidarity at the same level of theoretical depth as some 
of his other works. Kropotin’s Ethics, however, is, in a sense, a continuation of his 
work on Mutual Aid. As noted in the translators’ note on the Ethics, ‘The basic ideas 
of the two books are closely connected, almost inseparable, in fact: the origin and 
progress of human relations in society’ (Friedland and Piroshnikoff, 1993: p. iii). 
These ‘basic ideas’ about the development of human society, I argue, can be linked 
by their fundamental reliance on the core concept of solidarity.  
Kropotkin’s central purpose in Mutual Aid is to prove, contrary to the social Darwinist 
thesis, that the factor of mutual aid is more important in the evolution of species than 
that of competition between individuals (Kropotkin, 2006: p. xviii). The linguistic link 
between the terms ‘mutual aid’ and solidarity is quite clear. But whilst both conjure 
impressions of cooperation, reciprocity and unity, this does not necessarily attest to 
their synonymy. Nevertheless, there is clearly some relationship between the two, 
whether it be directly onomasiological, or simply brought about through some shared 
area of meaning incorporated within each concept. In order to establish the nature of 
the relationship between mutual aid and solidarity we must examine their usage by 
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Kropotkin and attempt to unravel their specific applications. For although Kropotkin 
titled his book Mutual Aid, the text is scattered with references to solidarity. For 
example, in his preface to the 1914 edition, drawing on the recent and ongoing 
events of the First World War, Kropotkin asserts that, in spite of the impending 
wreckage, ‘we may still be sure that the teachings and traditions of human solidarity 
will, after all, emerge intact’ (Kropotkin, 2006: p. vii). This confidence is founded, he 
says, on the fact that, amidst the state-sanctioned slaughter, ‘we see thousands of 
manifestations of spontaneous mutual aid’: the offerings of food by local peasants to 
captured soldiers; the emergence of cooperative kitchens across France; the 
provision of aid to Belgium by the British and Americans and to Poland by the 
Russians; and, perhaps most tellingly, the tending of the wounded by thousands of 
men and women of all nations ‘without making distinction between friend and foe, 
officer or soldier’ (ibid.: pp. vii-ix). Indeed, Kropotkin’s final example puts one in mind 
of the British nurse Edith Cavell, who, as matron of a Red Cross hospital near 
Brussels, was known to nurse all soldiers regardless of military allegiance (Schafer, 
2005: p. 280). On the eve of her execution by firing squad for aiding the escape of 
Allied soldiers from German-occupied Belgium, Cavell famously pronounced that 
‘patriotism is not enough. I must have no hatred or bitterness towards anyone’ (in 
Knowles, 1999: p. 198).12 
The linguistic contexts in which Kropotkin uses the terms ‘mutual aid’ and ‘solidarity’ 
suggest that he sees them if not as synonymous then certainly as similar or closely 
related. Whilst solidarity is embodied in ‘teachings and traditions’, mutual aid 
appears as ‘spontaneous manifestations’. This would seemingly place solidarity at a 
higher level of abstraction than mutual aid, which, in its being expressed through 
human actions is more empirically verifiable. Further, it might suggest that actions of 
mutual aid are manifest expressions of a broader feeling of solidarity, or that 
solidarity is in some way more fundamental. This interpretation is supported by David 
Morland, whose reading of Kropotkin stipulates that ‘the construction of social 
relations’ facilitated by social solidarity (though Morland prefers the term ‘sociability’) 
‘by their very nature supply the bedrock of that which is known as mutual aid’ 
(Morland, 1997: p. 134). It is the human tendency for social solidarity that produces a 
                                                          
12
 It is worth noting, incidentally, that the Allied governments made effective use of Cavell’s death for 
propaganda purposes. Against her explicit wishes, she was made a martyr and the weeks following 
her execution saw a significant spike in military recruitment (Schafer, 2005: p. 80). 
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set of social relations that constitutes the supportive network within which mutual aid 
can occur. For without solidarity society cannot properly function, and without a 
functioning society mutual aid is deprived of its channel of expression. 
In his introduction to Mutual Aid, Kropotkin reviews the researches of a number of his 
contemporaries, some of whom had made tentative steps towards the suggestion 
that mutual aid has a role in species’ development. In doing so, he makes one 
particularly interesting criticism, which focuses on the tendency ‘to reduce animal 
sociability to love and sympathy’ (ibid.: p. xv). To view animal sociability in this way, 
says Kropotkin, is to underplay its ‘generality and its importance, just as human 
ethics based upon love and personal sympathy only have contributed to narrow the 
comprehension of the moral feeling as a whole’ (ibid.: p. xv). Indeed, it is not love 
which on finding a fellow human being – to whom one may be a complete stranger – 
in a situation of acute distress or danger impels one to rush to their aid. Rather, says 
Kropotkin, ‘it is a far wider, even though more vague feeling or instinct of human 
solidarity and sociability’ which moves one (ibid.: p. xv). For Kropotkin, then, 
solidarity amounts to much more than merely a feeling of love, or even sympathy. 
Whilst one feels love for those to whom one is close, for one’s friends and family, this 
same feeling cannot apply in situations of the type that Kropotkin cites. Rather, it is a 
deep-seated instinct that has been gradually developed in both animals and men 
through a long process of evolution (ibid.: p. xvi). The distinction is important, says 
Kropotkin, because although ‘love, sympathy and self-sacrifice’ have contributed to 
the development of our moral feelings, they do not constitute the bases of human 
society. Again, then, Kropotkin elevates his concept of solidarity to a level of 
generality which apparently distinguishes it from mutual aid, which by contrast is 
constituted in particular instances of human action. In the hypothetical scenario cited 
above, it is the feeling of solidarity which impels us to perform acts of mutual aid. 
This same thread runs throughout Kropotkin’s work. Indeed, in the introduction to the 
1922 edition of Kropotkin’s Ethics, it is emphasised by the Russian editor Lebedev 
that for Kropotkin, ‘in the world of moral relations solidarity is expressed in sympathy, 
in mutual aid, and in co-miseration’ (Lebedev, 1993: p. xv – sic.). This supports our 
initial hypothesis concerning the relationship between solidarity and mutual aid. 
Mutual aid and solidarity are not, then, onomasiologically related; they are not simply 
two different terms for the same concept. However, in framing their relationship to 
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one another in a certain way, in viewing acts of mutual aid as empirical 
manifestations of an abstract concept of solidarity, we gain a more sophisticated and 
instructive understanding of both.  
In his Ethics, Kropotkin sought to demonstrate that moral philosophy must be firmly 
rooted in the natural sciences. He termed his ethics ‘naturalistic’ (Harrison, 1993: p. 
ix), in that they rejected both metaphysics and the supernatural and assumed that 
the basis of human morality could be found by means of an inductive method 
informed by evolutionary theory. Ultimately, Kropotkin’s conclusion is that solidarity 
represents the basis of human moral conceptions. Indeed, it is argued by Lebedev 
that Kropotkin’s Ethics can be characterised as a teaching of ‘brotherhood’, but notes 
that Kropotkin himself ‘preferred the term solidarity’ (Lebedev, 1993: p. xiv). Volume I 
therefore consists in a history of moral philosophy in which Kropotkin evaluates the 
points at which progress has been made by various thinkers towards this end. 
However, Kropotkin’s Ethics were left unfinished at the time of his death, the great 
anarchist succumbing to pneumonia in 1921. His intention had been to follow up the 
first volume – itself incomplete – with his own theoretical statement on the origin and 
character of human beings’ moral principles and conceptions. Although this 
statement was never written, there is provision enough in Kropotkin’s critical survey 
in Volume I for a reconstruction of his own views on moral philosophy. As Andrew 
Harrison notes in his introduction to one edition of the Ethics, in laying out the history 
of intellectual development that had gone before, Kropotkin certainly presents a very 
clear impression of his own thoughts on the matter (Harrison, 1993: p. v; p. ix).  
 The crux of Kropotkin’s argument is that the moral feeling in human beings is 
derived from the feeling of sociality and the practice of mutual aid, rather than from 
any divine creator or other external source. The feeling of mutual sympathy 
engendered by social life, and our tendency to identify our own existence with that of 
the wider group inevitably lead to the development of a code of right and wrong, to 
the evolution of an ethical system. As in Mutual Aid, Kropotkin observes the way in 
which nearly all development and progress in both animal and human life is 
propelled by the extension of mutual aid and solidarity. In short, solidarity for 
Kropotkin constitutes the basis of morality. Given that it supports his theses on moral 
philosophy, it inevitably informs his political ideology also. Indeed, the role of the 
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concept of solidarity is such that it occupies a core position within Kropotkin’s 
morphology. We can learn more about the further shape and character of Kropotkin’s 
concept of solidarity from his critical account of the development of moral philosophy 
from the time of the thinkers of Ancient Greece onwards. While it is unnecessary to 
conduct a full exegesis of Kropotkin’s entire account, it is useful for us to examine 
the intellectual moments in time that he saw as holding particular importance.  
Kropotkin’s own interpretation of the work of various thinkers provides a relatively 
detailed impression of his own ethical system, and in particular the nature of his 
concept of solidarity and the place it holds in his morphology. 
The individual-collective bond 
We have said that the ineliminable component of the concept of solidarity is the 
individual-collective bond. Every known usage of solidarity employs this central 
feature, and, of course, as is evidenced at various points in his writings, Kropotkin’s 
is no different.  
In Mutual Aid, in a section devoted to a study of ‘Mutual Aid Among Savages’, 
Kropotkin notes the shift from the Rousseauian idealisation of human nature in the 
eighteenth century to the exaggerated notion of the ‘bestial savage’ promulgated by 
many of his own contemporaries. The reality, Kropotkin states, is that the ‘savage’ is 
neither ‘an ideal of virtue, nor is he an ideal of “savagery”’ (Kropotkin, 2006: p. 91). 
However, one characteristic of primitive humans, according to Kropotkin, is that they 
identify their own existence with that of the tribe. This quality has been developed 
and maintained by necessity in the struggle for existence; without it, Kropotkin says, 
humankind would not have attained its current level of development (ibid.). Herein 
lies a crucial link between Kropotkin’s notion of mutual aid and solidarity as a 
concept with an internally complex morphology. For here Kropotkin lays out in direct 
terms the ineliminable component contained in all conceptions of solidarity; he 
explicitly refers to the fundamental bond between the individual and the collective. In 
his Ethics, Kropotkin states that Darwin himself identified the instinct of ‘mutual 
sympathy’ as predominant and as the basis of the moral conscience. In the same 
instinct, Kropotkin argues, we find the origin of ‘feelings of benevolence’ and of 
‘partial identification of the individual with the group which are the starting-point of all 
the higher ethical feelings’ (Kropotkin, 1993: p. 16). Kropotkin thus highlights the 
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importance of the individual making a connection between their own identity and that 
of the wider group. According to Kropotkin the ‘higher representatives’ of each class 
of animals (humans amongst the mammals, for instance) exhibit higher levels of 
individual identification with the interests of the group. This, he claims, points to the 
natural origin of all ethical feelings. The fact that we observe more prominent 
tendencies of individual-collective identification amongst the more developed species 
suggests that the trait has been developed through a gradual process of evolution. 
As we have seen, the ineliminable component alone is insufficient to communicate a 
full concept. In isolation, the notion of the individual-collective bond tells us nothing 
substantial or interesting about Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity. In order to gain a 
full picture of Kropotkin’s concept we must ascertain the additional attributes that are 
secured to the ineliminable component and which furnish it with further meaning. 
These idea-components are determined by processes of logical and cultural 
adjacency. 
Universal inclusion 
One logically necessary category of meaning refers to the subject of the ineliminable 
component. In other words, in order to gain a full(er) understanding of Kropotkin’s 
concept we must establish who exactly is involved in the individual-collective bond. 
Or, more properly, we need to know the identity of the collective; of whom it is 
comprised. This aspect also gives rise to the questions (to be dealt with later on) of 
why and how the collective is comprised in such a way; what are the criteria for 
inclusion?   
In his introduction to Mutual Aid, Kropotkin, refers to the ‘conscience … of human 
solidarity’ as the ‘recognition of the force that is borrowed by each man from the 
practice of mutual aid; of the close dependency of every one’s happiness upon the 
happiness of all’ (Kropotkin, 2006: p. xvi). The suggestion here is that solidarity 
entails a widespread notion of interdependence, a social arrangement whereby the 
well-being of each member of the group is in some way bound up with that of the 
other members and indeed with that of the collective as a whole. However, despite 
the seemingly inclusive language used by Kropotkin, we are not given enough 
information here to be sure that the collective to which the ineliminable component 
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refers is universal, since Kropotkin’s use of ‘every one’ and ‘all’ may apply merely to 
those who belong to a narrower social group demarcated along the lines of tribe or 
nation or some other designation. Indeed, in his discussion of mutual aid in primitive 
human societies, Kropotkin remarks that the solidarity practiced within the tribe does 
not extend beyond that very particular community; it does not apply to other tribes. 
Each clan is a separate unity; this is what marks out the primitive social organisation 
from later, more developed societies (ibid.: p. 92). So whilst recognising the limits of 
solidarity – at least at a certain point in human history – Kropotkin also refers here to 
the idea that positive development is characterised by a broadening of the scope of 
solidarity, since ‘more developed societies’ exhibit  a wider circle of inclusion. 
However, despite the progression of solidarity since the time of primitive human 
societies, the constitution of the collective is still not universal. Indeed, Kropotkin 
compares the practice of mutual aid in contemporary human society (in 1902) 
unfavourably to that of various insect species, concluding that often solidarity is not 
extended to the whole species, but is limited to only a specific sub-section thereof. 
‘In that respect’, he writes, somewhat irreverently, ‘[bees, ants and termites] 
evidently have not attained a degree of development which we do not find even 
among our political, scientific, and religious leaders’ (ibid.: p. 15). Kropotkin also 
asserts then that the social role of the elite precludes them by default from 
involvement in the solidary collective. It is not that its members are actively excluded 
by those who do belong to the group, but more that their structural positions of power 
and privilege have prevented them from developing the practice of mutual aid to the 
requisite degree. However, although this hints at Kropotkin’s evaluation of the state 
of solidarity in the early twentieth century, it does not provide us with any useful 
information about his concept in a more normative sense; it does not tell us what he 
thinks solidarity could or ought to be. 
Nevertheless, Kropotkin’s designation of ‘human solidarity’ does seem to hint at a 
potentially universally inclusive conception of the collective, and his association of 
‘development’ with the notion of a widening collective certainly confirms his 
evaluation as to its desirability. Of primitive human societies, Kropotkin notes that 
inter-tribal relations, though not necessarily antagonistic, were certainly not habitually 
solidaristic. Whilst tribes may, from time to time, share resources and cooperate in 
various other ways, there is certainly no obligation for them to do so in the same way 
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that there is within the tribe itself. As such, Kropotkin observes, ‘the life of the savage 
is divided into two sets of actions, and appears under two different ethical aspects: 
the relations within the tribe, and the relations with outsiders’ (ibid.: p. 93). In other 
words, the bounds of solidarity are limited; the collective to which solidarity refers is 
demarcated in a quite specific way. As a result, we observe the development of a 
dual morality, which is manifest in the difference between ‘inter-tribal’ law and 
common law. This dual morality, says Kropotkin, has been inherited by modern 
societies and is clearly manifest in the differences between domestic and 
international law, for instance. As far as contemporary examples go, one might point 
to the different rights accorded to asylum seekers in comparison to domestic 
citizens. In the United Kingdom, for instance, asylum seekers given limited leave to 
enter or remain in the UK may be subject to conditions restricting their employment 
and access to welfare and other services to which British citizens are entitled 
(Immigration Act 1971, c. 77: p. 4). The notion of a dual morality is thus clearly 
manifest in the law, which prescribes one set of rules for citizens and another, less 
generous set for outsiders. In times of war, notes Kropotkin, a double conception of 
morality can lead not merely to a negative withdrawal of responsibility for those seen 
as ‘foreign’, but to the positive glorification of their suffering; it allows for ‘the most 
revolting cruelties’ to be viewed as ‘so many claims upon the admiration of the tribe’ 
(Kropotkin, 2006: p. 93). The jingoistic behaviours of western governments and 
media may be cited here as clear examples of this tendency from our very recent 
history. A particularly notable instance is the Sun newspaper’s infamous ‘GOTCHA’ 
headline in the aftermath of the deaths of 323 sailors following the sinking of the 
Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano by British forces during the Falklands/Malvinas 
Conflict in 1982 (Snow, 1982). The language used in the headline and corresponding 
report and its implied message contains a clearly antagonistic distinction between an 
‘us’ and a ‘them’, (the sub-headline read ‘Our lads sink gunboat and hole cruiser’ 
[ibid.]). The consequence of such discourse is that any harm done to the ‘enemy’ is 
seen as a good thing and is exalted as such. However, remarks Kropotkin, there has 
been significant progress in the eradication of this dual morality, but ‘while we have 
in some measure extended our ideas of solidarity – in theory, at least – over the 
nation, and partly over other nations as well’, this progress has come at the expense 
of more local bonds of solidarity (Kropotkin, 2006: p. 93). Kropotkin notes here the 
difficulty of extending solidarity across tribal and national boundaries whilst 
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maintaining bonds of unity within existing communities. However, in remarking upon 
the progress of humankind in overcoming this double ethical standard (at least to 
some extent), he provides us with a glimpse of his solidaristic vision: Kropotkin 
clearly sees the widening of the circle of solidarity as representative of ethical 
progress.   
The broadening scope of solidarity is a trend which Kropotkin traces throughout 
human history. A particularly important feature of pre-feudal ‘village communities’, he 
notes, is ‘the gradual extension of the circle of men13 embraced by the feelings of 
solidarity’ (ibid.: p. 112). For Kropotkin, this is evidenced by the federation of tribes 
into stems and the joining of stems into confederations. Later on, in Europe, he 
observes, this was manifest in the development of nations – conceived as cultural 
communities quite distinct from states, it must be stressed – such as Merovingian 
France and the Russia of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. These nations were 
held together solely by ‘a community of language, and a tacit agreement of the small 
republics to take their dukes from none but one special family’ (ibid.: p. 113). 
Kropotkin refers here to a natural development whereby the scope of solidarity is 
gradually extended from its tribal base to include those who were previously deemed 
outsiders. Though inhibited at various points by the wars and conflicts that occur 
both as the inevitable products of large scale migration and as the consequences of 
the expansionist tendencies of military authority, this process of the extension of 
solidarity has been at work throughout human history. Indeed, where Kropotkin cites 
nation formation, we might take as tangible examples of solidarity’s development 
from our more recent history the evolution of the global justice movement and 
progress made in overcoming racial, religious, gender and various other forms of 
oppression and exclusion. Following the slaughter and destruction brought about by 
two world wars in the twentieth century, even the establishment of such formal and 
hierarchical institutions as the European Union and the United Nations may be 
understood, if not as products of a widening circle of solidarity then perhaps in some 
way as elite organisational concessions to popular demands for solidarity, however 
strained the notion of European solidarity has become in light of the ongoing debt 
                                                          
13
 Despite the implied exclusivity of Kropotkin’s archaic use of ‘men’, we can safely assume that the 
term is in fact used to signify humanity in a general sense and not merely men. Indeed, in ‘Anarchist 
Morality’, Kropotkin emphasises the inclusion of women, proclaiming that ‘It is in the name of equality 
that we are determined to have no more prostituted, exploited, deceived and governed men and 
women’ (Kropotkin, 2002a: p. 99). 
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crisis. For, indeed, insists Kropotkin, contrary to those accounts that misrepresent 
human history as one long episode of bloody struggle, societies have nearly always 
put in place measures that aim at the very avoidance of violent conflict and at the 
provision of alternative dispute resolutions (ibid.: p. 113). More than that, Kropotkin 
remarks in his Ethics, despite the occurrence of ‘temporary regressive movements’, 
the overwhelming characteristic of the development of human societies is ‘the 
tendency of always widening the current conception of human solidarity and justice, 
and of constantly improving the character of our mutual relations’ (Kropotkin, 1993: 
pp. 17-18). 
Further, Kropotkin argues, the gradual expansion of the circle of solidarity is a 
necessary condition of the continuation of solidarity as such. Kropotkin emphasises 
on several occasions in Mutual Aid that the historical instances in which human 
solidarity has been undermined (by individual or factional interests) have been 
precipitated by a tendency to halt the extension of the circle of inclusion. One 
prominent example is the downfall of the medieval ‘free cities’ in feudal Europe, the 
social organisation of which was characterised by the same current of mutual aid as 
were the pre-feudal village communities (ibid.). In contrast to previous societies, 
however, in the medieval city this current of solidarity was reinforced by a new model 
of organisation which reflected the growing diversity of crafts and occupations: the 
guilds.  
A guild, to borrow Sheilagh Ogilvie’s definition, was ‘an association of people who 
share some common characteristic and pursue some common purpose’ (Ogilvie, 
2011: p. 19). There are a number of shared characteristics around which a guild may 
be formed, but by far the most common is that of occupation. Certainly, it is this type 
of guild to which Kropotkin refers in Mutual Aid, and he identifies the principles of 
common enterprise and equality in mutual relations as their almost universal 
characteristics (Kropotkin, 2006: pp. 140-141). Ultimately, explains Kropotkin, the 
guilds represented institutional manifestations of solidarity; they were ‘but a further 
development of the same principles [of mutual aid] which we saw at work in the gens 
and the village community’, and they ‘answered to a deeply inrooted want of human 
nature’: the need to feel and to provide ‘mutual support in all circumstances and in all 
accidents of life’ (ibid.: pp. 140; 145). Indeed, throughout the first half of the second 
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millennium, the federations that existed between ‘small territorial units’, the guilds 
and the cities represented for Kropotkin an ‘immense attempt at securing mutual aid 
and support on a grand scale’ (ibid.: p. 171). Though largely successful in achieving 
solidarity, freedom and progress, the system would eventually perish in the sixteenth 
century as centralised states, ‘reconstructed on the old Roman pattern’, came into 
existence (ibid.: pp. 177-178). The downfall of the medieval city was precipitated in 
part, says Kropotkin, because ‘mutual aid and support cannot be limited to a small 
association; they must spread to its surroundings, or else the surroundings will 
absorb the association’ (ibid.: p. 179). As such, the failure of the citizenry to accept 
outsiders as potential contributors to city life led to sharp class divisions between the 
established burghers (who reaped the benefits of communal trade and land) and 
newcomers (who were left only with the value of their own labour) (ibid.). The 
overemphasis of the economy on commerce and industry at the expense of 
agriculture led to further division between the city and its surrounding villages. 
However, for Kropotkin, the foremost catalyst of the decay of the medieval city was 
the influence of Roman law and the Christian church. Indeed, their promotion of the 
idea of the strongly-centralised state under the divine authority of a king hastened a 
fundamental shift away from the leading ideals of ‘Self-reliance and federalism, the 
sovereignty of each group, and the construction of the political body from the simple 
to the composite’, which had served as fertile soil for the germination of solidaristic 
relations (ibid.: p. 181). Ultimately, according to Kropotkin’s reading, the medieval 
city succumbed to the centralising power of the emerging states because of a failure 
to extend the scope of solidarity. Solidarity in Kropotkin’s scheme therefore, is a 
necessarily outward-reaching or expanding concept. If its bounds become fixed, if 
they are not encouraged to widen, solidarity is inevitably swallowed up by its external 
surroundings. Of course, the logical product of a concept of solidarity which includes 
the idea-component of a necessarily broadening circle of inclusion is the normative 
notion of universality. The logically necessary category of the subject of the 
ineliminable component is therefore satisfied. Kropotkin’s ideal of solidarity conforms 
to a model of universal inclusion and, as such, he advocates a project of solidarity 
which involves an expansion of the collective – of those who are involved in mutual 
relations of solidarity – so as to eventually include the whole of humankind.  
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Although the notion of a subject is logically necessary to the ineliminable component, 
its particular instance – in this case the notion of the universal collective – is 
contingent and is most usefully understood as being determined by culture. This 
refers to the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of the particular decontestation of the ineliminable 
component we have observed in Kropotkin’s writings, particularly in relation to the 
context provided by notable events, institutional practices, influential theories, 
popular beliefs and dominant discourses. The universalism of Kropotkin’s concept of 
solidarity, the notion of the ever-widening circle of solidarity betrays the influence on 
Kropotkin of the moral philosophy of the French Epicurean thinker Jean-Marie Guyau 
(1854-1888). In order to appreciate the way in which Kropotkin’s concept is culturally 
moulded, it is necessary to review the fundaments of Guyau’s thought and remark 
upon the way in which they impacted upon Kropotkin’s own theory. 
The influence of Guyau 
Though little known as a philosopher today, for Kropotkin, Guyau was the most 
important ethicist of the late nineteenth century. In his Ethics, Kropotkin effectively 
endorses the approach of Guyau, whose philosophy aimed to free morality both from 
the supernatural and from external coercion or duty. Whilst also rejecting the 
utilitarian emphasis on personal, material interests and the striving for happiness, 
Guyau’s ethics were founded on a conception of ‘life’, in a very broad sense. 
According to Guyau, ‘life’ represents ‘the motive underlying all our actions’, and, as 
such, ethics should consist in ‘the science which has for object all the means of 
preserving and enlarging material and intellectual life’ (Guyau, 2012: p. 75). Moral 
teaching must seek to ‘increase the intensity of life’ by enlarging ‘the range of activity 
under all its forms’ (ibid.: p. 76). In short, the goal of moral philosophy must be to 
provide a framework for the growth and development of variety in all areas of human 
activity. Human morality is derived from the very need to live a full, productive, varied 
life, since the ‘existence of a certain impersonal duty is created by the power-of-
acting itself’ (ibid.: p. 91). In other words, to possess an ability or a power is to be 
obligated to exercise it, or, to use Guyau’s preferred maxim: ‘I can, therefore I must’ 
(ibid.: p. 89). For Guyau, the individual’s recognition of their capacity for doing 
translates into ‘duty’: ‘To feel inwardly the greatest that one is capable of doing is 
really the first consciousness of what it is one’s duty to do’ (ibid.: p. 91). This results, 
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says Guyau, in ‘moral fecundity’, whereby the very condition of life is that it must 
‘diffuse itself for others, and, if necessary, should yield itself up’ (ibid.: p. 209). This 
leads in turn to the practice of self-sacrifice, since when we feel that we are capable 
of more than that which serves merely to preserve and expand our own lives, we 
offer up our surplus energies for the service of others. The same principle applies 
also to our feeling of sympathy: the consciousness that our capacity for sympathy is 
more than is required for our own self-preservation impels us to expend it on others 
irrespective of the consequences. The nature of ‘life’, then, results in an ‘equivalent 
of duty’ that occurs throughout the natural world: ‘The plant cannot prevent itself from 
flowering. Sometimes to flower means for it to die. No matter, the sap still rises’ 
(ibid.: p. 92). 
Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity is culturally shaped by Guyau’s notion of ‘life’ in 
three clear ways. First, when applied to the individual, Guyau’s notion of surplus 
sympathy serves to explain the human capacity – nay, tendency – for mutual aid. 
Indeed, one might argue further that all solidaristic actions can be seen as a product 
of the assertion of ‘I can, therefore I must’. Second, the notion of capacity-as-
obligation negates the requirement for an external authority to fulfil the role of moral 
arbiter. The fact that moral conceptions are drawn from the nature of life itself allows 
for us to do away with metaphysical enquiry and, indeed, with the institutions of 
church and state. Third, Kropotkin’s idea of the widening circle of solidarity closely 
reflects Guyau’s conception of life’s necessary expansion. Indeed, Guyau’s claim 
that a full, productive life is dependent upon its expansion can be applied directly to 
Kropotkin’s decontestation of the universal collective. Kropotkin’s idea of the 
necessarily widening circle of inclusion is essentially an application of Guyau’s notion 
of the fecundity of life to the ineliminable component of solidarity. It provides a 
cultural mould from which a universal decontestation of the individual-collective bond 
is cast. For if an anarchist society is to flourish, insists Kropotkin, individuals must 
dedicate their emotional, intellectual and physical faculties to ‘the service of the 
human race without asking for anything in return’ (Kropotkin, 2002: p. 107). This 
reading is supported by Alan Ritter, who understands Kropotkin’s notion of the 
‘extended neighbourhood’ as requiring ‘outgoing relationships’ (Ritter, 1980: p. 56). 
Ritter characterises such relationships as ‘benevolence’, but acknowledges that he is 
actually referring to that which Kropotkin calls mutual aid (ibid.: pp. 56-57). It is the 
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reciprocal character and the essential equality with which acts of mutual aid are 
imbued which reinforces social solidarity and which enables the extension of 
‘neighbourhood’ to the human race as a whole. 
The desirability of solidarity 
In order for a concept to be fleshed out from its ineliminable component and in order 
for it to play a meaningful part in a wider ideological morphology, it may require an 
evaluation as to its desirability. For, an ideology’s core is not always comprised of 
concepts to which it ascribes positive value. The concept of domination may appear 
within the core of many anarchist ideologies, for instance, yet it is clearly seen by 
anarchists as a ‘disvalue’, as something which must be negated, rather than as a 
normative goal (Gordon, 2007b: p. 37). Further, an ideology’s conceptual 
morphology may bring into play other concepts which must be either explicitly 
rejected or addressed in a critical way. The liberal decontestation of the concept of 
liberty as non-constraint, for instance, necessitates if not an a priori rejection, then at 
least some critical perspective on notions such as constraint, authority and power. 
Whilst we know enough of Kropotkin’s account already to be certain that this is 
patently not the case with his concept of solidarity (that solidarity is seen by 
Kropotkin as a positive thing) it is nevertheless worthwhile to explore the normative 
value he attaches to it. 
Kropotkin’s explanation for the importance of solidarity is, as ever, a naturalistic one, 
and is best understood within the context of the development of evolutionary theory 
and the adjacent debates about human nature. Kropotkin introduces his Mutual Aid 
thesis with the assertion that the received wisdom of mutual competition as the law 
of nature is fundamentally not supported by scientific observation (ibid.: p. xiii). In 
fact, argues Kropotkin (citing the work of both Darwin and the German-Russian 
zoologist Karl Kessler), besides the law of mutual struggle, nature exhibits a further 
law of mutual aid, which is of far greater importance ‘for the progressive evolution of 
the species’ (ibid.: p. xiii). The significance of this hypothesis is not to be 
underestimated. Indeed, during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
evolutionary theory was exerting huge influence on the emerging social sciences and 
on moral and political philosophy. Claims made about the evolution of human beings 
as a species, particularly in relation to the development of human morality, shaped 
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discourses on how society should – and could – be arranged. For this reason, 
Kropotkin felt it crucial to establish the facts of evolution, and felt the need to provide 
a robust antidote to what he saw as the bastardised versions of evolutionary theory 
that were dominating scientific and philosophical discussion. As such, Kropotkin’s 
central purpose in Mutual Aid was to prove, in opposition to the social Darwinists, 
that the factor of mutual aid is in fact more important in the evolution of species than 
that of mutual struggle. Accordingly, Kropotkin argues, Darwin was ‘quite right when 
he saw in man’s social qualities the chief factor for his further evolution, and [his] 
vulgarizers are entirely wrong when they maintain the contrary’ (Kropotkin, 2006: p. 
91). Indeed, Kropotkin correctly points out that Darwin, in The Descent of Man 
(1871), placed significant emphasis on the role of sociability in human evolution. As 
such, he states his intention to wrest back the legacy of Darwin from those who have 
sought to use evolutionary theory to promote the notion that the Hobbesian struggle 
of each against all constitutes the principal driving force of species’ development 
(Kropotkin, 2006: p. xiii). 
Kropotkin locates his argument in opposition to two strands of thought, both of which 
he sees as having formed misplaced conclusions with regard to the character of 
human nature. Hobbes saw human beings’ natural state of existence as one of 
perpetual struggle of each against all (see Hobbes, 1996), a view which was 
promulgated in the nineteenth century by the evolutionary theory of T. H. Huxley 
(see Huxley, 1970). Conversely, according to the Rousseauian version that was so 
influential in the previous century, the state of nature was relatively benign (see 
Rousseau, 1997a). According to Kropotkin, both the pessimism of Hobbes and 
Huxley and the overly optimistic perception of Rousseau are unfounded. Although 
both strands of thought identify quasi-realities, each exaggerates the importance of 
their own version and neither affords the other sufficient recognition. For whilst there 
are innumerable examples in nature of struggle and slaughter, there are equal if not 
more instances of mutual support within single species, or at least within identifiable 
societies. As such, Kropotkin concludes, sociability is just as much a ‘natural law’ as 
mutual struggle (Kropotkin, 2006: pp. 4-5). However, whilst it is impossible to 
ascertain numerically the precise balance between the two factors in terms of their 
bearing on evolution, brief observation of the natural world tells us that the fittest 
species – those which have the best chances of survival and have attained a higher 
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level of development – are those that practice mutual aid. As such, although mutual 
aid and struggle between individuals are both laws of nature, in Kropotkin’s view it is 
the former which is more important as a factor of evolution (ibid.: p. 5). 
Kropotkin cites various examples of the importance of solidarity in the animal world. 
With reference to ants, bees and termites, he demonstrates the way in which species 
both survive and develop through mutual aid. Such species, the isolated member of 
which cuts a diminutive and defenceless figure, would simply not have survived – 
much less progressed – were it not for their practice of mutual aid. Indeed, where 
they exist the anti-social tendencies are gradually eliminated, because solidarity 
proves much more advantageous for the species than egoistic behaviour. ‘The 
cunningest and the shrewdest’, explains Kropotkin, ‘are eliminated in favour of those 
who understand the advantages of sociable life and mutual support’ (ibid.: p. 15). 
Here, then, Kropotkin establishes the manner in which solidarity drives the evolution 
of species. Those which practice mutual aid survive, whilst those who act egoistically 
perish in the struggle for existence. In this way, solidarity gradually attains a central 
importance in species’ modes of living, and the development of species’ faculties 
and intelligence grows in proportion to it. Inevitably, therefore, the most sociable 
species become the most successful, and Kropotkin holds human beings to be the 
most successful of all. 
Further, Kropotkin holds solidarity – expressed through mutual aid – to be the origin 
of ethical feelings. This is evidenced, he claims, by the broad consistency of moral 
conceptions across the species. ‘The ant, the bird, the marmot, the savage have 
read neither Kant nor the Fathers of the Church nor even Moses’, he tells us, ‘And 
yet all have the same idea of good and evil’ (Kropotkin, 2002: p. 91). This idea is 
expressed in the principle that ‘what is considered as good … is that which is useful 
for the preservation of the race; and that which is considered evil is that which is 
hurtful for race preservation’ (ibid.). So nature does not, as is claimed by some, 
teach us ‘a-moralism’, but in fact lends us ‘the very ideas of bad and good’ 
(Kropotkin, 1993: p. 16). Kropotkin’s naturalistic explanation of the origin of moral 
conceptions can be clearly linked to his concept of solidarity, since moral acts occur 
in consonance with solidarity’s characteristic bond between the individual and the 
collective. The study of human development, he argues, clearly shows ‘the co-
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ordination of the individual will with the will and the purpose of the whole’; in the 
process of our evolution, the human being ‘had to become accustomed to identifying 
his “I” with the social “We”’, and learnt to ‘think of his ego in no other way than 
through the conception of his group’ (ibid.: pp. 64; 65). This process – effectively the 
conception and gradual establishment of solidarity – necessitates ‘the working out of 
certain rules of social morality’ (ibid.: p. 64). For Kropotkin, solidarity (manifest in 
mutual aid) is not only what has enabled both the survival and development of 
human beings as a species. It constitutes the basis of our moral conceptions; to act 
in a solidaristic way is to act in a moral way, and this fact alone attests to the value 
assigned to the concept in Kropotkin’s wider morphology. 
Community 
As we have seen, Kropotkin’s central purpose in Mutual Aid is to counter the 
assertion – given an illusory scientific credence by the social Darwinists – that the 
Hobbesian war of each against all constitutes human beings’ normal state of 
existence and that the preservation of social order requires the arbitration of an 
external Leviathan. For this to be the case, says Kropotkin, would contradict all that 
we have learned from the study of nature. For humankind to have developed and to 
have prospered through struggle rather than mutual aid would set our species starkly 
apart from the vast majority of others, whose practice of mutual aid has lent them the 
best chances of survival (Kropotkin, 2006: pp. 62-63). The principal error of Hobbes 
– indeed of all the contractarians – Kropotkin tells us, was to assume that human 
society was preceded by less cohesive modes of living, to think that the earliest 
members of the human race lived in small, isolated family groups. With the benefit of 
subsequent scientific discovery, notes Kropotkin, we now know that this was not the 
case: ‘As far as we can go back in the palæo-ethnology of mankind’, he observes, 
‘we find men living in societies’ (ibid.: p. 64). As such, the notion of community 
attached to the ineliminable component in Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity is a far 
broader one than that which might be decontested as a small family group, or some 
other subsection of society. ‘Community’, in Kropotkin’s scheme can be applied to a 
far wider network of social relations: to society generally. The significance of this 
point in relation to Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity is easily comprehended. Given 
the social complexity exhibited in early human societies, he argues, given that such 
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complicated modes of social organisation were developed and maintained amongst 
humans ‘who stood at the lowest known degree of development’, and were enforced 
by ‘no kind of authority besides the authority of public opinion’, the extent to which 
the social instincts are deeply entrenched in human nature is clearly apparent (ibid.: 
pp. 70-71). The knowledge that early humans lived in societies, that societies 
actually predated smaller, family-based groups enables Kropotkin to place solidarity 
(for him, the basis of society itself) at the heart of his conception of human nature. 
More than this, it anchors the notion of community to the ineliminable component in 
such a way that allows for the broadening scope of solidarity which we identified 
earlier in the chapter.  
But whilst the abstract notion of community morphologically helps to define the 
parameters of solidarity, the existence of strong community ties in an empirical 
sense also serves to reinforce the feeling of solidarity by encouraging a sense of 
common interest and facilitating interaction. Kropotkin gives an example of this in his 
account of the emergence of friendly societies and the flourishing of voluntarism in 
the nineteenth century, phenomena he views as institutional manifestations of 
solidarity. His favourite and most cited example is that of the British Lifeboat 
Association, whose crews, he notes, consist of volunteers ready to sacrifice their 
own lives in order to rescue complete strangers, even when there is little chance of 
success (ibid.: pp. 226-227). For Kropotkin, it is an inbuilt aspect of human 
psychology, ‘nurtured by thousands of years of human social life’, which impels us to 
act in such ways. But what of those instances whereby we ignore pleas for help and 
do not come to the aid of those in need? Kropotkin cites an (unverifiable, but 
certainly not inconceivable) example of ‘men who were drowned in the Serpentine in 
the presence of a crowd, out of which no one moved for their rescue’ (ibid.: p. 228). 
The explanation, he argues, is that since we are a product of both ‘inherited instincts’ 
and ‘education’, in those – like the lifeboat volunteers – amongst whom solidarity 
tends to flourish, the tendency can often be attributed to ‘common occupations’ and 
‘every-day contact with one another’. Conversely, in the cities – as with the 
Serpentine incident – ‘the absence of common interest nurtures indifference’ (ibid.: p. 
228). For Kropotkin, then, the feeling of solidarity has its root in human nature, but 
the strength of the bond that results is dependent upon environmental factors, 
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namely that of common interest, of a collective cause, both of which are reinforced 
by the existence of strong community ties.  
Community gives rise to other important conditions for the flourishing of solidarity. In 
particular, the aspects of familiarity and regular social interaction serve to enhance 
the strength of solidaristic ties. For Kropotkin, solidarity is both the basis for and the 
product of social life; neither can thrive in the absence of the other. Social life would 
not be possible lest for the ties of solidarity between individuals and the group, whilst 
equally that solidarity would never come into being if it were not for the social 
character of human interactions. Indeed, for Kropotkin, the notions of familiarity and 
the aspect of regular social contact serve to enhance solidarity by enabling a shared 
identity and a consciousness of a common interest to take root. This rule accounts 
for the fact, he contends, that social solidarity is more consistent amongst the 
industrial working classes than it is amongst the bourgeoisie. By the simple fact of 
their living in closer proximity with one another, the poorer members of society are 
bound to engage more frequently in social exchange. This, along with the necessity 
borne out of the conditions of hardship in which they live, inevitably gives rise to a 
greater feeling of social solidarity (ibid.: pp. 234-238). The aspect of community, 
connoting reciprocal awareness in all areas of life, thus takes on significant 
importance in Kropotkin’s scheme. The ‘richness’ and ‘pervasiveness’ of Kropotkin’s 
notion of community has led Alan Ritter to understand Kropotkin’s anarchism in 
terms of an ‘extended neighbourhood’ or ‘pervasive community’ (Ritter, 1980: p. 58). 
It is the ‘benevolent and solidaristic’ relations that we often find in small 
neighbourhoods, he observes, that Kropotkin wishes to extend to ‘the context of 
society at large’ (ibid.). 
Despite his analysis that reciprocal awareness (and thus solidarity) is more abundant 
amongst the industrial proletariat, Kropotkin insists that the habits of mutual aid are 
maintained even amongst the higher strata of society. Although attitudes of the 
property-owning classes towards working people are often characterised by a cruel 
indifference, he says, such behaviour is caused not merely by the egoistic 
tendencies in human nature, but is exacerbated by the ‘stratification’ (as opposed to 
familiarity) brought on by feelings of distrust and fear promoted by the agents of the 
church and the state (Kropotkin, 2006: p. 239). Furthermore, it is not demonstrative 
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of a lack of mutual aid per se in the middle and upper classes. For amongst 
themselves, notes Kropotkin, the bourgeoisie practice mutual aid much as do the 
working classes (ibid.: p. 240). In this case then, it is not a complete absence of 
solidarity that leads to poor quality mutual relations, but rather the barriers formed by 
class divisions and a lack of familiarity that inhibit the widening of the circle of 
inclusion.  
To further illustrate the importance of familiarity and social interaction, Kropotkin 
looks to the host of associations and societies which sprung up in the nineteenth 
century around the sciences, the arts, sport and all manner of common interests. 
Such associations inevitably bred familiarity between individuals and provided 
platforms for regular social exchange. For Kropotkin, their beneficial consequence 
was that they served to ‘break down the screens erected by States between different 
nationalities’ and cultivate a ‘conscience of international solidarity’ (ibid.: p. 232). 
Kropotkin’s use of language here is telling. By forming bonds based on common 
interests, rather than remaining within traditional circles of solidarity founded on the 
ideas of nation, language and ethno-cultural factors, we serve to dissolve the 
barriers between previously disparate groups, to transcend the differences which 
hitherto kept us apart. This represents the essence of the necessarily broadening 
character of solidarity; the process of reaching outward involves the dissolution of 
divisive relations and the constitution of new ones based on mutual aid.  
Common interest and shared identity 
Kropotkin’s ideal of the widening circle of solidarity is also morphologically interlinked 
to the notions of shared identity and common interest. For Kropotkin, solidarity 
involves an act of identification – at some or other level of consciousness – on the 
part of the individual of their own existence with that of the society to which they 
belong. There must be some form of recognition by each member that their own 
identity is inevitably and irreversibly bound up with that of the collective and each 
other member of it. According to Kropotkin, the extent to which this self-identification 
with the collective is played out in primitive societies is such that the acts of each 
individual come to be considered as tribal affairs. Subsequently, the regulation of 
individuals’ behaviour takes place according to various unwritten codes which 
emerge as the products of common experience as to what is beneficial or harmful to 
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the tribe (ibid.: p. 91). Those acts which benefit the tribe are ‘good’; those which are 
harmful are ‘bad’. Although many of the superstitious explanations attributed to such 
‘common laws’ are plainly absurd, the primitive human obeys them, even in the 
event of their inconvenience. To do so has become habitual, since these laws are 
firmly rooted in the collective memory (ibid.: p. 92). From shared identity stems 
common interest: the interests of the collective become prioritised in the 
consciousness of the individual.  
The notions of shared identity and common cause are supported morphologically by 
another of Kropotkin’s core concepts. The proximity of the concept of equality is of 
crucial importance for this aspect of solidarity’s decontestation, since it serves to 
preserve the necessary conditions of existence for shared identity and common 
interest. For the maintenance of equality serves to prevent the development of 
stratification and of partial interests – both of which inevitably undermine the aspects 
of shared identity and common interest attached to Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity. 
Kropotkin provides empirical examples of this conceptual interdependence, citing the 
habitual mutual aid of the European peasantry as proof that even in the age of 
‘reckless individualism’ mutual support is maintained amongst the masses. In 
particular, he emphasises the importance of communal possessions, which ‘maintain 
in village life a nucleus of customs and habits of mutual aid’, which serve to act as a 
check on the egoistic tendencies (ibid.: p. 200). For Kropotkin then, the institution of 
common ownership represents the manifestation of his concept of equality, which in 
turn discourages the erosion of the crucial elements of shared identity and common 
cause. 
Clearly, for the historian of solidarity, the key development of the nineteenth century 
is the emergence of the socialist movement. Indeed, the continuous renewal of 
trades unions and the growth of the practice of workers’ striking in spite of the very 
real threat of persecution by the state are characterised by Kropotkin as evidence of 
the resilience of the mutual aid tendency (ibid.: pp. 219-221). He also explains how, 
for the first time, with the emergence of ‘sympathy strikes’, circles of solidarity began 
to extend across boundaries of trade and region and even nationality (ibid.: pp. 221-
222). In this sense, the emergence of an international class of industrial workers 
served to provide a common cause and shared identity which could apply to a much 
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larger collective and which led to the growth of a transnational movement for which 
class solidarity was a key principle. With the growth of the industrial proletariat, then, 
solidarity was beginning to transcend the boundaries which had previously limited it 
to quite local parameters. 
The structural inclusion of the notion of common interest within Kropotkin’s concept 
of solidarity ensures that interdependent social relations remain benevolent and do 
not degenerate into domination and exploitation. For Kropotkin does not overlook the 
human capacity to exercise power over others – how else could he account for the 
existence of institutions such as capital and the state? Nevertheless, he holds that 
the divisions caused by such institutions are artificial and that the state serves only to 
cloak the fundamental identity of human beings’ basic interests. As such, in order to 
reveal the natural unity of our basic interests, we must throw off the yoke of existing 
social relations. ‘Let us arrange matters so that each man may see his interest 
bound up with the interests of others’, urges Kropotkin, ‘then you will no longer have 
to feel his evil passions’ (Kropotkin, 1887: p. 12). It is precisely because human 
beings have the potential for evil that we should construct society so as to negate 
opportunities for domination and exploitation. Given social and political 
arrangements that discourage egoism and individual competition, runs Kropotkin’s 
argument, we become aware of the interdependence of social relations and the 
essential harmony of our basic interests. The aspect of common interest is locked 
into Kropotkin’s concept, is affixed to the ineliminable component partly because of 
the presence of the concept of equality within the core of Kropotkin’s morphology. 
Kropotkin’s insistence upon equality in all spheres of life serves to provide the 
requisite conditions for general awareness of a fundamental common interest to gain 
traction. Since social division – that between the bourgeoisie and the masses being 
the most prominent – is caused by the separation of interests that arises from 
inequality, to promote equality is therefore to expose the artificial nature of such 
divisions and to reinforce the notion of common interest in the collective 
consciousness. 
Kropotkin’s inclusion of the component of common interest has led George Crowder 
to the conclusion that Kropotkin’s is a ‘mechanical’ concept of solidarity – the label 
assigned by Durkheim to the type of solidarity that results from similarities, as 
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opposed to the ‘organic’ type that is produced by the interdependence brought about 
by differentiation (Crowder, 1991: p. 141; Durkheim, 1984). It is Kropotkin’s reliance 
on mechanical solidarity, argues Crowder, that leads him to promote, in place of 
Adam Smith’s exalted division of labour (Smith, 1999a), an ‘integrated labour’ which 
allows for the individual to engage in both physical and intellectual work, in both 
‘brain work’ and ‘manual work’, as Kropotkin puts it (Kropotkin, 1985: p. 169). The 
increased specialisation brought about by the division of labour, argues Kropotkin, 
has served to shackle the individual – and this applies to both manual and 
intellectual workers – to one very specific area of production, with the result that, to 
borrow from Marxian terminology, the worker is alienated from both the process and 
the product of his labour (Marx, 2000). The solution, says Kropotkin, is to integrate 
labour, to reorganise work so that each individual is encouraged to partake in a 
diverse range of tasks. Integrated labour ensures that ‘the greatest sum total of well-
being can be obtained’, argues Kropotkin, and, further, human creative faculties are 
given their fullest expression when we are able to exercise our ‘usually-varied 
capacities to several pursuits in the farm, the workshop, the factory, the study or the 
studio, instead of being riveted for life to one of these pursuits only’ (Kropotkin, 1985: 
p. 18). Crowder is critical of Kropotkin here for justifying this versatility in terms of 
human perfection, for positing the full development of the individual as the goal of 
integrated labour. ‘It is reasonable to suppose that a person will be more fully 
developed if he does more than make pins’, concedes Crowder, evoking Smith, ‘but 
less obvious that his potential can be realised only if he becomes a jack of all trades’ 
(Crowder, 1991: p. 143). According to Crowder, Kropotkin’s real purpose in 
promoting integrated labour is to ‘create an egalitarian society held together by a 
solidarity of likeness’, and to ensure that ‘no classes or elites will reassert the 
inequalities of the past’ (ibid.). To frame this criticism in terms of conceptual 
morphology, Crowder thus points to an apparent structural tension in Kropotkin’s 
concept of solidarity between the components of common interest and individual 
development. Since, for Crowder, Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity is ‘mechanical’ in 
that it appeals to interdependence through similarity rather than differentiation, in 
emphasising the importance of common interest it cannot also adhere to a 
perfectionist conception of individual development. In order to maintain structural 
integrity, Crowder suggests, Kropotkin must resolve the question as to how his 
concept’s ‘reliance on shared identity can be reconciled with the important goal of 
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individuality’ (ibid.). Crowder supports Durkheim’s argument that the advance of 
individuality can be historically linked to an increasingly specialised division of 
labour. ‘There appears to be a significant connection between the growth of 
individual expertise in technical matters and the emergence of individual self-
direction in general’, he argues (ibid.: pp. 144-145). In other words, the more the 
individual becomes specialised in their own field, the more they come to realise their 
potential. According to this logic, the apparent contradiction in Kropotkin’s concept of 
solidarity between common interest and individual development would seem 
irresolvable. But the fact is that Kropotkin, like Marx before him, simply does not 
accept that the division of labour drives the development of individuality. Although he 
recognises a degree of benefit in terms of economic efficiency, he disputes the claim 
that specialisation drives individuality, the latter conceived as the realisation of 
individuals’ unique creative potentialities. Indeed, for Kropotkin, the worker whose 
job has been highly specialised by the division of labour loses interest in his work, 
and subsequently his creative powers wane: 
What can a weaver invent who merely supervises four looms, without knowing 
anything either about their complicated movements or how the machines grew to be 
what they are? What can a man invent who is condemned for life to bind together the 
ends of two threads with the greatest celerity, and knows nothing beyond making a 
knot? (Kropotkin, 1985: p. 171) 
Ritter has argued that the goal of Kropotkin’s integrated labour can be understood as 
‘communal individuality’. This points to the morphological interdependence of the 
components of individuality (understood as the full development of the self) and 
community (understood as reciprocal awareness) attached to Kropotkin’s concept of 
solidarity. The diversity spawned by the full development of each individual results in 
a mutual attraction and dependence between them and as a result reciprocal 
awareness and a sense of community is increased. Further, for Kropotkin, among 
the very characteristics of a fully realised individuality are more highly developed 
‘social inclinations and instincts of solidarity’ (quoted in Ritter, 1980: p. 30). As such, 
the fully-developed individual is well disposed toward solidaristic social 
arrangements. As Ritter notes, the influence of Guyau upon Kropotkin’s thought here 
is clear (ibid.). Indeed, for Guyau, the end-point of human development is a situation 
whereby the individual will ‘no longer be able to enjoy himself alone; his pleasure will 
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be like a concert, in which the pleasure of others must form a part, by virtue of its 
being a necessary element’ (Guyau, 2012: p. 96). In the other direction, of course, 
community serves to reinforce individuality, since, according to Kropotkin, reciprocal 
awareness is a necessary constituent of a fully-developed self. 
To provide the conditions in which a truly communal individuality might flourish, 
argues Ritter, Kropotkin relies upon the model of the agro-industrial commune, 
which, in ensuring that ‘all activities, but especially production’ are ‘carried out in 
small, internally unspecialized units’, serves to encourage ‘more intimate’ relations, 
lessens acute differentiation not only between manual and intellectual work, but also 
between individual trades and as a consequence constitutes an appropriate base for 
‘solidaristic trust’ (Ritter, 1980: pp. 58-59). For Kropotkin, it is the free association 
between such units that provides the network for solidaristic relations and also 
serves to foster the development of individuality. In contrast to specialisation, it is 
variation, manifest in ‘ever changing, ever modified associations which carry in 
themselves the elements of their durability and constantly assume new forms which 
answer best to the multiple aspirations of all’, (Kropotkin, 2002: pp. 123-124), that 
allows for the individual to develop a unique self (Ritter, 1980: p. 59).  
Let us return to Crowder’s critique of Kropotkin’s ‘mechanical’ conception of 
solidarity. A further point of criticism raised by Crowder refers to the traditional 
reliance of mechanical solidarity on ‘small-group identity’ (Crowder, 1991: p. 143). 
Whilst he acknowledges the resilience of the solidarity that is produced in the ‘small 
homogeneous community’, Crowder argues that the common interest of the 
collective ‘is defined in part by the terms in which they collectively set themselves 
apart’ (ibid.: pp. 143-144). The class solidarity of the proletariat, for instance, is 
reliant upon a quite stark contradistinction between the collective interest of the 
working class and that of the bourgeoisie. It follows that the vision of an anarchistic 
society in which the pre-existing divisions have fallen away cannot rely on the 
solidarity of a universal shared interest, since the inclusion of such a notion ‘robs 
mechanical solidarity of what … gives it its intensity and force’ (ibid.: p. 144). 
Crowder’s suggestion here is that the strength of solidarity we find in small 
homogeneous communities cannot be extended to society in general, since it is 
dependent upon a unifying characteristic which differentiates insiders from outsiders. 
98 
 
For Kropotkin, though, the origin of solidarity is to be found in the social instinct 
developed by human beings in the struggle for existence. Accordingly, the insider-
outsider dichotomy is not a prerequisite for solidaristic relations. Rather, we are able 
to galvanise group solidarity on a universal scale by appealing to unity in the face of 
external threats to humanity as a whole. It is not other groups of fellow human beings 
against whom we should set ourselves apart; we can struggle instead against the 
common enemies of alienation, poverty and ecological degradation that pose both 
immediate and long-term threats to our well-being and survival. 
Crowder’s critique is thus founded on a misreading of Kropotkin’s concept of 
solidarity. Whilst there are some similarities between Kropotkin’s concept and the 
mechanical type identified by Durkheim, to assert that Kropotkin conceptualises 
solidarity according to an explicitly mechanical model is to overplay the features they 
hold in common. Crowder’s supposition is essentially founded on the fact that 
Kropotkin’s concept emphasises the role of similarity over that of differentiation. This 
is a misconception: Kropotkin’s political prescriptions are not intended to encourage 
similarity or sameness. On the contrary, in advocating a varied education and 
integrated work for all, his purpose is not to make everyone a ‘jack of all trades’ in 
order to prevent a hierarchy of occupations and professions, but rather to ensure that 
all members of a community have ample opportunity to develop their own unique 
capacities and so contribute to the diversity and thus the cohesion of the whole. To 
further rebut Crowder’s analysis, it should be noted that in Durkheim’s scheme, 
mechanical solidarity coincides with a collective conscience that is highly religious 
and transcendental and with social norms that are reinforced through repressive 
sanctions manifest in the prevalence of penal law (Lukes, 1975: p. 158). These are 
all things which Kropotkin vehemently rejects. He explicitly insists that the 
development of a ‘greater effectual solidarity’ enables society to do away with 
systems of justice based on the principle of vengeance (Kropotkin, 1902: p. 10), and 
one of the central goals of his ethical project is to free human morality from the 
religious domain. Indeed, Crowder himself acknowledges that the religious aspect of 
mechanical solidarity and its reliance on punitive codes of justice represent ‘the very 
antithesis of the anarchist ideal’ (Crowder, 1991: p. 144). He subsequently suggests 
that Kropotkin might attempt to resolve this tension by turning to an organic 
conception of solidarity instead, but then goes on to identify the ways in which this 
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model, too, is incompatible with anarchist principles, since ‘According to Durkheim, 
organic solidarity is always found in conjunction with the State’ (ibid.: p. 145). 
Crowder’s use of Durkheim as an analytical framework is problematic because he 
ends up criticising Kropotkin for inconsistency in relation to a paradigm from which 
Kropotkin was actually attempting to distance himself. Indeed, it is not clear that 
Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity is either mechanical or organic, and it is surely 
unhelpful of Crowder to shoehorn his concept into this ill-fitting Durkheimian boot. In 
doing so, Crowder fails to properly acknowledge the central flaw in Durkheim’s 
mechanical-organic distinction, namely that specialisation leads to social solidarity. 
Specialisation under the division of labour may indeed produce a degree of 
interdependence between productive industries, but that does not necessarily equate 
to a general social solidarity. Indeed, Durkheim’s thesis actually ignores the fact that 
under capitalism the role of the bourgeoisie is essentially non-productive or 
intellectual work; they are thus dependent upon the working-class who fulfil their 
needs as consumers. The truer observation is that the capitalist division of labour 
leads inexorably to class conflict and individual alienation – a quite different picture 
to that of a mutually interdependent and solidaristic society of well-developed 
individuals. Naturally, Durkheim’s liberalism plays down the significance of class 
struggle, and he assumes that any conflicts of interest arising from the division of 
labour can be regulated by the state in order to preserve harmony. Of course, this 
notion is entirely at odds with anarchist principles, which hold that the state is in fact 
the guarantor of class oppression rather than a neutral arbiter. 
Collective development and the social production of individuality 
Whilst it is impossible to ascertain the precise contribution of each of mutual aid and 
competition between individuals as factors of evolution, Kropotkin insists that 
observation of the natural world tells us that the fittest species – those which have 
the best chances of survival and have attained a higher level of development – are 
those that practice mutual aid. As such, although mutual aid and competition are 
both laws of nature, it is the former which is more important as a factor of evolution 
(ibid.: p. 5). In this sense then, mutual aid, as an expression of the feeling of 
solidarity, is chiefly responsible for the development of species.  
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Kropotkin holds solidarity, mutual support and common union as the decisive factors 
in both the survival and evolution of human beings. Indeed, in his account of pre-
feudal ‘barbarian’ peoples, Kropotkin insists that, without the element of mutual aid 
enabled by the feeling of solidarity, societies would have become divided into 
partisan family groups and the level of development that was attained – in 
agriculture, technology, science, ethics and the arts – simply would not have been 
possible (ibid.: p. 124). Cooperation and mutual support are essential conditions of 
human progress; by contrast, social relations characterised by competition and 
egoism are not conducive to positive development. The more each member feels 
solidarity with his fellows, the more completely developed become the two qualities 
which drive progress: courage and free individual initiative. The more solidarity 
diminishes (often in circumstances of either exceptional scarcity or plenty), the more 
do these other two factors of progress, eventually leading to the decay of society 
(Kropotkin, 2002: p. 97). Further, claims Kropotkin, solidarity as manifest in 
institutions such as that of common ownership, which constitute manifestations of 
solidarity, contradict popular economic theories which assert that they are not 
compatible with progress, since in reality such institutions have often led to 
considerable advances (Kropotkin, 2006: p. 210). Kropotkin cites the example of the 
movement in Russia in the early nineteenth century and also in Poland, Greece, 
Bulgaria and Germany, back towards village community-style ownership, which 
became ‘the very means for introducing various improvements in agriculture and 
village life altogether’ (ibid.: p. 210-211). For Kropotkin, then, solidarity is no mere 
means of survival; it is the principal driving force of development in all areas of life. 
He identifies the key progression in the period of the ‘barbarians’ as the extension of 
solidarity to those outside of the village community, to those belonging to the wider 
‘stem’ and further still to other confederated communities (ibid.: p. 124-125). A 
corollary of solidarity’s expansion, observes Kropotkin, is manifest in the modification 
that occurred in systems of justice, the emphases of which were shifted from crude 
revenge-based conceptions to more sophisticated models founded on notions of 
compensation. This development, the influence of which is still predominant in 
contemporary law, occurred alongside the growth of a ‘system of habits intended to 
prevent the oppression of the masses by the minorities whose powers grew in 
proportion to the growing facilities for private accumulation of wealth’ (ibid.: p. 125). 
This again testifies to the morphological interdependence of solidarity and equality in 
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Kropotkin’s system of thought. The proximity of the concept of equality encourages a 
decontestation of solidarity through mutual aid which necessitates the prevention of 
the development of exploitative social relations.  
A further example of the way in which the notion of collective development is 
addressed in Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity can be identified in his account of 
mutual aid in the medieval period. Following the imposition of feudalism, whereby 
village communities fell under the subjugation of military specialists (lords, to whom 
the mass of peasants became serfs), there was established, Kropotkin notes, a 
series of ‘free cities’ across Europe: ‘Wherever men had found, or expected to find, 
some protection behind their town walls, they instituted their “co-jurations” [sic.], their 
“fraternities”, their “friendships”, united in one common idea, and boldly marching 
towards a new life of mutual support and liberty’ (ibid.: p. 134). Kropotkin argues that 
during this period solidarity continued to provide the basis for development through 
mutual aid. Indeed, he goes as far as to insist that the geneses of all the major 
developments made in the first four centuries of the medieval period are to be found, 
not in ‘the genius of individual heroes’, nor in ‘the mighty organization of huge States 
or the political capacities of their rulers’, but, rather, in precisely the same traditions 
of mutual aid which characterised the life of the village community (ibid.: p. 134). 
The fact that the individual-collective bond constitutes solidarity’s ineliminable feature 
raises questions not only as to the nature of social development, but also to that of 
the individual. How might Kropotkin’s theory of collective progress impact upon his 
account of individuality? Given that its microstructure is characterised by such 
emphasis on the social, cooperative aspect, how and in what form might Kropotkin’s 
concept of solidarity accommodate the notion of individual flourishing? Clearly, 
Kropotkin’s anarchism cannot harbour an egoistic, amoral conception like that 
promoted by Nietzsche and the individualist anarchists (see, for instance, Nietzsche, 
1968; Stirner, 1995). Rather, his must be a notion of individuality that remains 
morphologically compatible with his insistence upon the factor of cooperation as the 
mainspring of progress. 
Kropotkin’s notion of individuality is underpinned by his concept of freedom, which, 
like solidarity, constitutes a core concept within his ideological morphology. He 
makes a clear distinction between true freedom and the type propagated by the 
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individualist anarchists, whereby, Kropotkin claims, ‘minding one’s own business’ 
represents the only law to which one ought submit (Kropotkin, 2002: p. 173). Given 
Kropotkin’s emphasis on social interdependence, such an atomised view of 
individual freedom is clearly incompatible with his wider conceptual arrangement. For 
Kropotkin, true freedom requires not merely the negative notion of non-constraint, 
but the positive goal of human perfection, of ensuring conditions in which individuals 
are able to realise their full and unique potentialities. As George Crowder has noted, 
this account of freedom and individual development is clearly identified as a central 
principle in the first edition of Freedom, the anarchist journal of which Kropotkin was 
a founder: 
The human freedom to which our eyes are raised is no negative abstraction of 
license for individual egoism … We dream of the positive freedom which is 
essentially one with social feeling; of free scope for the social impulses, now distorted 
and compressed by Property, and its guardian the Law … of free scope for the 
spontaneity and individuality of each human being (quoted in Crowder, 1991: p. 124) 
This implies a high degree of morphological interdependence between freedom and 
solidarity; it is quite clear that according to Kropotkin’s anarchism neither freedom 
nor solidarity can flourish in the absence of the other. Whilst freedom enhances 
solidarity via the removal of constraints placed upon productive social relations by 
institutions of domination, in turn, solidarity underwrites freedom by providing a 
supportive context for its positive realisation in terms of individual development. 
Since solidarity complements freedom, it follows that, conversely, ‘the ideal of liberty 
of the individual’ is often ‘incorrectly understood’ in ‘surroundings where the notion of 
solidarity is insufficiently accentuated by institutions’ (Kropotkin, 2002: p. 143). It is 
within such social contexts that distorted notions of liberty take root, hence the 
prevalence of bourgeois conceptions of negative liberty in capitalist societies. 
Further, the robust network of solidaristic relations that results from the intercourse 
between Kropotkin’s concepts of freedom and solidarity constitutes a necessary 
condition for the development of individuality. It is only in a social setting 
characterised by freedom and solidarity that true individuality – the full realisation of 
each individual’s unique potential – can be achieved, since only in such an 
environment do the ‘infinite variety of capacities, temperaments and individual 
energies’ find their expression (ibid.: p. 123). Thus Kropotkin is able to circumvent 
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the individualist criticism that to assign precedence to society over the individual is in 
fact to shackle the development of individuality. Far from it, in Kropotkin’s scheme, it 
is the very solidarity of social relations which allows for the positive realisation of 
freedom and from which, owing to the endless diversity of humans’ capabilities, 
drives the development of individuality. 
So, Kropotkin’s conception of individuality is borne of the collective, but how might it 
be prevented from degenerating into the egoistic licence that he deplores? Might not 
the individual, having fulfilled their unique potential, seek to exercise their faculties to 
selfish ends? In Kropotkin’s scheme, the social character of individuality is 
maintained by reason and is limited by ‘conscientious obedience to an objective 
moral law’ (Crowder, 1991: p. 124). In fact, for Kropotkin, a key element of the 
achievement of true individuality involves ‘personal independence for working out a 
new, better form of society, in which the welfare of all would become a groundwork 
for the fullest development of the personality’ (Kropotkin, 1993: p. 28). As such, the 
personal capabilities which are developed through social life are ones which serve to 
perpetuate sociability and which are consistent with egalitarian and solidaristic ends. 
Indeed, the greater the extent of an individual’s free development, insists Kropotkin, 
the more confident we can be that they will ‘behave and act always in a direction 
useful to society’ (Kropotkin, 2002: p. 102). Morphologically, of course, solidarity’s 
ineliminable feature simply cannot account for an egoistic notion of individuality. 
Such a conception would serve to disrupt the individual-collective bond, and is thus 
incompatible with it. 
At a theoretical level, then, Kropotkin’s notion of individual development is shaped by 
the proximity of the two core concepts of freedom and solidarity. In practice, it is 
harmonised with the development of the collective and enabled by social relations 
characterised by mutual aid. This is particularly well illustrated, again, by the 
example of the guilds. The guilds were well suited, said Kropotkin, ‘to serve the need 
of union, without depriving the individual of his initiative’ (ibid.: p. 145). Indeed, 
through collective endeavour, the solidarity manifest in the guilds served not only to 
complement the liberty of the individual, but also to enhance the dynamism and 
creativity of each of its members. The example of the guilds is demonstrative of the 
arrangement of core concepts in the morphology of Kropotkin’s thought. It is the 
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interlinkage within the core of Kropotkin’s morphology of solidarity with the concept 
of liberty which allows for this particular notion of individual development to attach to 
solidarity’s ineliminable component. For the proximity of liberty ensures that 
Kropotkin’s notion of the individual is not subsumed by the collective; on the 
contrary, the individual is a product of social life. Indeed, Kropotkin argues that the 
scale of progress – in agriculture, industry and the arts, to name but three areas – 
achieved under the guild system was proof that social organisation based on both 
solidarity and liberty drives human development and creativity (ibid.: p. 162). For 
Kropotkin, the guilds provide fine examples of solidarity and liberty operating 
harmoniously; they represent ‘a close union for mutual aid and support, for 
consumption and production, and for social life altogether, without imposing upon 
men the fetters of the State, but giving full liberty of expression to the creative genius 
of each separate group of individuals’ (ibid.: p. 153). Importantly for Kropotkin, of 
course, the guild was not a collection of individuals placed under the control of the 
state or an external authority, but a free union of people connected by a common 
occupation. For according to Kropotkin it is the centralised state – not the solidarity 
of the collective – that stifles the energy and the creativity of the individual (ibid.: p. 
162). From the moment of its inception, observes Kropotkin, the state ‘systematically 
weeded out all institutions in which the mutual-aid tendency had formerly found its 
expression’ (ibid.: p. 186). In other words, the state served to fundamentally 
undermine social solidarity, and in its absorption of all social functions it inevitably 
led to the development of individualism (ibid.: p. 187). 
Kropotkin’s distinction between individualism and individuality requires some 
emphasis. Whilst the former connotes egoistic behaviour and social relations of a 
competitive or exploitative character, the latter refers to ‘the fullest development of 
the personality’ (Kropotkin, 1993: p. 28). Further, for Kropotkin, the two notions are 
fundamentally incompatible. Characterising contemporary society as suffering from a 
lack of individual initiative, Kropotkin argues that, ‘Economical individualism has not 
kept its promise: it did not result in any striking development of individuality’ (ibid.). In 
Kropotkin’s view, the capitalist system has failed to encourage this development 
because it has granted the individual freedom in only the economic sphere. (And, 
even then, it is a negative freedom available only to a propertied minority.) In other 
spheres – political, intellectual, artistic, and so on – individual rights lessened as 
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economic individualism and its corresponding state institutions were reinforced. 
Conversely, for Kropotkin, an economy that ensures the welfare of all serves to 
provide the very basis for the development of individuality. This again points to the 
morphological proximity to Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity of that of equality. The 
notion of individual development incorporated within Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity 
relies upon the preservation of certain conditions in which individuality can thrive. 
Conclusion 
This analysis has shown that Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity comprises, in addition 
to the ineliminable component of the individual-collective bond, four other sub-
conceptual idea-components: universal inclusion; community; common interest; and 
the social production of individuality. The internal morphology of Kropotkin’s concept 
is displayed in Figure 4: 
 
 
 
I have demonstrated that Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity inevitably involves the 
ineliminable component of the individual-collective bond. For Kropotkin this central 
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Figure 4: Kropotkin's concept of solidarity 
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that of the collective, we establish a basis for cooperation as an invaluable tool in the 
struggle for existence. In other words, the individual-collective bond is what allows 
for the development of mutual aid as a factor of evolution. (Importantly, in exploring 
the link between the terms ‘mutual aid’ and ‘solidarity’, I argued that Kropotkin 
employs them in such a way that mutual aid can be best understood as an empirical 
manifestation of his concept of solidarity.) Further, according to Kropotkin, the 
moment of self-identification with the collective is also that from which stem human 
moral conceptions. To identify oneself with the wider collective to which one belongs 
is to enable feelings of sympathy and subsequently benevolence which represent the 
starting point of ethical thinking. However, it is the additional idea-components that 
Kropotkin attaches to the ineliminable core that allow for such a decontestation of the 
individual-collective bond in the first place. Investigation of the microstructure of 
Kropotkin’s concept, and of its position in relation to other concepts within the 
morphology of his ideology is essential for a full understanding of what he means by 
‘solidarity’. Accordingly, a morphological analysis has allowed us to ascertain the 
way in which various important categories of meaning are fulfilled. 
We were able to deduce from Kropotkin’s notion of a necessarily widening circle of 
solidarity that his solidaristic ideal incorporated the notion of universal inclusion. The 
logical endpoint of an expanding circle of inclusion is one which embraces the 
entirety of humankind and is not limited to more narrow denominations based on 
race, class, nation or some other unifying characteristic. This was evidenced by 
Kropotkin’s association of ethical progress with the idea of overcoming the moral 
double standard which not only impedes the advancement of solidaristic relations but 
allows for the justification of wrongdoings to those seen as ‘other’. Kropotkin then 
went further, to argue that the expansion of solidarity is in fact a precondition for the 
survival of solidarity in itself. If the boundaries of solidarity become fixed, he argued, 
if they are not encouraged to explore new frontiers, solidaristic relations inevitably 
succumb to egoism and are swallowed up by their surroundings. The notion of the 
ever-expanding collective – culturally shaped by the influence on Kropotkin of Guyau 
– is one which we might seek to operationalise for the purpose of contemporary 
struggles against social ills. Indeed, a politics rooted in the idea of a pervasive circle 
of inclusion is one which is well-positioned to confront problems such as extreme 
poverty in the developing world, increasing economic inequality in the more affluent 
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nations, and racism, homophobia and gender discrimination more generally – not to 
mention the present Syrian refugee crisis. 
The notion of community is important for Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity since it 
reinforces the feeling of common interest and facilitates social interaction, both of 
which are prerequisites for the flourishing of solidaristic relations. Indeed, it is 
societies in which regular social contact is prevalent that exhibit greater levels of 
solidarity, since the feelings of familiarity and of a shared identity is strengthened 
when we experience social life. Conversely, social bonds are weakest in atomised 
societies in which individuals do not experience the same level of interaction and as 
a result are less likely to develop reciprocal awareness. The key point here is that 
although the human capacity for solidarity has been gradually developed through a 
long period of evolution, the strength of its manifestation in real terms is dependent 
on environmental factors, namely upon a social arrangement which facilitates 
familiarity and reinforces the feeling of a shared identity amongst members of a 
collective. 
The notion of common interest is lent morphological support through the proximity of 
Kropotkin’s concept of equality. Equality serves to anchor the idea-component of 
common interest to the ineliminable component since it serves to preserve the 
necessary conditions in which it can develop. The evolution of a shared identity and 
of a collective recognition of a common interest is dependent in part upon the 
maintenance of equality in all spheres of life, since it insures against the social 
stratification and partiality brought about by class divisions. 
The final component incorporated in Kropotkin’s concept of solidarity is the social 
production of individuality. Kropotkin emphasises the importance of collective 
development, which refers to the part played by solidarity in human progress and the 
evolution of our social structures and ethical codes, ideas that Kropotkin elaborated 
at length in Mutual Aid and Ethics. The way in which Kropotkin addresses the notion 
of individual development is less straightforward, but is logically necessitated by his 
emphasis on that of the social body, which inevitably leads to questions about the 
place of the individual and individuality. As such, we observed the morphological 
importance of Kropotkin’s concept of freedom, the presence of which within the core 
of his ideology impacts significantly on his decontestation of individual development. 
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For in advocating a positive conception of freedom, Kropotkin is able to negate 
negative, egoistic notions of individuality. His own conception of individuality thus 
incorporates the positive goal of human perfection, of ensuring the conditions in 
which each individual is best placed to realise their creative potentialities to the full. 
Of course, Kropotkin’s argument is that the best conditions for such development are 
characterised by social relations based on solidarity. 
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5. Bookchin’s concept of solidarity 
There is a pleasure in the pathless woods, 
There is a rapture on the lonely shore, 
There is society where none intrudes, 
By the deep Sea, and music in its roar; 
I love not man the less, but nature more 
Lord Byron, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage  
(Byron, 1995: p. 243) 
This chapter explores the concept of solidarity as found in the work of Murray 
Bookchin. Bookchin’s scholarly output is extensive, and his synthesis of anarchism 
and ecological thought that he labelled ‘social ecology’ is elaborated – and, indeed, 
has evolved – over a series of writings published between the time of his initial 
discovery of anarchism in the early 1960s and his gradual break from the ideology 
during the latter half of the 1990s (Biehl, 2007).  
The legacy of Bookchin’s work has been the subject of much controversy, within 
both the anarchist and ecological movements. Indeed, appraisals of his contribution 
range in tone from earnest affirmation to near-vitriolic denunciation. The present 
study is not the place to discuss the whys and wherefores of Bookchin’s complex 
reputation; suffice to acknowledge that he was and is a polarising figure and to note 
also that much of the negative coverage has tended to focus on the individual rather 
than his work. Indeed, as Andy Price notes in Recovering Bookchin (his attempt to 
discount the Bookchin caricature), a significant portion of the critical literature ‘fails to 
deal with Bookchin’s philosophical and political positions’ and stems instead from his 
combative, argumentative style and perceived political ambitions, with the resulting 
critiques appearing ‘ad hominem, personal and unsubstantiated’ (Price, 2012: p. 25). 
Nevertheless, many commentators have assessed Bookchin’s work in much kinder 
terms. David Goodway assures us that he should be considered the ‘foremost 
contemporary anarchist thinker’ (Goodway, 1989: p. 11) and, indeed, despite his 
jettisoning anarchism towards the end of his career and his advocacy of 
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‘Communalism’ from that point until his death in 2006, Bookchin’s contribution to the 
contemporary anarchist canon over a period of several decades remains virtually 
unrivalled. In any case, the originality of Bookchin’s thought – he is described by 
Peter Marshall in his history of anarchism as ‘the thinker who has most renewed 
anarchist thought and action since the Second World War’ (Marshall, 1992: p. 602) – 
is such that his influence surely transcends the bounds of the anarchist tradition. In 
its insistence upon the eminent compatibility of traditional anarchist principles with 
ecological ideas, Bookchin’s thought has exerted a powerful and enduring influence 
well beyond the reaches of the anarchist movement and his ideas have helped to 
shape numerous contemporary green movements and a variety of forms of 
ecological thought, particularly in the United States. Notably, following an ideological 
realignment under Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party has, since the turn 
of the millennium, adopted a position influenced heavily by Bookchin’s theory of 
Communalism (Taylor, 2014). Further, Bookchin’s exploration of the conceptual 
convergence between the two ideological families of anarchism and ecologism left 
him convinced that, ‘an anarchist society, far from being a remote ideal, has become 
a precondition for the practice of ecological principles’ (Bookchin, 2004: p. 35). In 
short, Bookchin’s contention was that not only were anarchism and ecologism 
theoretically complementary; in terms of an effective and coherent programmatic 
politics they were inextricable. 
The purpose here is to ascertain the place of solidarity in the conceptual morphology 
of Bookchin’s thought and to explore the way in which that concept is decontested. 
Although his 1982 opus, The Ecology of Freedom, is scattered with references to 
solidarity, at no point in that work does Bookchin proffer a direct conceptualisation or 
explicit definition as such. More often than not, the word ‘solidarity’ is deployed either 
as a descriptor for the outlook of ‘organic societies’ (preliterate and essentially 
egalitarian human communities that preceded the emergence of hierarchy and were 
characterised, Bookchin claims, by ‘their intense solidarity internally and with the 
natural world’ [Bookchin, 2005: p. 110]), or else as a form of social tie usurped or 
subverted, or rendered latent – but certainly not eradicated – by the onset of 
hierarchical relations. 
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Nevertheless, despite the lack of an explicit definition, there is evidence enough in 
The Ecology of Freedom to support the notion that Bookchin does have a concept of 
solidarity, and that its place in the conceptual constellation of social ecology is a 
significant one. Indeed, exegesis of this seminal work, supplemented by analytical 
exploration of his other important writings on social ecology,14 makes it quite possible 
to discern the way in which a Bookchinian concept of solidarity is decontested. 
Accordingly, this chapter will argue that solidarity constitutes a core concept in 
Bookchin’s thought and that a particular decontestation of solidarity sits at the very 
heart of his social ecology thesis. In his insistence that the ecological crisis is social 
in origin, that our domination of nature has its roots in our domination of each other – 
a perspective which at the turn of the century made him, according to Andrew Light, 
‘one of the most widely read ecological thinkers in the last thirty years’ (Light, 1998: 
p. 6) – Bookchin implies that a more harmonious relationship between humanity and 
nature necessitates an internal solidarity within human society. Solidarity is therefore 
a core concept within Bookchin’s ideology, since it constitutes a fundamental base 
for its political focus at the most general level and provides one of the basic 
principles from which its political objectives are derived. Indeed, the removal of 
solidarity from the conceptual map of Bookchin’s social ecology renders his ideology 
unrecognisable as such. 
The chapter will go on to explore how Bookchin’s concept of solidarity is fleshed out, 
and will argue that there is a strong morphological link between the core concept of 
solidarity and Bookchin’s proposals for a rejuvenated notion of citizenship and 
radical direct democracy. Citizenship, I argue, constitutes an adjacent concept within 
the Bookchinian morphology, since by way of its relationship to solidarity it lends that 
core concept ‘greater logical precision and cultural shape’ (Hazareesingh, 1997: p. 
46). As we shall see, the concept of citizenship is central to Bookchin’s proposals for 
‘libertarian municipalism’. Libertarian municipalism is essentially the politics derived 
from the more general, philosophical position inhabited by social ecology. As such, 
its central prescriptions can be said to represent adjacent concepts, since they 
enable the application of the abstract core to a more concrete political world. This is 
certainly the case with Bookchin’s decontestation of citizenship, which, influenced 
                                                          
14
 Bookchin takes the most significant of these to be The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of 
Citizenship (1987), Remaking Society (1990a) and The Philosophy of Social Ecology (1996) 
(Bookchin, 2005: p. 18). 
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heavily by the Athenian notion of philia (translated by Bookchin as ‘solidarity’) he 
sees as an essential ingredient for the dissolution of hierarchy and the fostering of 
social solidarity internally, and subsequently in an ecological sense – between 
human society and the natural world. Further, the chapter will explore in more detail 
how Bookchin’s ideas for solidarity through citizenship are manifest in his more 
specific practical proposals for libertarian municipalism. In terms of ideological 
morphology, these proposals – for institutions such as the citizens’ assembly and the 
confederation – constitute peripheral concepts, since they enable Bookchin’s 
ideology to relate more specifically to the political world; they give concrete meaning 
to the abstract core concepts by providing practical policy initiatives and political 
objectives. 
The ecology of solidarity 
At the core of the social ecology thesis sits a fundamental and somewhat 
controversial claim. It is expressed by Bookchin on the very first page of The Ecology 
of Freedom in the incisive formulation that ‘the very notion of the domination of 
nature by man15 stems from the very real domination of human by human’ 
(Bookchin, 2005: p. 65). Social ecology thus consists in an insistence upon the social 
origin of environmental degradation, upon the direct link between hierarchical human 
relations and the ecologically catastrophic dislocation of humanity from nature. This 
central supposition serves to set social ecology fundamentally apart from various 
other approaches to nature: (i) Marxism, which, as Bookchin sees it, holds 
humanity’s mastery of nature to be a necessary condition of freedom (Bookchin, 
2005: p. 74); (ii) liberal, reformist environmentalism,16 the purpose of which, 
according to Bookchin, is merely to render the natural world ‘more serviceable for 
human use’ (ibid.: p. 85); and, (iii) the ‘biocentric’ assumptions of deep ecology that 
in terms of inherent worth value human beings as precisely and only equal to all 
                                                          
15
 And Bookchin does mean ‘man’, tracing, as he does, the emergence of social hierarchy and the 
consequent domination of nature partly to the gradual shift away from ‘matricentrism’ (a term he 
borrows from Erich Fromm [Fromm, 1973]) in organic society towards increasingly patriarchal 
institutions (Bookchin, 2005: pp. 147-150). 
16
 In Bookchin’s terminology, there is a key distinction to be made between ‘environmentalism’ and 
‘ecology’ or ‘ecologism’. The former denotes an ‘instrumental’ approach, which views nature merely 
as a store of ‘natural resources’ for human usage (thus its focus is on ameliorating, but essentially 
maintaining a dominatory, dislocated relationship); the latter, a notion of a humanity involved in nature 
as a part of an interdependent whole (Bookchin, 2005: pp. 85-86). 
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other organisms, and in characterising the ecological crisis simply as ‘man-made’ fail 
to identify the true social bases of the problem (ibid.: p. 55).17 
From the assertion that the geneses of anti-ecological outcomes are embodied in the 
hierarchical nature of social life follows the qualification that ecological problems are 
in fact social problems as opposed to spiritual, governmental, technological or 
biological ones. And social problems, insists Bookchin, require (radical and 
genuinely) social solutions; they cannot be resolved through philosophical 
reorientation, technological innovation or bourgeois reformism. The first cause of 
ecological degradation is not human alienation from nature, but society’s inevitable 
tendency to project the logic of its own internal associations into the arena of its 
interaction with the natural world, thus reproducing a relationship with nature that is 
reflective of those within society itself. As such, if internal social relations are 
characterised by hierarchy and domination, the relationship between human society 
and nature is bound to reflect that. What is required, then, is an institutional 
reconfiguration according to a utopian, revolutionary politics which serves to 
transform the social dimension so as to free it from the hierarchical sensibilities, 
practices and institutions whose historical development have coincided with the 
advent of ‘civilisation’. Bookchin terms this stream of social history, the ‘legacy of 
domination’, and his project consists substantially in the rediscovery from its 
dialectical antithesis – the ‘legacy of freedom’ – the latent traditions and social 
patterns characteristic of a free and consequently ecological society (Bookchin, 
2005: pp. 11-12). In this sense, Bookchin is to a certain extent following Kropotkin 
(although the ecological concerns are afforded greater emphasis) and, indeed, he 
explicitly acknowledges the fact that social ecology sits comfortably within the 
tradition of Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid (ibid.: p. 30). His idea of excavating and 
reinvigorating the ‘legacy of freedom’ is very similar to his predecessor’s notion that 
the traditions and habits of mutual aid and the instinct of solidarity remain intact in 
some small way no matter the extent to which society is dominated by political 
                                                          
17
 Bookchin’s concerns about the potentially reactionary implications of some of the central 
assumptions of deep ecology are not necessarily without foundation. However, it has been suggested 
by Roy Krøvel that deep ecology and social ecology may not be entirely mutually contradictory, as is 
often assumed. Indeed, notes Krøvel, in the work of Arne Næss – deep ecology’s most influential 
thinker – there is nothing which ‘proscribes serious engagement with the real and important social 
issues raised by Bookchin, as later developments in deep ecology have demonstrated’ (Krøvel, 2013: 
p. 36). 
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authority (see, for example, Kropotkin, 2006: p. vii). Central to Bookchin’s project of 
recovery is the reconstitution of ‘a communion of humanity and nature that patently 
[expresses] the communion of humans with each other; a solidarity of the community 
with the world of life that [articulates] an intense solidarity within the community itself’ 
(Bookchin, 2005: p. 129). Thus the morphological centrality of solidarity to 
Bookchin’s project of social ecology is confirmed. In order for us to participate in and 
contribute to, rather than use, exploit or dominate – or, at the other extreme, revere, 
fetishise or defer to – the natural world, the humanity-nature relation must be 
fundamentally solidaristic in character. In turn, the realisation of solidarity between 
human beings and the biosphere depends entirely upon the constitution of 
solidaristic relations within human society itself. 
Let us now consider the way in which Bookchin’s concept of solidarity is 
decontested. Thus far we have established its importance but are yet to gain an idea 
of what the concept actually looks like in terms of its ideational content. Perhaps the 
closest Bookchin comes to an explicit definition in The Ecology of Freedom is when 
discussing the ‘The Outlook of Organic Society’ in Chapter 2. In reviewing the work 
of anthropologist Dorothy Lee on Wintu Native Americans (Lee, 1959: p. 42), 
Bookchin argues that the lack of possessive verbs in Wintu language is reflective of 
an absence of ‘coercive and domineering values’ and of a prevalence of cooperative 
ones instead (Bookchin, 2005: p. 111). Rather than saying, ‘I have [a family member 
or possession]’, the Wintu say ‘I live with …’ implying, claims Bookchin, a ‘deep 
sense of mutual respect for person and a high regard for individual voluntarism’ and, 
moreover, a ‘profound sense of unity between the individual and the group’ (ibid.). 
Here then is a direct reference to the individual-collective bond that constitutes the 
ineliminable component found in all concepts of solidarity. This central feature is 
fleshed out with notions of mutual respect – manifest social relations of non-
domination – and the firmly established virtue of mutual aid. 
Bookchin observes of another Native American tribe – the Hopi – that their society 
was similarly ‘geared entirely toward group solidarity’ (ibid.). This solidarity entailed, 
Bookchin tells us, the cooperative undertaking of nearly all the basic tasks of the 
community, and the installation in all individuals of ‘a sense of responsibility for the 
community’ (ibid.). Cooperation and mutual aid, along with a deep feeling of 
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responsibility for others and for the collective generally are thus important factors in 
Bookchin’s ideal of solidarity. Further, ‘from this feeling of unity between the 
individual and the community,’ argues Bookchin, ‘emerges a feeling of unity between 
the community and its environment’ (ibid.: p. 112). Organic societies, Bookchin tells 
us, retain a conscious link to the natural world that involves a real sense of 
symbiosis, of ‘communal interdependence and cooperation’ with non-human nature. 
On these terms, the organic community is thought to be ‘part of the balance of 
nature’; it constitutes ‘a truly ecological community or ecocommunity peculiar to its 
ecosystem, with an active sense of participation in the overall environment and the 
cycle of nature’ (ibid.: p. 112). The solidarity practiced within human society is thus 
reproduced in humans’ dealings with their surroundings, and the collective 
consciousness of a humanity-nature symbiosis encourages and enables society’s 
ecological existence. Indeed, Bookchin suggests that the ‘human artfulness and 
natural fulfilment’ expressed by many artefacts of the Neolithic period support the 
notion that human solidarity in matricentric, horticultural societies was extended to 
the natural world, that so long as an ‘internal solidarity persisted, nature was its 
beneficiary’ (ibid.: p. 129). 
Bookchin identifies a series of social practices and norms that characterise 
preliterate societies and that serve to reinforce the feeling of social solidarity (White, 
2003: p. 38). The first is the practice of usufruct: ‘the freedom of individuals in a 
community to appropriate resources merely by virtue of the fact that they are using 
them’ (Bookchin, 2005: p. 116). Usufruct entails not merely communal proprietorship 
– the notion of property of any kind simply does not exist in organic societies. The 
emphasis is on function rather than possession: ‘need, in effect, still orchestrates 
work to the point where property of any kind, communal or otherwise, has yet to 
acquire independence from the claims of satisfaction’ (ibid.: p. 117). For Bookchin, 
the prevalence of usufruct over property is indicative of a similar predominance of 
‘complementarity’ (‘the disinterested willingness to pool needed things and needed 
services’) over ‘interest’ (‘the rational satisfaction of egotism’) (ibid.). Objects are only 
valued according to their usefulness and, as such, are most valuable when they are 
in use. This notion of use-value dovetails with the principle of need as the basis for 
provision, since objects – whether they be food, building materials or hunting 
equipment – become available to all who have the need to use them. It is not difficult 
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to envision how such practices might produce ecological outcomes: by definition they 
preclude the stockpiling of ‘resources’, negate the acquisitive logic of consumerism, 
and render futile the principle of ‘ownership’ for its own sake. In short, they reject the 
modern identification of ‘limitless growth with “progress” and the “mastery of nature” 
with “civilization”’ (Bookchin, 1984: p. 49). In doing so, the need – or rather the 
tendency – for exploiting the natural world beyond its limits is greatly reduced, if not 
eradicated. The institution of usufruct is distinctly and explicitly anti-capitalist, and for 
Bookchin, it hints at one of many ways in which non- or anti-capitalist societies may 
enjoy a more productive and harmonious relationship with the natural world. 
The second practice is embodied in the principle of the ‘irreducible minimum’, a label 
Bookchin borrows from the anthropologist Paul Radin, and which refers to ‘the 
inalienable right [of every individual in the community] to food, shelter and clothing’, 
‘irrespective of the amount of work contributed by the individual to the acquisition of 
the means of life’ (Radin, 1960: p. 11, Bookchin, 2005: p. 123). The principle of the 
irreducible minimum was absolutely integral to the solidarity of the community, since 
it institutionalised society’s recognition of the value of each individual as a part of the 
collective. Indeed, Radin tells us, to deny a person those essentials of life – food, 
shelter and so on – was effectively to say that that person ‘no longer existed, that he 
was dead’ (Radin, 1960: p. 106). The irreducible minimum represented an act of 
acknowledgment on the part of society of the humanity and subjectivity of the 
individual; it served to cement the individual-collective bond fundamental to group 
solidarity. In Bookchin’s view, then, this principle was absolutely integral to the 
affirmation of solidarity in organic societies. 
Further, as Bookchin sees it, the social practices captured by Radin in the notion of 
the irreducible minimum were symptomatic of organic society’s commitment to an 
‘unarticulated principle of freedom’ (Bookchin, 2005: p. 218). This freedom is 
decontested in a positive sense, for implied within the notion of the irreducible 
minimum is an acknowledgement of and a compensation for natural inequalities in 
physical, intellectual and all other kinds of abilities. According to Bookchin, what we 
have here is a concept of ‘the equality of unequals’, decontested as ‘a freely given, 
unreflective form of social behaviour and distribution that compensates inequalities 
and does not yield to the fictive claim … that everyone is equal’ (ibid.: p. 219). The 
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equality of unequals represents the third social practice that bolsters solidarity in 
organic society. By contrast, an equality which sees all as equal in terms of ability is 
obviously misguided and, furthermore, ‘denies the commonality and solidarity of the 
community by subverting its responsibilities to compensate for differences between 
individuals’ (ibid.). In actuality, such a concept of equality – ‘the inequality of equals’, 
as Bookchin would have it – is often used to deal with people on very unequal terms: 
‘the same burdens are imposed on very disparate individuals who have very different 
abilities to deal with them’ (Bookchin, 1990a: p. 98). This concept of pseudo-equality 
therefore serves to undermine social solidarity since it erases the notion of collective 
responsibility for the satisfaction of personal needs and, in its disregard and 
subsequent lack of compensation for individual differences, fails to affirm the 
freedom of the individual.  Indeed, for Bookchin, to subscribe to such a concept is 
inevitably to harness difference to the production of hierarchy. To invert it, on the 
other hand, to encourage an egalitarian notion of difference of the kind Bookchin 
identifies in organic societies is to institutionalise interdependence and solidarity, to 
render individuals in a collective ‘members of a larger natural whole’ (ibid.: p. 49). 
But the equality of unequals is not merely to do with ‘compensatory mechanisms’. 
Rather, it concerns a much more general attitude on the part of society and its 
members, or ‘an outlook that manifests itself in a sense of care, responsibility, and a 
decent concern for human and non-human beings’ (ibid.: p. 99). These are all 
practices Bookchin associates with a solidaristic society. More importantly, the 
principle of the equality of unequals ‘may rest on emotional determinants such as a 
sense of sympathy, community, and a tradition that evokes a sense of solidarity’ 
(ibid.). However, Bookchin argues, in organic societies, practices and codes such as 
the equality of unequals took the form of customs, which, by virtue of those 
communities’ characteristic parochialism, did not apply to non-members. In order for 
the bounds of solidarity to be widened and for its practices to be extended 
universally, says Bookchin, those customs must become ethics (ibid.). In other 
words, they must be exercised not merely as some distantly inherited communal 
habit, but rather be recognised as possessing an inherent moral character. The 
practitioners of solidarity in Bookchin’s utopia will not follow its codes merely by way 
of routine; they will actively seek to reinforce social solidarity because they know it is 
the right thing to do. 
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The final defining characteristic of organic society, Bookchin tells us, is a 
commitment to an ‘ethics of complementarity’. For Bookchin, complementarity is 
integral to non-hierarchical social organisation; it is the antithesis of the command 
and obedience ethic that would be ushered in with the later emergence of civilisation. 
Indeed, the function of these ethics was to guard against precisely that: the 
development of dominatory social relations. Complementarity serves to oppose any 
claim of one member of a group to dominate another, and subsequently, given the 
central claim of Bookchin’s social ecology, ‘any claim that human beings have a 
“right” to dominate first nature’ (Bookchin, 2005: p. 40). Rather, says Bookchin, such 
an ethics emphasises the value of a diversity of life which contributes to a more 
genuine ‘wholeness’; it produces a solidarity of the whole through the heterogeneity 
and interdependence of its components (ibid.). 
In Bookchin’s analysis, then, the systems of economic distribution prevalent in 
organic society were essentially organised according to the famous communistic 
principle, ‘from each according to their ability, to each according to their needs’ – 
long before the maxim was popularised by Marx in the nineteenth century. In 
morphological terms, this particular decontestation of equality is, as Bookchin himself 
insists, ‘inextricably tied to freedom’ (Bookchin, 2005: p. 219). Indeed, says 
Bookchin, an authentic freedom necessarily entails the recognition of inequality and 
‘transcends necessity by establishing a culture and distributive system based on 
compensation for the stigma of natural “privilege”’ (ibid.). On these terms, the 
development of civilisation would ultimately result in the subversion of freedom, as its 
expression in the principle of the equality of unequals gave way to notions of justice, 
which called for balance rather than compensation. For Bookchin, ‘justice’ therefore 
constitutes a manifestation of the ‘inequality of equals’ (ibid.: p. 224), since to assert 
that ‘everyone is equal before the law’, is to overlook the myriad natural differences 
and inequalities between individuals. Accordingly, the conception of justice whose 
development signalled the decline of organic societies and ushered in the era of 
civilization represents, in Bookchin’s view, a complete reversal of the genuine 
‘freedom’ enabled by an equality of unequals. 
Nevertheless, notes Bookchin, such a conception of justice does not necessarily 
consist in a complete negation of genuine freedom. Although it brought about the 
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subversion of the egalitarian practices of organic society, it also, he observes, 
prepared the ground for freedom ‘by removing the archaisms that linger[ed] on from 
the folk world of equality’ (ibid.: p. 225). For, despite its authenticity, in reality the 
conception of ‘primordial freedom’ supported by the solidaristic practices outlined 
above was one marked by an intense parochialism. The solidarity expressed in the 
practices and principles of usufruct, the irreducible minimum and the equality of 
unequals was not extended beyond the relatively local circle of the immediate 
community; it ‘made no real provisions for the rights of the stranger, the outsider, 
who was not linked by marriage or ritual to the kin group’ (ibid.). In short, in organic 
society, the subject of solidarity pertained to a relatively exclusive social circle, of 
which the criteria for inclusion were both particular and narrow. ‘The notion of a 
humanity in which all human beings are considered united by a common genesis’, 
Bookchin informs us, ‘was still largely alien’ (ibid.). Conversely, in its application of 
‘the rule of equivalence’, in its insistence upon equality before the law, the new 
concept of justice very slowly began to break down the barriers erected by the 
parochial solidarities of primordial communities. This gradual process would 
culminate, Bookchin notes, in the granting of citizenship by Emperor Caracalla on 
the entire non-slave male population of the Roman Empire, an act which marked the 
first formal expression of the notion of a ‘universal humanitas’ (ibid.: p. 228). Despite 
suggestions that the principal aim of Caracalla’s Constitutio Antoniniana was not the 
extension of social inclusion, but rather that of the Empire’s tax base – not to 
mention the propagandistic opportunities spawned by the edict – (Southern, 2001: 
pp. 51-52) the move was historically unprecedented, and became the first juridical 
recognition of humankind’s common genesis. The ‘horizons of the human political 
community’, as Bookchin puts it, had been suddenly and vastly enlarged (Bookchin, 
2005: p. 228). The break from parochialism had set in motion the long, gradual 
process of an extension of the circle of inclusion and ultimately given rise to the 
possibility of a universal human solidarity. 
To summarise our findings thus far: Emerging from the analysis is an ideational trio 
at the core of Bookchin’s ideology, comprising the morphologically interdependent 
concepts of freedom, equality and, more importantly for our purposes, solidarity. 
These three concepts are interlinked in such a way that each serves to shape the 
content of the others. Freedom is decontested in a peculiar way: as an ability for the 
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positive realisation of potential that is enabled only by egalitarian means and as a 
product of collective unity. Equality is decontested as pertaining to a recognition of 
and compensation for natural differences and to a mode of provision geared to the 
satisfaction of needs. Solidarity is both a necessary condition and an inevitable 
product of these two neighbouring central concepts. Its interlinkage with equality is 
particularly important in terms of the decontestation of its own ideational anatomy. 
Bookchin’s needs-based concept of equality allows for a much richer notion of 
solidarity than one bound up merely with notions of shared interest and reciprocity 
(which ‘marks the first step toward exchange’ [ibid.: p. 117]). Indeed, according to 
Bookchin, reciprocity is far more likely to lead to the forming of ‘alliances between 
groups’, rather than the fostering of ‘internal solidarity within them’ (ibid.: p. 118). For 
Bookchin, then, solidarity connotes something altogether more fundamental than that 
which ensures merely that the constituent parts of the whole hang together 
harmoniously. In these circumstances, he tells us, cooperation is ‘more than just a 
cement between members of the group; it is an organic melding of identities that, 
without losing individual uniqueness, retains and fosters the unity of consociation’ 
(ibid.: p. 118). So the solidarity found in organic communities consists not merely in 
the social bonds between members or in some unifying characteristic afforded 
separate recognition by each and all. Rather, it finds its expression in the unique 
identity of the collective qua the collective; it is manifest in the very real subjectivity of 
the group itself. The implication here is that solidarity precedes individuality and, 
indeed, for Bookchin the solidarity of the collective is a precondition for the 
development of human uniqueness. Without the basis of a solidary collective identity, 
there is simply no prospect for the emergence of the individual. Equally, a solidarity 
which consists in the superficial bonds and alliances founded contractually on the 
basis of interest – in short, an agreement to consociation by individuals for their 
mutual benefit – is no solidarity at all. For Bookchin, therefore, the lack in organic 
societies of ‘an “I” with which to replace a “we”,’ points not to a deficiency in 
individuality, but instead to a richness of community (ibid.: p. 117). In ecological 
terms, this richness is invaluable, for it produces a relationship between human 
society and the non-human natural world that is characterised by symbiosis rather 
than domination. As such, to paraphrase Bookchin, as long as solidarity persists, 
nature is its beneficiary (ibid.: p. 129). 
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The adjacency of citizenship 
For Bookchin, the notion of a universal humanity remains devoid of any real meaning 
unless it is given ‘existential reality by self-assertive personalities who enjoy a visible 
degree of autonomy’ (ibid.: pp. 228-229). Put differently, individuality represents a 
necessary morphological companion to the development of a more inclusive 
solidarity. The decline of organic society and the rise of civilisation had inevitably 
resulted in the decline of primordial parochial solidarities. For Bookchin this gave rise 
to a need for the development of new social patterns that would allow for the 
individual to function in an ‘increasingly atomised’ social world (ibid.: p. 229). In the 
absence of the intense sense of collectivity that had characterised organic society, 
says Bookchin, this was achieved through the development of a ‘resourceful, 
comparatively self-sufficient, and self-reliant ego that could readily adapt itself to … a 
society that was losing its human scale and developing more complex political 
institutions and commercial ties’ (ibid.). On Bookchin’s reading, classical antiquity 
was marked by an unprecedented level of development in the social, economic and 
political spheres that rendered previous modes of association simply unworkable. 
Whilst the shift from intense, parochial solidarities to more outward-looking, self-
assertive individuals was not a direct corollary of these developments – indeed, the 
evolution of the two phenomena necessarily coincided – it is a truism that social 
networks based solely on kinship, marriage and tribal ties simply were not 
compatible with emerging modes of technology, distribution and association. As 
such, says Bookchin, the increasingly sophisticated political realm – and indeed 
society generally – witnessed a steady transformation of the notion of individuality. 
Indeed, the rise of civilisation signaled the departure of the parochial forms of group 
solidarity that had characterised organic society, and impelled the development of 
‘autonomous egos … free to undertake the varied functions of citizenship’ (ibid.: p. 
231).  
However, this was no unfettered individuality (or, more properly, individualism) like 
that promulgated by the bourgeois classes of European modernity. Quite to the 
contrary, it was a conception of individuality whose development took place on an 
explicitly social level, whose purpose was not to divorce the individual from the 
collective, but rather to reinforce that essential link in the context of a changing social 
setting. This was the rise of the autonomous individual-as-citizen and the 
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crystallisation of all the notions of collective responsibility and civic engagement 
implied therein. Its function, initially, at least, was not to produce a disconnected 
assortment of monadic, amoral and asocial egoists, but to aid individual participation 
in the political collective – in a word, citizenship – which reinforced the solidarity of 
the collective. 
In Bookchin’s ideology, citizenship lends morphological support to solidarity; it 
constitutes a means by which social solidarity is created, nurtured and preserved. 
The relationship of citizenship to solidarity within the conceptual structure of 
Bookchin’s thought is significant, and analysis of this relationship is crucial to 
understanding solidarity as a core concept. The adjacency of citizenship – 
decontested as the exercise of civic virtue via active political participation – also 
renders solidarity fundamental to the realisation of freedom, for ‘No ecological ethics 
of freedom’, insists Bookchin, ‘can be divorced from a politics of participation, a 
politics that fosters self-empowerment rather than state empowerment’ (Bookchin, 
1996: p. 93). In short, a participatory politics is essential for the genuine expression 
of collective freedom, the peculiar decontestation of which is inextricably bound up 
with notions of group solidarity. Morphologically, though, it is arguable that 
citizenship is more closely linked to Bookchin’s concept of solidarity than his concept 
of freedom, although it enables the latter. For it is the very disconnectedness brought 
about by the domination of the social and political spheres by the institutions of 
contemporary capitalism that is the root cause of the minimisation of individuals’ 
control over their own lives. It is the diminution of social solidarity engendered by the 
hierarchical relations inherent to capitalism and the state that represents the root 
cause of a lack of freedom in the first instance.  
The erosion of solidarity is manifest partly in civic estrangement, in a ‘Decline of 
Citizenship’, as Bookchin puts it in the title of his 1987 work.18 Indeed, he argues, we 
are no longer ‘citizens’ in any meaningful sense, or at least not according to the 
                                                          
18
 The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship (1987) was later reworked and retitled by 
Bookchin as From Urbanization to Cities (1995a). The latter work was symptomatic of a significant 
shift in Bookchin’s writings from the ‘ecotopian’ to the ‘strategic and programmatic’. Indeed, as 
Damian White has observed, ‘Many of the ecological components of the text [were] in large part taken 
out’ (White, 2008: p. 155). Mindful of the need to capture as consistent and coherent a Bookchinian 
morphology as possible, this analysis shall focus on the initial manifestation of the work, which sits 
much more comfortably with Bookchin’s earlier writings on social ecology, and which is more firmly 
rooted in the anarchist tradition than the later book. 
123 
 
original meaning of the word, whose etymology is rooted in the Latin civitas, meaning 
a social body united by a series of rights and responsibilities. The modern notion of 
citizenship has recognisably denatured from this ancient ideal so that we have 
become instead ‘the electorate’, ‘taxpayers’ and ‘constituents’ – terms which clearly 
reflect our separation from the public sphere and the body politic (Bookchin, 1987: p. 
11). Further, this decline of citizenship is the result of the ‘Rise of Urbanization’, 
whereby city life – initially characterised by a thriving civic culture – has been 
absorbed by ‘smothering traits of anonymity, homogenization and institutional 
gigantism’ (ibid.: p. 3). The antidote, insists Bookchin, is to redefine and reshape ‘the 
citizen’ as an active agent in a political community, to reclaim ‘politics’ from the 
discipline of ‘statecraft’, and to reinvigorate the public sphere (‘the city’) as an ‘ethical 
union, a humanly scaled form of personal empowerment, a participatory, even 
ecological system of decision making, and a distinctive source of civic culture’ (ibid.: 
pp. 57, 54). As White has put it, Bookchin’s scheme necessitates a retrieval and 
reevaluation of the ‘classic conceptions of politics, citizenship and the city’ (White, 
2007: p. 183). These conceptions have been manifest with varying degrees of 
durability in fleeting moments throughout history, but the most sustained and 
authentic exercise in participatory democracy and civic virtue was of course 
embodied in the Athenian polis (Bookchin, 1987: p. 35). On that topic, Bookchin 
draws attention to the common mistranslation of polis as ‘city-state’, or even simply 
‘state’. In fact, he insists, the high point of Athenian democracy was marked by the 
very absence of a ‘professionalised bureaucracy of social control’ – as he sees it, the 
defining characteristic of states proper from the sixteenth century onwards (ibid.: p. 
33). Bookchin is insistent that, despite the fact that the citizenry of ancient Athens 
represented an elite minority in comparison to the population of women, slaves, 
artisans and manual labourers and disenfranchised resident aliens, the system of 
governance was distinctly and ‘consciously amateur’ (ibid.: p. 35). In other words, the 
polis resembled the very antithesis of a state as such; its administration was entirely 
reliant upon the direct participation of citizens. 
The significance of this in relation to Bookchin’s concept of solidarity lies in 
Bookchin’s reading of Aristotle, the eminent theorist of the Hellenic polis. For 
Aristotle, Bookchin tells us, our self-fulfillment as political animals is dependent on 
the existence of institutions substantiated by a ‘body of ethics’ and a ‘civic centre’ 
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offering a plethora of ‘social activities’ that serve to ‘nourish interactions and 
discourse’ and ‘foster the growth of ethical and intellectual insight’ (ibid.: p. 37). 
Crucially, Aristotle’s necessary means for human self-fulfillment are, Bookchin tells 
us, grounded in a notion of ‘human solidarity or philia’ (ibid.). Ordinarily translated as 
‘friendship’, Bookchin insists that philia is in fact a much more far-reaching notion 
that ‘implies an expansive degree of sociality that is a civic attribute of the polis and 
the political life involved in its administration’ (ibid.: p. 38). In Bookchin’s account, 
philia transcends that which pertains merely to the immediate and intimate 
associations implied by ‘friendship’. This is demonstrated, he tells us, in Aristotle’s 
distinction between home life and public life. While the private household is a ‘sphere 
of mere survival’ to which the political animal retreats in order to satisfy purely 
material and physiological needs, the polis, as evolved from ethical and cultural 
communities more generally, represents a political expression of human beings’ 
need for consociation and quest for the good life (ibid.: p. 38-39). Put another way, 
genuine fulfilment necessitates social interaction beyond parochial circles of 
solidarity. That the workings of the polis were necessarily underpinned by philia is 
thus reflective of the latter’s generality, since the term patently refers to a much 
broader range of associations than those that are played out in our immediate social 
circle. Indeed, the prevalence of philia suggests an extension of solidarity by 
members of a collective to those with whom they have no immediate relationship. As 
Bookchin puts it, ‘Aristotle’s notion of philia or solidarity as a crucial precondition for 
a political life expressed the unique identity politics possessed as a form of 
governance, one that transcended mere kinship obligations’ (ibid.: p. 52). Further, 
the pervasive nature of association implied by Aristotle’s concept serves to enrich 
the idea of citizenship. As John Clark has noted, the civic commitment implied by 
philia imbues the notion of the citizen with ‘a sense of ethical responsibility toward 
one’s neighbours, and an identification with a larger whole: the political community’ 
(Clark, 1998: p. 145). As such, philia represents a meaningful and genuine social 
relation – manifest in ‘civic ties’ and ‘ethical precepts’ as opposed to ‘blood ties’ or 
‘tribal custom’ (Bookchin, 1987: p. 52-53) – that embodies an individual-collective 
bond. It is for this reason that Bookchin prefers to characterise it as solidarity. 
Whilst the direct-democratic tradition has flowered in sporadic bursts since the time 
of the Athenian polis – notably in the medieval city-states and the town meetings and 
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sectional assemblies that arose briefly during the American and French revolutions 
respectively (ibid.: p. 83) – it was ultimately usurped by the centralising and 
representative tendencies of republican Rome. However, for Bookchin, the legacy 
bequeathed to modernity by the Hellenic experiment is considerable and both the 
Athenian ideal of citizenship and conception of politics demand close inspection if we 
are to wrest back the activity of politics from professional bureaucrats and reinstate 
ourselves as political agents, as active, empowered citizens within a thriving public 
sphere (ibid.). 
Central to Bookchin’s project, then, are the tasks of disentangling the social from the 
political and the political from the state, for we have ‘created a terrible muddle by 
confusing the three and thereby legitimating one by mingling it with the other’ (ibid.: 
pp. 226-227). According to Bookchin, the political is not synonymous with the social. 
Rather, politics emerge when the activities involved in human beings’ communal 
intercourse become organised into institutions and made ‘operationally systematic’ 
(ibid.: p. 226). Politics is thus a distinctly human activity, since other social animals 
do not have institutions, have not developed ‘consciously formed ways of ordering 
their communities that are continually subject to historical change’ (ibid.). Equally, for 
Bookchin, statecraft – a relatively recent development – has ‘no authentic basis in 
community life’, and as such, ‘by assigning political functions and prerogatives to 
“politicians”’, ‘we have lost our sense of what it means to be political’ (ibid.: pp. 226, 
227). By contrast, a genuine politics must be rooted in the social; it inevitably 
emerges from human beings’ propensity to communise and becomes manifest in 
organisational forms and processes that serve to enhance the social dimension. 
Accordingly, the modern concept of politics is a deception, since statecraft does not 
represent a politics that is rooted in the social sphere. Politics has degenerated from 
a face-to-face, participatory activity involving the entire community to something 
done by an elite of professional administrators and bureaucrats. As a consequence, 
argues Bookchin, ‘we have lost our sense of what it means to be a citizen’ (ibid.: p. 
227).  
In order to reclaim citizenship, says Bookchin, we must pursue a programme of 
decentralisation that ‘links the re-empowerment of the community with the re-
empowerment of the individual’ (ibid.: p. 228). Bookchin’s goal is a ‘municipal 
126 
 
freedom’, which results from the relocation of political activity from the centralised 
state to the city as a public sphere and centre of civic engagement. This represents 
‘the basis for political freedom’, which, in turn, is ‘the basis for individual freedom’ 
(ibid.). For the unrelenting march of urbanisation, the dismantling of previous 
‘institutional, ethical and personal ideals’ and the shift towards ‘acquisitive 
individualism’ were, of course, coincident with and accelerated by the development 
of industrial capitalism (ibid.: pp. 241, 242). The new individualism, having 
mushroomed since the end of the Second World War, says Bookchin, now 
‘constitutes a social malignancy, more properly a cancer of society that threatens to 
destructure and undermine not only the social bond but the natural world’ (ibid.: p. 
242). By ‘unravelling … all social ties into the loose threads of the marketplace’, by 
objectifying values, monetising ideals and prioritising a form of economic ‘growth’ 
that inevitably results in the commodification of nature, it has the effect of ‘ossifying 
community and individual alike’ (ibid.). In short, an individualism founded on 
acquisition – in essence, a bourgeois individualism – inevitably results in a 
diminution of social solidarity which in turn stunts the development of a genuine 
individuality and threatens the ecological balance of the biosphere. But whilst politics 
and citizenship are undoubtedly victims of the corrosive processes engendered by 
acquisitive individualism, Bookchin offers the hope that ‘they are also the antidote … 
provided, to be sure, that we can reconstruct them in ways that are redolent of their 
classical meaning and enlarged by what we can learn from the modern world’ (ibid.). 
The concept of citizenship is thus an important adjacent concept in the morphology 
of Bookchin’s thought. Decontested as the exercise of civic virtue, Bookchin’s notion 
of citizenship seeks to nurture an inclusive, participatory politics that marks a sharp 
departure from the representative models that have dominated modern conceptions 
of the political. For Bookchin, a genuine politics is an ‘organic phenomenon’ which 
consists in ‘the activity of a public body – a community’ (ibid.: p. 243). According to 
this view, politics is a vital site of rational public discourse which constitutes ‘the 
sphere of societal life beyond the family and the personal needs of the individual that 
still retains the intimacy, involvement and sense of responsibility that is enjoyed in 
private arenas’ (ibid.: p. 244). Politics is necessarily a community activity, the 
realisation of which is dependent on the development of an active, stimulated and 
empowered citizenry. The necessary conditions of public engagement and the 
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extension of responsibility entailed by politics and citizenship shape those concepts 
in such a way that their morphological link to solidarity is crucial for the 
decontestation of the latter and the structural integrity of Bookchin’s ideology more 
generally. Citizenship as the exercise of civic virtue via a participatory politics serves 
simultaneously as a manifestation of social solidarity and as a scaffolding which 
lends that solidarity structural support. The cause-effect relation between the two is 
not a one-way street, but a veritable dual-carriageway of morphological interlinkage. 
For Bookchin, therefore, a revitalised notion of citizenship must take its place on the 
front line in the battle against the individualistic tendencies fostered by urbanisation, 
homogenisation and marketisation – in short, capitalism – and, as such, its role in 
remaking a society based on solidarity is integral. 
The notion of citizenship as a workable basis for solidarity is not difficult to grasp. 
Indeed, the idea that a reinvigorated and empowered (and/or empowering) local 
politics can foster group unity and cooperation is a very straightforward one. 
However, the task of reclaiming politics from statecraft and revitalising and re-
engaging a genuine and participatory citizenry from the mass of monadic individuals 
presided over by late capitalism is altogether more problematic. Indeed, the question 
remains: how are we to free ourselves and our politics from the auspices of the 
market and centralised authority so as to avert both social and ecological 
degradation? Bookchin’s proposed programme is that which he terms ‘libertarian 
municipalism’, the stated goal of which involves the redefinition of ‘politics’ according 
to the word’s classical meaning, interpreted as ‘the management of the community or 
polis by means of direct face-to-face assemblies of the people in the formulation of 
public policy and based on an ethics of complementarity and solidarity’ (Bookchin, 
1991: p. 4). 
 According to Bookchin’s political vision, the municipality – an ‘association of people 
reinforced by its own economic power, its own institutionalisation of the grass roots, 
and the confederal support of nearby communities organized into a territorial network 
on a local and regional scale’ (Bookchin, 1987: p. 245) – constitutes the fundamental 
unit and arena of authentic political activity.  His proposal is for a radical dissolution 
of hierarchical relations through the removal and relocation of politics from the 
national state to the municipality. Bookchin accepts that ‘cast in strictly structural and 
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administrative forms’ a project of decentralisation on this scale amounts to a 
formidable problem, since many contemporary urban conurbations simply and 
literally have no way of ‘assembling’ if they attempt to emulate Athens, the citizenry 
of which was relatively small (ibid.: p. 246). It is logistically impossible for all of the 
citizens of London or New York or Beijing, for instance, to physically assemble in one 
place. But Bookchin’s notion of ‘the city’ does not equate to the megalopolises that 
dominate contemporary urban space. Indeed, what is required, says Bookchin is a 
shift from urbanisation – a socially moribund, anti-ecological phenomenon – to 
citification – a reconstitution of cities as centres of civic engagement and social 
exchange. Further, as Bookchin reminds us, even the most vast of today’s urban 
conurbations are themselves made up of neighbourhoods – ‘organic communities 
that have a certain measure of identity’ – which actually render large cities quite 
amenable to political decentralisation. Political decentralisation is the foremost 
principle of libertarian municipalism and, claims Bookchin, ‘No city … is so large that 
it cannot be networked by popular assemblies for political purposes’ (ibid.: p. 247). 
For, although the administration of municipal projects would likely require expert 
coordination (architects and engineers to design and construct buildings and 
infrastructure; doctors and nurses to provide healthcare; farmers and agricultural 
specialists to manage cultivation and food production, et cetera), the politics of the 
municipality – i.e. the processes of decision making – are, according to Bookchin, 
eminently open to participation by non-experts. The formulation of public policy is an 
entirely different thing from its execution, so that while the latter activity will inevitably 
require specialist expertise, the former is one in which amateurism is as desirable as 
it is feasible. Bookchin’s vision is not for a politics of politicians, but for a politics of 
citizens acting in solidarity as responsible members of a community. 
However, insists Bookchin, libertarian municipalism is absolutely not a politics of the 
referendum. Under such a model, he argues, the individual in his or her capacity as 
a voter ‘becomes a seemingly asocial being whose very freedom is denuded of vital 
traits that provide the necessary flesh and blood for genuine individuality’ (ibid.: p. 
248). The referendum represents, for Bookchin, the privatisation, quantification and 
consequently the subversion of democracy. In reducing ‘views into mere 
preferences’, ‘ideals into mere taste’, and ‘overall comprehension into quantification’, 
the system does not allow for the full expression of our political wills and convictions 
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(ibid.: p. 250). In short, referendum politics do not encourage a genuine or 
meaningful form of citizenship. Quite to the contrary, for Bookchin, the so-called 
‘autonomous individual’, ‘left to his or her own destiny in the name of … 
independence’ – in other words, in the capacity of ‘voter’ implied by a referendum-
based politics – is actually divested of genuine individuality (ibid.: p. 248). Bookchin 
explicitly supports Max Horkheimer’s assertion that the individual in absolute 
isolation is an illusory notion, and that, in fact, ‘The most esteemed personal 
qualities, such as independence, will to freedom, sympathy, and the sense of justice, 
are social as well as individual virtues’ (quoted in Bookchin, 1987: p. 248).  Indeed, 
Horkheimer was insistent that a genuine individuality can only be realised by social 
means. Accordingly, he argued that ‘The fully developed individual is the 
consummation of a fully developed society’ (Horkheimer, 2013: p. 96). 
With this in mind, Bookchin proffers the observation that, according to the processes 
involved in referenda politics, the individual does not maintain his or her basis in the 
community, and is therefore unable to properly develop their individuality. In 
conducting their politics in the privacy of the voting booth, the individual becomes 
separated from society rather than a part of it. Further, says Bookchin, the so-called 
‘independence’ afforded the individual by this form of politics is often ‘confused with 
independent thinking and autonomy of behaviour’, and ‘has been so marbled by pure 
bourgeois egoism that we tend to forget that our freedom as individuals depends 
heavily on community support systems and solidarity’ (Bookchin, 1987: p. 249). Thus 
there is a clearly identifiable morphological link between solidarity and individual 
freedom, whereby the former allows for the flourishing of the latter. Indeed, for 
Bookchin, this is what marks us out as social beings: we do not subordinate 
ourselves to the community, but neither do we detach ourselves from it. Rather, we 
achieve an authentic humanity through ‘our capacities for solidarity with each other, 
for mutually enhancing our self-development and creativity and attaining freedom 
within a socially creative and institutionally rich collectivity’ (ibid.: p. 249). 
Accordingly, when citizenship is divorced from the community we become dependent 
and as such we achieve neither individuality nor community in any real sense. ‘Both 
… are dissolved by removing the communal ground on which authentic individuality 
depends’ (ibid.) – the erosion of solidarity is in effect the erosion of the soil in which 
the germ of individuality takes root. To reiterate: ‘it is interdependence within an 
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institutionally rich and rounded community that fleshes out the individual with the 
rationality, solidarity, sense of justice, and, ultimately, the reality of freedom that 
makes for a creative and caring citizen’ (ibid.). So, in the morphology of Bookchin’s 
thought, not only does individuality depend on solidarity, solidarity in turn requires a 
network of relations and institutions that provide the intimacy and interaction without 
which it suffocates. 
Herein lies the programmatic centrality of the municipality. For Bookchin, that the 
municipality constitutes the fundamental unit of political life, that it provides the arena 
in which citizens engage in intimate and genuinely political discourse, makes it a 
physical, necessary condition for solidarity. Indeed, it enables the very activity of 
‘communizing, of the on-going intercourse of many levels of life that makes for 
solidarity, not only the “neighbourliness”, so indispensable for truly organic 
interpersonal relationships’ (ibid.: p. 250). As such, collective decision-making must 
amount to much more than merely registering one’s preferences via a ballot; it 
necessarily involves a face-to-face experience, a productive dialogue. Further, the 
communal setting of the municipality encourages the Athenian notion of personal 
development or education (paideia) that helps shape individuals as citizens. For 
according to Bookchin, ‘True citizenship and politics entail the on-going formulation 
of personality, education, a growing sense of public responsibility and commitment 
that render communing and an active body politic meaningful’ (ibid.). Paideia, 
Bookchin tells us, is an important bulwark for solidarity, since it encourages a sense 
of communal loyalty through a political education rooted in participation. This is a 
quite different thing to ‘institutional obedience’ or patriotism, which implies a 
‘mindless, indeed, infantile relationship to the state’ (ibid.). Indeed, Bookchin 
explicitly states that ‘solidarity is the ultimate result of the educational and self-
formative process that paideia was meant to achieve’ (ibid.: p. 251). This is 
something which, for Bookchin, is painfully absent from modern conceptions of 
politics, whereby political education does not even enter into public discourse, and 
engagement and participation are gauged according to turnout at elections and 
membership of parliamentary political parties. Bookchin’s proposed solution to the 
crisis of citizenship and the subsequent lack of solidarity is a ‘new municipal agenda’ 
designed to facilitate the reclamation and rejuvenation of the political sphere. 
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Solidarity at the periphery: Bookchin’s ‘New Municipal Agenda’ 
Bookchin’s outline of a ‘new municipal agenda’ constitutes a broadly sketched 
programmatic strategy for the revitalisation of citizenship and politics. This outline is 
significant to the central meanings carried by Bookchin’s ideological morphology and 
marks the point at which Bookchin’s concepts of solidarity and citizenship (or, more 
accurately, solidarity through citizenship) begin to lose their abstraction and become 
translated into concrete proposals for political action. As such, they can be said to be 
peripheral concepts, as they enable an application of broader conceptual ideals 
within a specified spatial and temporal context. 
Despite his utopian vision for libertarian municipalism, Bookchin is quick to point out 
that he does not profess to have devised a comprehensive template for a future 
society. To do so, he claims, would be to ‘subvert the very meaning of the libertarian 
municipal project it seeks to advance’, since ‘Utopias have a bad way of becoming 
fixed blueprints – after which they degenerate into inflexible dogmas’ (ibid.: pp. 252, 
268). Equally, Bookchin does not claim to possess all of the solutions to all of the 
problems with which a municipal model might be confronted. Rather, he sees his 
agenda as comprising ‘certain basic coordinates’ that apply to any conception of 
municipal freedom and any notion of a solidarity achieved through a participatory 
politics and active citizenship (ibid.: p. 257). Here, we explore the way in which these 
peripheral notions are morphologically interconnected with and help to mould 
Bookchin’s concept of solidarity. 
The most important of Bookchin’s ‘coordinates’ is the revival of the ‘citizens’ 
assembly’. Assemblies may be instituted on the basis of town meetings or, in the 
case of larger metropolitan areas, individual neighbourhoods, the priority being to 
maintain a ‘human scale’ that facilitates not only a participatory mode of politics, but 
a ‘personalistic’ one which necessarily entails a face-to-face intercourse (ibid.). 
Bookchin’s notion of citizenship as a support for social solidarity thus depends partly 
on familiarity and social exchange. Central to the citizens’ assembly model is a 
notion of citizenship which involves a direct and intimate mode of political activity that 
nourishes solidaristic relations. The acts of engaging with fellow citizens on a regular 
basis, of directly challenging each other’s assumptions and of contributing to the 
fecundity of public discourse and the political expression of the collective serve to 
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reinforce the sense of interdependence and the strength of unity between individual 
citizens and the wider group. 
The second of Bookchin’s coordinates refers to the necessary confederation of 
municipal assemblies and the need for communication between them (ibid.). He 
outlines the structural arrangement of the confederation as resembling ‘a network of 
administrative councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-
to-face democratic assemblies, in the various villages, towns, and even 
neighbourhoods of large cities’ (Bookchin, 1990b: p. 8). These ‘strictly mandated 
delegates’ – as opposed to ‘representatives’ – that execute the administrative 
processes at the confederal level must be ‘rotatable, recallable, and above all 
rigorously instructed in written form to support or oppose any issue that appears on 
the agenda of local confederal councils composed of delegates from several 
neighbourhood assemblies’ (Bookchin, 1987: p. 246). The overarching purpose of 
confederation is to preserve harmony between local assemblies and to prevent the 
development of parochialism within individual communities. However, John Clark 
sees the confederal aspect of Bookchin’s project as problematic and argues that 
there is an inherent contradiction between Bookchin’s ‘desire for universalism’ and 
his ‘commitment to particularism’, between the notion of a general solidarity on the 
one hand and the sovereignty and distinctiveness of the municipality on the other 
(Clark, 1998: p. 148). Bookchin’s claim is that the municipal assembly must serve 
exclusively as the policy-making body and that the confederation exists solely for the 
purposes of administration, to implement the policy decisions taken at the municipal 
level. This way, runs the argument, the intimacy of the assembly encourages 
authentic political participation, while the confederation guards against the 
degeneration of decentralisation into parochialism. Solidarity is fostered locally (in 
the municipality), and exercised and protected further afield (in the confederation and 
beyond). For Clark, however, it is not clear how this division of functions – between 
municipal decision making and confederal administration – is to operate in the event 
of disagreement within or between assemblies on matters of policy (ibid.: pp. 176-
177). Put another way, if there are policy disagreements at the municipal level then 
the implementation of policy at the confederal level is complicated. This certainly 
represents a significant difficulty in Bookchin’s vision for libertarian municipalism. 
Given the extent of social, cultural and economic diversity concentrated within 
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relatively small metropolitan areas, the tension between a universal ethic and a local 
politics could amount to a major operational obstacle. When large populated areas 
are divided into smaller communities that may often have quite distinct identities 
based on cultural heritage, social values, economic interests and so on, conflicts of 
interest between one locality and the next would appear inevitable. Bookchin offers 
little explanation of how such an eventuality might be avoided or resolved, at least 
not beyond the rather vague notion of municipalities’ inevitable economic 
interdependence created by the need to share resources and produce (Bookchin, 
1990b: p. 9). In his defence, Bookchin does not claim to offer a vision for a society 
free of all social conflict and, indeed, he is not required to do so. Bookchin does not 
equate solidarity to social harmony; he is merely suggesting that processes of 
conflict resolution should be executed by citizens directly rather than by a centralised 
bureaucracy.  
Nevertheless, as Clark illustrates, the logistical problems involved in executing a 
municipal project of the type Bookchin advocates are potentially enormous. Taking 
into account that metropolitan Paris, for example, has a population of roughly 8.5 
million, Clark estimates that the devolution of that city’s government into 
neighbourhood assemblies of roughly 25,000 people would mean that 340 
assemblies would be needed to cover the metropolitan area. Further decentralisation 
into ‘much more democratic assemblies for areas of a few blocks, with about a 
thousand citizens each’ would result in 8,500 Parisian assemblies (Clark, 1998: p. 
178). Given the proliferation of municipalities that would be necessary for a 
genuinely direct democratic system to operate, for Clark it is simply inconceivable 
that policy administration would remain effective at the confederal level without some 
concession of political authority by the municipalities. As such, while Clark accepts 
that attempts to restructure society according to the local assembly model should be 
considered an important aspect of a ‘left green, social ecological, or 
ecocommunitarian politics’, he urges us to consider that such a programme is 
unlikely to become the default method of political process in a future society (ibid.: 
pp. 181-182). Importantly, however, Price has pointed out that the tension found in 
Bookchin’s politics ‘between the particular and the general’ – in other words, 
between local civic participation and widely inclusive notions of solidarity – has 
actually been embraced as a positive by the theorists and practical experiments 
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associated with the contemporary alter-globalisation movement (Price, 2012: p. 256). 
Indeed, Price argues, the now familiar appeal promoted by the movement to ‘think 
globally, act locally’, represents a particularly tangible example of the dissolution of 
this apparent contradiction. This points to the possibility that both practically and 
conceptually, a global sensibility and a universally inclusive notion of solidarity need 
not conflict with a politics founded on localism, decentralisation and participatory 
democracy. 
The third of Bookchin’s basic coordinates for libertarian municipalism is the need for 
the political sphere to serve as ‘a school for genuine citizenship’ (Bookchin, 1987: p. 
258). According to Bookchin, we must promote ‘the values of humanism, 
cooperation, community, and public service’ not only in schools, local societies and 
other institutions, but in the arena of politics itself. In this sense, the means of 
achieving citizenship are not to be distinguished from that very end; we acquire civic 
virtue through civic practice. For Bookchin, the development of citizenship, ‘the need 
to foster civic solidarity’, is a creative, ethical and educative process that speaks to 
‘the deeply human desire for self-expression in a meaningful spiritual community’ 
(ibid.: p. 259). In Bookchin’s scheme, then, authentic citizenship – and, in turn, 
solidarity – must be nurtured by learning, both through ‘traditional’ educational 
institutions and a society and politics orchestrated in such a way that the level of 
participation by each member of the collective is enhanced to an optimum degree. 
The final of Bookchin’s proposed coordinates is economic. Noting the danger posed 
to municipal freedom by class divisions brought about by economic inequality, 
Bookchin places his hopes for the preservation of solidarity in contemporary 
‘transclass issues’ – notably the threat of nuclear conflict, increasingly authoritarian 
state structures and, of course, ecological degradation – that have emerged as a 
result of urbanisation and dominatory social relations (ibid.: p. 260). These types of 
issues, Bookchin claims, transcend class interests and often bring into effect the 
coalescence on a local basis of individuals and groups that would otherwise remain 
relatively disparate. Bookchin also points to the emergence and development of 
feminism, a movement which recognises that ‘gender oppression afflicts wealthy 
women, no less than poor’ (ibid.: p. 260-261). For Bookchin, the development of a 
‘general social interest’ – arguably pre-empting Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s 
135 
 
concept of the ‘multitude’ (Hardt and Negri, 2006) – is symptomatic of a significant 
structural shift not only at the political level, but at the economic as well (ibid.: p. 
261). For the classical liberal conception of private property – the mythology that 
sees the individual citizen as economically self-sufficient – is being undermined by a 
global economy that is increasingly dominated by corporate hegemony. A solution, 
Bookchin tells us, lies not in the nationalisation of property (he sees this as merely a 
different shade of bureaucratisation to that which concentrates economic power in 
the hands of a corporate elite) but in its ‘municipalisation’, the management of the 
municipality’s economy ‘by the community as part of a politics of self-management’ 
(ibid.: p. 262). The municipalisation of the economy is a quite different thing to its 
collectivisation, which, as Bookchin sees it, consists in a continuation of contractual 
relationships and thus leaves the door open for the reentry of private property. 
Further, through the principle of workers’ control, collectivisation encourages 
competition between collectively controlled units and in perpetuating occupational 
identities – those of factory workers, agricultural workers, professionals, etc. – it has 
the potential to undermine the solidarity of the whole through the crystallisation of 
separate interests (ibid.: pp. 262-263). In other words, collectivisation is 
morphologically incompatible with the economic priorities of Bookchin’s proposed 
model.  By contrast to the approach of colectivisation, Bookchin’s project of 
libertarian municipalism ‘politicises the economy and dissolves it into the civic 
domain’, so that ‘property’ is controlled by ‘the citizen body in assembly as citizens – 
not as … vocationally oriented special-interest groups’ (ibid.: p. 263). 
However, given the reinforcement of the municipality by its own economic structure, 
the potential for the fragmentation of individual communities from the confederation 
surely increases. It is possible, therefore, that the municipalisation of the economy 
does more to threaten solidarity than to protect it. There is seemingly little provision 
to prevent the municipality coming to resemble, as Bookchin puts it, ‘a parochial city-
state of the kind that appeared in the late Middle Ages’ (ibid.). Bookchin 
subsequently points out that, in fact, the principal cause of solidarity’s diminution 
during the medieval era was not increased differentiation between communities, but 
rather ‘stratification from within’, which occurred along the lines of wealth, status, 
family origin and vocational identity (ibid.: p. 264). By contrast, the municipalisation 
of the economy dissolves both vocational differences and incorporates ‘communal 
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forms of distribution’ which serve to institutionalise the principle of ‘from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs’ (ibid.). Further, Bookchin 
notes, economic municipalisation must recognise and emphasise the importance of 
communities’ interdependence. Ultimately, interdependence in all spheres 
constitutes the bulwark of universal solidarity against tendencies towards 
parochialism. ‘Shared needs and resources’, Bookchin tells us, ‘imply the existence 
of sharing and, with sharing, communication, rejuvenation by new ideas, a wider 
social horizon that yields a wider sensibility to new experiences’ (ibid.). Put another 
way, the very distinctiveness of individual communities is what renders their needs 
interdependent and harmonious as opposed to antagonistic. If one municipality 
specialises in the cultivation of wheat but lacks the engineering base from which to 
build machinery to plough the soil and harvest its crop efficiently, while another is 
perfectly capable of manufacturing such machinery but is situated on a particularly 
barren area of land, then the needs of the two communities are not opposed to one 
another; on the contrary, they are harmonised. Simplistic though this example may 
be, in Bookchin’s scheme, the same principle can apply to a more complex 
networked and confederated economy comprised of a great many municipalities. 
Of course, there are significant practical limitations to Bookchin’s proposals for 
libertarian municipalism. Both Clark and Robert Graham have argued that it is quite 
simply unrealistic for administrative procedures to be divorced entirely from the 
policy-making process and for that process to remain the exclusive prerogative of the 
municipal assembly in the way that Bookchin stipulates. As Clark puts it, ‘It seems 
impossible to imagine any form of assembly government that could formulate such 
specific directives on complex matters that administrators would have no significant 
role in shaping policy’ (Clark, 1998: p. 164). If at least some level of administrative 
involvement in policy-making is inevitable, Bookchin’s requirement for all policy to be 
formulated by the popular assembly is undermined. Further, Graham claims that the 
de facto policy-making power attributed to administrators under Bookchin’s scheme 
reintroduces the very ‘hierarchical structure of authority’ that he set out to dissolve in 
the first place, since administrative specialists will have unique influence on policy 
implementation in their relevant areas (Graham, 2004: p. 20). He also expresses 
doubts to do with the process of policy-making within the municipal assembly itself, 
attesting that Bookchin fails to provide us with a convincing vision of political 
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relationships that are genuinely non-hierarchical. For the municipal assembly to 
function effectively as a centre of policy-making, decisions must ultimately be taken 
by majority vote. For Graham, this inevitably leads to a situation whereby the 
majority wields political authority, since it has to enforce its favoured policy against 
the will of the minority. As such, he concludes, ‘Whenever there is a lack of 
unanimity on a policy decision … a hierarchical relationship will arise’ (ibid.: p. 19).  
Bookchin’s riposte would likely emphasise the distinction between personal 
autonomy and social freedom – two concepts which he sees as often confused, 
especially in relation to anarchism(s). For Bookchin, the former connotes a 
somewhat egoistic notion which ‘upholds individual rights over – and against – those 
of the collective’ (Bookchin, 1995b: p. 14). The consequence of this, says Bookchin, 
is that there is ‘no basis whatever for social institutionalization’, and ‘Even 
democratic decision-making is jettisoned as authoritarian’ (ibid.: p. 17). Indeed, as he 
sees it, to prioritise the individual over the collective is to award ‘a minority of one 
sovereign ego the right to abort the decision of a majority’ (ibid.). In defence of his 
vision for libertarian municipalism, Bookchin therefore insists that a truly free society 
must be predicated on the principle of direct democracy. Accordingly, policy 
decisions would be arrived upon following open discussion by citizens in assembly, 
whereupon minorities – even minorities of one – would be accredited plenty 
opportunity to present counter-arguments. The outcome of this process, he claims, is 
in fact radically removed from the subordination of the individual to the collective, 
since it allows for ‘ongoing dissensus – the all-important process of continual 
dialogue, disagreement, challenge, and counter-challenge without which social as 
well as individual creativity would be impossible’ (ibid. – emphasis in original). So the 
solidarity or philia that Bookchin identifies as essential to municipal life actually 
serves to enhance individuality. We may not always get our own way, but, for 
Bookchin, getting one’s own way represents a degenerate notion of personal 
autonomy which bears no resemblance to genuine freedom. On the contrary, we 
achieve a genuine freedom, we realise an authentic form of individuality only in an 
explicitly social context. In the case of Bookchin’s libertarian municipalism, this social 
context is the municipal assembly, and we become individuals not by removing 
ourselves from the collective when we disagree with the outcome of the democratic 
process, but by engaging in that process in the first instance, by challenging our own 
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assumptions and those of others in the political arena. The juxtaposition of personal 
autonomy and social freedom is therefore crucial, since the latter conception – 
which, for Bookchin, constitutes freedom as such – is always morphologically linked 
to solidarity. Indeed, he explicitly states that, in contrast to the ‘self-sovereign 
individual’ implied by the notion of ‘autonomy’, ‘freedom dialectically interweaves the 
individual with the collective’ (ibid.: p. 12). In Bookchin’s case, as we have seen, this 
solidarity is manifest through the adjacent concepts of politics and citizenship and 
the peripheral proposals for libertarian municipalism. 
Whether Bookchin’s pleas of innocence to the charges of majority authoritarianism 
are convincing or not, this is not the only difficulty that critics have perceived in his 
political project. Indeed, further practical issues have been flagged up. In maximising 
participation in the public sphere, and in ascribing the role of economic management 
to that same municipal body, even Bookchin’s sympathisers must concede that he is 
asking a lot of the institutional framework he envisages. As Damian White has 
observed, Bookchin’s libertarian municipalism is at risk of creating a ‘democratic 
overload’ (White, 2008: p. 176). In other words, if every policy decision is to be made 
at the level of the municipality then, quite simply, there will be an awful lot of decision 
making to be done there – arguably more than the citizens’ assembly could cope 
with. It seems inevitable that a good deal of individuals’ time would be expended in 
the political arena, with potentially little left over for productive activity and leisure. As 
such, Bookchin places great import on the development of a ‘liberatory technology’ – 
one which is able ‘to produce a surfeit of goods with a minimum of toil’ and thus 
serves ‘to open the social arena permanently to the revolutionary people’ (Bookchin, 
1986: p. 152). Such a technology, writes Bookchin would allow not just for more 
efficient production, but would also enable us to consider ‘how the machine, the 
factory and the mine could be used to foster human solidarity and to create a 
balanced relationship with nature and a truly organic ecocommunity’ (ibid.: p. 127-
128). The question as to the extent of the liberatory capacity of technology is not one 
I wish to address here, but even if we assume Bookchin’s assessment of its potential 
to be accurate, there remain, as we have seen, significant practical criticisms of his 
municipal project. Nevertheless, it is a truism that Bookchin’s attempt to redefine the 
political according to a direct-democratic ethos, to refocus politics on spaces other 
than that occupied by the centralised nation state represents a significant attempt to 
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ignite human solidarity and lay the foundations for an ecological society. As White 
has noted, as increasingly complex networks of association – both local and global – 
have evolved, ‘the potential for post-national politics has gained new traction’ (White, 
2008: p. 176) Indeed, White singles out the broad vision of radical currents within the 
global justice movement for an alternative version of globalisation involving ‘a multi-
tiered and multi-scale network of democratic bodies from city-states down to village 
and neighbourhood assemblies’, which, he acknowledges, ‘does bear some 
resemblance with Bookchin’s writings’ (ibid.: p. 177). Certainly, it cannot be denied 
that the demands for global justice and a more democratic system of global 
institutions echo almost precisely Bookchin’s intentions for libertarian municipalism – 
that is, the need: 
To restructure our institutions into richly articulated forms, to reorganize our 
relationships into creative forms of human solidarity, to re-empower our communities 
and cities so that they can effectively counteract state and corporate power … and to 
create a new nonhierarchical and participatory relationship between humanity and 
nature (Bookchin, 1987: p. 267) 
Conclusion: a legacy of solidarity? 
This chapter has sought to determine, by way of a morphological analysis, the place 
of the concept of solidarity in the thought of Murray Bookchin and the way in which 
that concept is decontested. Bookchin’s concept incorporates four idea-components 
in addition to the ineliminable component: universal inclusion; social-ecological 
harmony; collective responsibility; and the social production of individuality. The 
internal morphology of Bookchin’s concept is displayed in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5: Bookchin's concept of solidarity 
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Bookchin’s ideal is for a solidarity that applies universally to all of humankind. His 
insistence that an ecological society is only possible through human solidarity is only 
compatible with a decontestation of solidarity that includes the notion of universal 
inclusion. Further, his observations on the advances – and, equally, the concessions 
– made by solidarity throughout human history confirm that the direction of progress 
is that which moves towards an increasingly wide circle of social inclusion. When 
genuine solidarity is achieved within human society, Bookchin argues, the 
relationship between nature and humanity – or ‘first nature’ and ‘second nature’ – will 
come to be solidary also. 
But can there really be genuine solidarity between human and non-human nature? If, 
as Axel Honneth has argued, solidarity is understood as ‘an interactive relationship 
in which subjects mutually sympathise with their various different ways of life 
because, among themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically’ (Honneth, 
1996: p. 128), then surely a relationship of this kind between humanity and nature is 
not possible. It goes without saying that non-human nature, including both animals 
and other organisms – and even objects – within the biosphere, are simply not 
capable of recognition in the same way as are human beings. Accordingly, it would 
seem that the relationship between human and non-human nature can only ever be 
a one-way street. Indeed, this is equally the case when humans’ attitudes and 
behaviour towards the natural world are deferential as it is when they are dominatory 
and exploitative. However, for Bookchin, an ecological outlook does not view nature 
merely as a passive backdrop against which social life is played out (Bookchin, 
2005: p. 114). Indeed, in organic societies, he tells us, ‘the very notion of nature is 
always social … in an ontological sense that the protoplasm of humankind retains an 
abiding continuity with the protoplasm of nature’ (ibid.). For Bookchin, then, humanity 
and nature are not entirely separate entities. Of course, the first nature-second 
nature dichotomy implies a distinction of some sort, but Bookchin’s stated goal is to 
synthesise these two entities into a ‘third nature’, ‘a more complete nature that is 
conscious, thinking and purposeful … [and] ethical and rational, not simply 
physiological and biochemical’ (ibid.: p. 11). The project of social ecology consists in 
the reconciliation of humanity and nature, the re-entry of humankind into the process 
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of natural evolution. This re-entry involves not only a ‘naturalisation of humanity’, but 
also a ‘humanisation of nature’ (ibid.: p. 411). Then – and only then – is nature 
capable of the recognition necessary for solidarity, since only with the re-entry of 
humanity into nature does nature become self-conscious. For Bookchin, it is 
humanity itself that represents the rational capacity of a complete nature, as part of 
which ‘we speak for a fullness of mind that can articulate nature’s latent capacity to 
reflect upon itself, to function within itself as its own corrective and guide’ (ibid.: p. 
411). In this way, Bookchin’s concept of solidarity is not only social, but ecological, 
too – it incorporates a notion of social-ecological harmony. 
Bookchin’s account of the solidaristic practices of organic societies is suggestive of a 
concept of solidarity that incorporates the notion of collective responsibility. 
Highlighting the obligation of all members of society to participate in communal 
affairs, he stresses the importance of fostering ‘a sense of responsibility for the 
community’, and of the responsibility of the community to provide for the needs of all 
individuals in it (Bookchin, ibid.: p. 111). The interlinkage of solidarity with the 
adjacent concept of citizenship allows for further development of collective 
responsibility through civic engagement and political participation. When citizens 
confront and engage with one another on a regular basis in order to make decisions 
that directly determine the way in which the community functions, the feeling of 
collective responsibility is strengthened. 
The adjacency of citizenship also impacts upon the manner in which Bookchin’s 
concept of solidarity addresses the issue of individuality. Indeed, he sees the 
practice of civic virtue – and of social life generally - as ‘the necessary flesh and 
blood for genuine individuality’ and argues that amongst our defining characteristics 
as social beings are ‘our capacities for solidarity with each other, for mutually 
enhancing our self-development and creativity and attaining freedom within a socially 
creative and institutionally rich collectivity’ (Bookchin, 1987: pp. 248, 249). 
Bookchin’s concept of solidarity thus incorporates the notion of individuality as a 
social product. 
The adjacent concept of citizenship is crucial to the decontestation of solidarity in 
Bookchin’s morphology. Bookchin’s concept of citizenship stresses notions of civic 
virtue, political participation and non-hierarchical, decentralised political institutions. 
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These components add meaning to citizenship’s ineliminable component: 
membership of a political community. The function of the morphological linkage of 
solidarity with citizenship is to make the two concepts interdependent, so that certain 
of the idea-components within those concepts provide each other with logical 
support and cultural shape. Citizenship thus provides a supportive framework for 
solidarity because, for instance, the exercise of civic virtue helps to produce a feeling 
of collective responsibility. Equally, the notion of social-ecological harmony within the 
concept of solidarity is safeguarded by citizenship’s basis in non-hierarchical political 
forms. Further, Bookchin sees political participation as a crucial means of social 
intercourse that allows for citizens to realise their individuality. Figure 6 displays the 
morphological relationship between Bookchin’s concepts of solidarity and citizenship: 
Perhaps Bookchin’s most important contribution is his identification of social 
solidarity as a fundamental feature of an ecologically sound society. Ultimately, 
according to Bookchin, organic societies’ internal solidarity would succumb with the 
emergence of hierarchy. Of course, this transformation did not take place overnight, 
but throughout a ‘millennia-long era that separates the earliest horticultural 
communities from the “high civilizations” of antiquity’ (ibid.: p. 130). This period saw 
the gradual emergence of towns, cities and eventually empires, and with them a 
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Figure 6: Solidarity and citizenship in Bookchin’s morphology 
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‘new social arena in which the collective control of production was supplanted by 
elitist control, kinship relations by territorial and class relations, and popular 
assemblies or councils of elders by state bureaucracies’ (ibid.). The consequences 
of this, claims Bookchin, were hugely detrimental to the biosphere inhabited by 
humans, since their relationship to it inevitably came to reflect their relationships with 
each other. The decay of human solidarity unavoidably brought about the dislocation 
of humanity from nature and the subsequent domination of the latter by the former.  
However, the re-entry of humanity into nature that Bookchin sees as necessary for 
an ecological existence does not necessitate a return to the primitive modes of living 
that existed in organic societies. On the contrary, Bookchin is insistent that ‘there can 
be no return to the past – to the domestic realm, to the age-ranks, or to the kinship 
relationships of tribalism … to the myths, amulets, magical practices, and idols – 
female or male – of the past’ (Bookchin, 1996: p. 93). However, that is not to say that 
the proper solution to the present crisis cannot take selective inspiration from the 
social and ecological practices of previous societies, so long as it simultaneously 
attempts to overcome those societies’ social deficiencies. ‘While we redeem what is 
valuable in premodern societies for enhancing human solidarity and an ecological 
sensibility’, Bookchin argues, ‘we must also transcend all the parochial and divisive 
features of the past and present’ (Bookchin, 1996: p. 93). Bookchin terms this stock 
of valuable social practices the ‘legacy of freedom’, but one might just as easily refer 
to it as a ‘legacy of solidarity’, since it consists in the rediscovery of types of social 
relations that help build solidarity and thus foster an ecological outlook. 
This is the point at which Bookchin’s political project takes off, and the stripe of 
solidarity runs strongly throughout his thought, from the central assumptions of his 
philosophy of social ecology to his utopian politics of libertarian municipalism. I have 
argued that the extent to which Bookchin’s ideology is influenced by solidarity is 
evidence that the concept resides within the core of its morphology. Further, the 
concept can clearly be seen to be interlinked with further core concepts – notably 
freedom and equality – in such a way that the relationships between these concepts 
are fundamental to the decontestation of each of them. Further still, the importance 
of solidarity in Bookchin’s ideology is manifest in additional adjacent concepts and 
also at the morphological periphery. It is impossible to fully grasp Bookchin’s vision 
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for libertarian municipalism without an understanding of the way in which its 
prescriptions are inextricably linked to the core concept of solidarity. Indeed, the 
notions of a reinvigorated citizenship and a reclamation of politics from the discipline 
of statecraft are explicitly expressed as concepts that are interdependent with 
solidarity. Whilst an active notion of citizenship requires a level of social solidarity, 
communities achieve a greater level of solidarity through the very practice of civic 
virtue. Only by instituting a politics that is human in scale, argues Bookchin, can we 
forge a genuine solidarity and subsequently a genuinely ecological sensibility.
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6. Chomsky’s concept of solidarity 
The humanistic conception regards a child as a gardener regards a young tree, i.e. 
as something with a certain intrinsic nature, which will develop into an admirable 
form given proper soil and air and light. 
Bertrand Russell, The Prospects of Industrial Civilization  
(Russell, 1959: p. 229) 
 
But by observing Nature and her laws. And this will lay 
The warp out for us – her first principle: that nothing’s brought 
Forth by any supernatural power out of naught. 
Lucretius, The Nature of Things  
(Lucretius, 2007: p. 7) 
Noam Chomsky has been described in the New York Times as ‘arguably the most 
important intellectual alive’ (Robinson, 1979: p. 3); according to The Guardian, he 
ranks ‘with Marx, Shakespeare, and the Bible as one of the ten most quoted sources 
in the humanities’ (Jaggi, 2001); and in 2005 he topped a Prospect magazine poll of 
the world’s greatest public intellectuals (Blackburn, 2005). But whilst Chomsky’s is 
certainly the most prominent anarchist-intellectual voice in the global justice 
movement, there is some uncertainty about his place in the anarchist canon. This is 
due in part to his tendency to borrow heavily from various strands of thought outside 
of the anarchist tradition – most notably classical liberalism and libertarian variants of 
socialism and Marxism. Whilst some have interpreted this as a lack of ideological 
purity which precludes his inclusion in the anarchist family, Chomsky’s pluralistic 
approach may also be seen as an attempt to broaden the theoretical horizons of the 
libertarian socialist tradition19 (Marshall, 1994: p. 618). Although he does not see 
himself as an original anarchist thinker, Chomsky does identify himself as an 
                                                          
19
 Chomsky uses the terms ‘anarchism’, ‘anarcho-syndicalism’ and ‘libertarian socialism’ virtually 
interchangeably. All three signify what might be understood in the British or European context as 
‘social anarchism’ or ‘socialist anarchism’. His occasional usage of the latter two can be attributed to 
the potential confusion in the United States of ‘anarchism’ with right-wing libertarianism or anarcho-
capitalism. 
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anarchist, and indeed, his role in establishing the contemporary relevance of 
anarchism as both a credible social theory and a global movement are not in doubt. 
Given that his apparent illustriousness has received such mainstream recognition, it 
is a curious point that in his native America, at least, Chomsky’s writings on politics 
and society are rather less than well-respected – let alone admired or endorsed – by 
a majority within the academy and public life more generally. For, indeed, as 
Chomsky himself has noted with some amusement, ‘If you go back and look at the 
context of [the New York Times] remark, the sentence was: “arguably the most 
important intellectual alive, how can he write such nonsense about international 
affairs and foreign policy?”’ (Chomsky, 1989: p. 35). Such dismissive attitudes 
towards Chomsky’s increasingly vast bibliography on politics, society, international 
relations and current affairs can be attributed in part to the fact that his main 
contribution to knowledge has been made in an altogether separate discipline: 
Chomsky is primarily a professor of linguistics, an area in which the impact of his 
work has arguably remained unrivalled in recent times. That his principal academic 
enterprise belongs in another field has seemingly lent thrust to an intellectual 
snobbery whereby academic specialists in politics and related subjects do not 
welcome intrusions into their disciplines by those, like Chomsky, who are perceived 
to belong elsewhere. Further, as Chomsky has noted, by contrast to Europe and 
elsewhere, in the United States there is much less of a culture of radical criticism 
amongst the intelligentsia (Chomsky, 2004: p. 135). Rather, he claims, in the US the 
function of the intellectual classes – journalists, academics, teachers and so on – 
tends to serve the interests of ruling elites, to reproduce capitalistic relations and, to 
use the title of one of Chomsky’s most influential works, to legitimise state power by 
‘manufacturing consent’ (Herman and Chomsky, 1994). As such, radical voices such 
as that of Chomsky tend to be frozen out, since in order to become a successful 
political intellectual within an essentially capitalist institutional framework one must 
generally adhere to the prevailing orthodoxy. 
There is an additional explanation for Chomsky’s marginalisation: namely that his 
writings on social and political matters tend in both format and style towards the 
journalistic, rather than the so-called ‘academic’. It is true that in relation to politics 
Chomsky is most properly considered a critic or a commentator rather than a 
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theoretician. Indeed, Chomsky is actually quite sceptical about the notion of political 
or social ‘theory’ as such, questioning whether there is ‘anything in the social 
sciences that even merits the term “theory”?’ That is, some explanatory system 
involving hidden structures with non-trivial principles that provide understanding of 
phenomena?’ ‘If so’, he answers, ‘I’ve missed it’ (Chomsky, 1969: p. 271). According 
to Chomsky, a genuine theory must proffer some explanation of phenomena in terms 
that are otherwise hidden or not immediately obvious. Chomsky does not consider 
his own work to fulfil this criterion, since in his view the workings of the present 
socio-political system are quite obvious – or at least potentially so – to those who 
possess what he calls ‘Cartesian common sense’ or ‘the kind of normal scepticism 
and willingness to apply one’s analytical skills that almost all people have and that 
they can exercise’ (Chomsky, 1988a: p. 35). In other words, there is not a huge deal 
about social and political structures that is beyond the comprehension of the average 
citizen, provided they are equipped with the correct information. (The actual 
provision of said information is, of course, another matter entirely.) As such, the 
notion of ‘theory’ as the exclusive domain of an intellectual elite capable of providing 
explanation of the otherwise unknowable is, in Chomsky’s view, redundant. 
But if Chomsky is not a theorist, does this not raise questions as to his suitability as 
the subject of a technical, theoretical analysis such as that in which this study has 
sought to engage? Perhaps, but if we apply Chomsky’s qualifying criteria, then it is 
likely that none of the other writers studied here would be considered theoreticians 
either – he would likely argue that the ‘theories’ of Bakunin, Kropotkin and Bookchin 
do not constitute explanatory systems that uncover any otherwise hidden truths. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that these three thinkers are far more explicit in 
their use of distinguishable theoretical frameworks than is Chomsky, whose work, as 
we have said, is noticeably more journalistic in style. Though it may not be clear, 
there is certainly a distinction between Chomsky’s political writings and the political 
theory or philosophy undertaken by his anarchist antecedents. In spite of this, Alison 
Edgley has argued that Chomsky’s writings on politics do conform to a discernible 
theoretical framework (Edgley, 2000). Edgley’s claim is founded on the observation 
that Chomsky’s work consists in the compilation of highly detailed accounts of 
political and social events and issues that do betray a consistent ‘form and structure’ 
(ibid.: p. 5). Further, she argues, given that Chomsky makes certain ‘propositions 
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about human behaviour and even predictions of a distinctly political kind’ that are 
based on ‘a description of the natural mind’, ‘his analysis has all the hallmarks of a 
theory’ (ibid.: p. 34). On Edgley’s reading, the theoretical components in Chomsky 
are often overlooked because they are obscured by empirical detail: ‘The framework 
is never at the forefront’, she tells us, since Chomsky is keen to discourage us from 
‘standing back from the picture so that we take in only its form and structure which 
allows us to remove our feelings about its content, precisely because we ignore the 
detail’ (ibid.). So Chomsky’s work has a seemingly atheoretical quality, but is 
nevertheless characterised by a consistency of approach that suggests some 
general theoretical principles. Of course, these principles constitute what can, in 
Freeden’s sense of the word, be properly referred to as an ‘ideology’. For in 
Freeden’s scheme ideologies are not solely the preserve of the intellectual elite – still 
less of those engaged in high theory or political philosophy. It is important to 
remember that, far from it, ideologies are ‘ubiquitous forms of political thinking, 
reflecting as they do variegated perceptions, misperceptions, and conceptualisations 
of existing or imagined social worlds’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 22). Theorist or not, from 
the morphological viewpoint Chomsky is most certainly an ideologist, whose 
interpretation of and vision for the political world inevitably displays some conceptual 
pattern. Further, this conceptual pattern – or ideological morphology – includes a 
conception of solidarity, to which this analysis now turns. 
The first section deals with Chomsky’s essentialism, and his assertion that any 
political or social theory should be founded upon a conception of human nature. 
Chomsky offers the suggestion – albeit tentatively – that the capacity for solidarity 
with others might constitute a feature of human nature, and subsequently that 
society should be organised to encourage its positive realisation. The second section 
explores Chomsky’s reappraisal of Enlightenment philosophy, placing particular 
emphasis on his reapplication of classical liberal notions of liberty to the capitalist 
mode of production. Ultimately, Chomsky concludes that capitalism negates 
individual freedom, which, decontested as the realisation of human potential, is 
dependent upon equality and solidarity. The third section considers the way in which 
the concepts of solidarity, equality and freedom are interlinked within the core of 
Chomsky’s anarchism, and finds that each is an essential precondition for the 
realisation of the others. In the fourth section, I characterise Chomsky’s concept of 
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solidarity as incorporating a notion of collective responsibility. According to Chomsky, 
this collective responsibility in manifested in the communal or social provision of 
wellbeing for all, and in a social policy driven by the needs of all members of the 
community. On this point, Chomsky – at odds with many other anarchists – is 
somewhat ambivalent about the potential role of the state in the delivery of public 
services, etc. For although he regards the state as ultimately illegitimate, Chomsky 
sees the general popular support for public provision as indicative of a deeper feeling 
of solidarity that might be channelled instead through non-hierarchical institutions. In 
the final section, I analyse Chomsky’s broad conception of class, whereby he seeks 
to extend revolutionary agency far beyond the oppressed working classes to create a 
universally inclusive social alliance based on ethical objections to injustice and 
inequality and a normative appeal to solidarity. 
Essentialism and solidarity 
As I have said, Chomsky’s principal academic contribution has been in linguistics, a 
discipline which he ‘has been widely accepted as having revolutionised … in its 
goals, boundaries, epistemology, theory and methodology’ (Garraty and Sternstein, 
eds., 1974: p. 915). Chomsky has often sought to downplay the connections 
between his work in linguistics and his political and social analyses, but has 
acknowledged that ‘If there is a connection, it is on a rather abstract level’ (Chomsky, 
2007: p. 3). Despite his reluctance to draw parallels between these two streams of 
his intellectual activity, it is clear that Chomsky’s work in both fields is rooted in some 
quite distinct and fundamental ontological and anthropological assumptions. 
Importantly, as various commentators have observed, the link between Chomsky’s 
two worlds consists in his views on human nature (see, for instance, Edgley, 2000: p. 
68; Otero, 2004: p. 5), which have been developed and reinforced through his 
research in linguistics and have served to inform the conceptual anatomy and 
political prescriptions of his ideology. Chomsky’s essentialism (‘the notion that 
human beings have certain essential characteristics that constrain or enable certain 
behaviour’ – Edgley, 2000: p. 34) is crucial for understanding his political thought. 
Further, his peculiar conception of human nature is particularly important for the 
decontestation of his concept of solidarity, for it provides both a limited framework for 
150 
 
the permutations of human society and political community and a distinct 
morphological context for his ideology more generally. 
For Chomsky, any vision of the good society – or indeed, any normative claim 
regarding the human species – is necessarily founded on a conception of human 
nature. For Chomsky, a good society must be designed so as to enable: 
the satisfaction of human needs, insofar as material conditions allow. To command 
attention and respect, a social theory must be grounded on some concept of human 
needs and human rights, and in turn, on the human nature that must be presupposed 
in any serious account of the origin and character of these needs and rights 
(Chomsky, 1988a: p. 195) 
As he puts it elsewhere, it is critical for political and social theory to centre on some 
idea ‘of what’s good for people, of their needs and rights, of the aspects of their 
nature that should be nurtured, encouraged and permitted to flourish for their benefit 
and that of others’ (Chomsky, 1996b: p. 70).  Only once these criteria are satisfied 
can a political vision be said to be truly ethical in character, since only then is it 
consciously geared toward the betterment of the human lot. In other words, when we 
make normative claims about how society ought to be, ‘it is because we believe or 
are hoping that this change we are proposing is better for humans because of the 
way humans are’ (Chomsky, 1988b: p. 597). Further, it is highly desirable that any 
conception of what constitutes human nature is substantiated by scientific evidence. 
The problem, claims Chomsky, is that we have very little scientific evidence with 
which to define a biological concept of human nature.  This problem marks the 
intersection between Chomsky’s work in linguistics and his work in politics, for 
despite our relative lack of knowledge about human beings’ essential characteristics, 
‘in specific domains such as the study of language, we can begin to formulate a 
significant concept of “human nature”, in its intellectual and cognitive aspects’, 
provided we ‘consider the faculty of language as part of human nature’ (Chomsky, 
1998b: p. 77 – emphasis added). Chomsky insists that since language constitutes a 
uniquely human attribute and, further, since language is one aspect of human 
creative intelligence about which our knowledge is relatively strong, it represents a 
legitimate and potentially fruitful avenue in which to explore the content and 
character of human nature more generally. Indeed, suggests Chomsky, ‘we might try 
to proceed from the detailed investigation of language and its use to a deeper and 
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more specific understanding of the human mind’; the study of language may provide 
us with a vehicle ‘to study other aspects of that human nature which … must be 
correctly conceived if we are to develop, in theory, the foundations for a rational 
social order’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 81). 
Chomsky’s most important contribution to linguistic theory is the concept of ‘universal 
grammar’, ‘a theory of the fixed and invariant principles that constitute the human 
language faculty and the parameters of variation associated with them’ (ibid.: pp. 
232-233). The thrust of Chomsky’s theory is that human beings have a genetic 
predisposition for the development of ‘grammar’, conceived in general terms as the 
capacity for language understanding. This is evidenced by the fact that children 
acquire sophisticated knowledge of their respective language remarkably easily 
given the very limited amount of data they are exposed to. For instance, a child will 
very quickly grasp the basic sentence structures appropriate to his or her respective 
language and implement them consistently, creating new, coherent sentences from 
virtually infinite possible word-combinations. This gulf in complexity between data 
input and knowledge output and its creative use, insists Chomsky, leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that there must be something innate, some genetically 
programmed language faculty which is common to all human beings, regardless of 
which language they end up speaking (which is determined, of course, by their 
environment and their upbringing). From this, Chomsky infers that if the language 
faculty is innate, it is highly likely that other aspects of human intelligence are innate 
as well. The philosophical significance of this, he says, is that ‘just as people 
somehow can construct an extraordinarily rich system of knowledge of language on 
the basis of rather limited and degenerate experience, similarly, people develop 
implicit systems of moral evaluation which are more or less uniform from person to 
person’ (Chomsky, 2004: p. 210). If human beings have an innate and restricted 
capacity for language, the argument runs, there is no reason to suspect that other 
aspects of human intelligence and behaviour are any different. It is therefore 
conceivable that we might ‘develop a social science based on empirically well-
founded propositions concerning human nature’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 90). 
Subsequently, in the same way that we study ‘the range of humanly attainable 
languages’, we might also attempt to ascertain the extent of human capabilities in 
‘artistic expression … scientific knowledge … and perhaps even the range of ethical 
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systems and social structures in which humans can live and function, given their 
intrinsic capacities and needs’ (ibid.). 
It should be noted at this juncture that the notion of a biological human nature is 
highly controversial and has long been the object of much mistrust within the social 
sciences. It is often argued that the conception of a fixed, invariant human essence 
lends scientific and philosophical bases to various forms of oppression, since it is 
possible that ‘biological differences amongst humans can be moulded into weapons 
to justify discrimination’ (Chomsky, 2004: p. 357). For instance, if a person of one 
race is found on average to have a slightly higher IQ than a person of another, this 
may be used as justification for discrimination against the race perceived to be ‘less 
intelligent’. There are of course innumerable historical examples of similar attempts – 
concerning both psycho-social and physical capabilities – to give grounds for varying 
forms of oppression, ranging from slavery and racial segregation to modern 
patriarchal social structures and anti-gay discourses, to name but a handful. 
However, for Chomsky, even if a genuine correlation did exist between, say, race 
and IQ, its discovery ‘would have essentially null scientific interest’ (Chomsky, 2008: 
p. 252). It is only in the ‘social domain’ that such a discovery acquires significance 
and, even then, only to those (racists, sexists, homophobes, etc.) who wish to treat 
each individual ‘not as what he or she is but rather as an example of a certain 
category’ (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, what Chomsky calls ‘environmentalism’20 – the doctrine that human 
beings’ mental and social life is shaped by experience rather than their nature – has 
often been perceived as a progressive doctrine, since it undermines the notion that 
each person has a fixed and natural place in society. Regardless of its scientific 
veracity or otherwise, this position would seem to be well-intentioned, but Chomsky 
gives the environmentalist argument short shrift. ‘It is true’, he insists, ‘that if people 
have no endowments, then they are equal in endowments: equally miserable and 
unfortunate’ (ibid.: pp. 251-252). Far from having progressive consequences, he 
argues, the notion of the human being as an ‘empty organism, completely plastic’ 
has profoundly reactionary ones, since it ‘eliminates any moral barriers to control and 
                                                          
20
 Chomsky discussed the issue of whether or not there is an essential human nature at some length 
in a celebrated televised debate with Michel Foucault in 1971. (For a textual reproduction of the 
debate see Elders, ed., 2011.) 
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domination’ (Chomsky, 2004: p. 357). If there are no essential human 
characteristics, if humans are indefinitely malleable beings, then there can be no 
fundamental ethical constraints regarding the way in which social relations are 
constructed – prospective oppressors are effectively afforded philosophical carte 
blanche. It is patently evident to Chomsky that we are in fact unequal in terms of 
biological endowment, but he sees the fact that ‘humans differ markedly in their 
capacities, their interests, their aspirations’ as something to celebrate rather than 
abhor (ibid.). Indeed, he notes, ‘It is difficult to think of a vision closer to Hell than a 
society of clones, biologically identical’ (ibid.). Further, there is no reason to suspect 
that human beings’ natural diversity may provide grounds for the infringement of 
certain groups’ human rights: ‘Those who assume otherwise must be adopting the 
tacit premise that people’s rights or social reward are somehow contingent on their 
abilities’ (Chomsky, 1988a: p. 199). As Milan Rai has observed, though the tendency 
to deny the existence of potential natural differences between races and various 
other categories may be intended as a rejection of racism and other forms of 
oppression, it is nevertheless founded on the meritocratic assumption that ‘rights and 
rewards should accrue to ability and intelligence’, which is a thoroughly ‘disturbing 
and elitist doctrine’ (Rai, 1995: p. 190). 
Chomsky, however, is convinced that human beings do indeed have an essential 
and invariant nature. Were it not so, then the human brain, he says, would constitute 
the only known organic thing in the universe that does not conform to a genetically 
determined pattern. As such, it would be ‘unique among the systems known to us in 
the natural world’ and ‘in effect, a tabula rasa on which the totality of historically 
determined social relations is inscribed’ (Chomsky, 1988a: p. 196). Equally, 
however, he does not deny the impact of social structure in the shaping of human 
behaviour: ‘Human nature has lots of ways of realising itself, humans have lots of 
capacities and options. Which ones reveal themselves depends to a large extent on 
the institutional structures’ (Chomsky, 1988b: p. 773). In other words, environmental 
factors do play a significant role in determining the types of behaviours that are 
manifest in individuals and groups, but the range of behaviours is limited in the first 
instance by human nature, by our essential characteristics. Whilst a child’s first 
language is of course dependent upon the language spoken by those around them in 
their formative years, they will nevertheless – given the correct encouragement – 
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learn a human language of some sort. In much the same way, individuals’ social 
practices and behaviours may conform to one of a number of different patterns, but 
the range of those available patterns is constrained by the needs and capabilities 
that make up our essential human nature. As such, argues Chomsky: 
If we have institutions which make greed the sole property of human beings and 
encourage pure greed at the expense of other human emotions and commitments, 
we’re going to have a society based on greed, with all that follows. A different society 
might be organised in such a way that human feelings and emotions of other sorts, 
say solidarity, support, sympathy become dominant. Then you’ll have different 
aspects of human nature and personality revealing themselves. (ibid.)   
Given this, Chomsky argues that psycho-biological and philosophical enquiry should 
seek to ascertain as accurately as possible the intrinsic properties of the human 
essence, so as to be able to recommend those social patterns and modes of living 
that best serve human needs and development. Indeed, moral progress to date, 
argues Chomsky, has virtually always coincided with the development of an 
increasingly sophisticated understanding of human nature. He gives the example of 
the gradual development of a common understanding that slavery constitutes an 
abuse of fundamental human rights, an instance in which the human species had 
eventually come to a ‘better understanding of the moral values rooted in our inner 
nature’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 245). This process is an ongoing one: as our knowledge 
of who we are as a species grows, we attain a more refined ethical outlook and thus 
are able to conceive and prescribe more suitable – and ultimately more human – 
modes of social organisation.  
Though adamant in his essentialism, Chomsky is somewhat sceptical about our 
ability to decode the precise character of human nature, at least at the current stage 
of scientific investigation. Indeed, as Edgley has noted, in Chomsky’s view, ‘we may 
not even have the faculties to begin to answer such a question’ (Edgley, 2000: p. 
182). At present our knowledge and understanding of essential human 
characteristics is, says Chomsky, relatively ‘shallow’ and we must proceed therefore 
‘on the basis of intuition and experience’ (Chomsky, 1996b: p. 70). Despite – or 
perhaps because of – our inability to make scientifically substantiated claims about 
human nature, our experience as a species counts for rather a lot when it comes to 
constructing a social theory. Taking into account this experience, says Chomsky, it is 
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reasonable to adopt a position of optimism, ‘meaning a commitment to change things 
for the better, in the hope that it is possible’ (in Bricmont, 2010: p. 74). A pessimistic 
stance is founded on the assumption that meaningful social change cannot be 
brought about and leads to the conclusion that current socio-political arrangements 
conform to our innate human needs. We are thus faced with a choice which 
Chomsky has compared to Pascal’s Wager:21 ‘assume nothing is possible, and the 
worst will come; assume that things can be improved, and perhaps they can’ (in 
Bricmont, 2010: p. 75). Of course, Chomsky’s hopes for the prospects of meaningful 
social change imply in turn certain hopes about human nature that make that change 
possible. Chomsky hopes that human beings’ innate characteristics do not include 
greed, competitiveness and the will to dominate others, but rather sympathy, 
solidarity, cooperation and the need for free, creative expression in association with 
others. It is this hope that allows him to promote a vision for a mode of social 
organisation which would ‘best encourage and accommodate the fundamental 
human need – if such it is – for spontaneous initiative, creative work, solidarity, 
pursuit of social justice’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 90). As this chapter will make clear, 
amongst Chomsky’s hopes – and they are only hopes – about human nature is one 
concerning the potential human capacity for social solidarity as an alternative to 
individualism. 
A ‘child of the Enlightenment’: Chomsky’s intellectual heritage 
A notable trait of the atheoretical appearance of Chomsky’s writings is that many of 
his political concepts lean heavily on the work of previous thinkers and are drawn 
quite directly from long-established traditions of social and political thought. Of 
course, this is by no means unusual. Less still does it constitute a unique 
characteristic of his more commentary-driven, applied approach, for the work of even 
the most original and abstract high theorists inevitably bears the influence – whether 
they acknowledge it or not – of previous thinkers. We have already observed 
Bakunin’s indebtedness to Hegel and Marx, for instance, Kropotkin’s inheritance 
from Guyau, amongst others, and Bookchin’s reliance on virtually all of the 
aforementioned thinkers and others besides. The point is that whilst a writer cannot 
                                                          
21
 Pascal’s Wager: the view that it is rational to believe in God and to live one’s life accordingly, given 
the prospect of eternal bliss for believers and eternal damnation for non-believers in the eventuality 
that He does in fact exist. If He does not, then, believer or non-, one loses nothing (Blackburn, 2008: 
p. 268). 
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and should not be detached from their intellectual family tree, in some cases we may 
find it more necessary to explore the peculiar genealogy of their ideas. Chomsky’s is 
such a case, since much of his ideological morphology is decontested through direct 
invocations of previous thinkers’ work, both from within the anarchist tradition and 
beyond. In this section, we explore the way in which Chomsky borrows, critically 
develops and redeploys the ideas of others and how, through this process, he pieces 
together the morphology of his own ideology. Naturally, the central focus throughout 
is on the way in which this affects Chomsky’s decontestation of solidarity. 
In his seminal essay ‘Language and Freedom’, (first presented as a lecture at the 
University Freedom and Human Sciences Symposium, Loyola University, Chicago, 
January 8-9, 1970) Chomsky invokes the revolutionary mood of the late eighteenth 
century, a period in which he argues, quoting F. W. J. Schelling, it was conceivable 
that ‘“the thought of making freedom the sum and substance of philosophy has 
emancipated the human spirit in all its relationships, and … has given to science in 
all its parts a more powerful reorientation than any earlier revolution …”’ (Chomsky, 
2008: p. 76). Indeed, this scientific and philosophical reorientation constituted both a 
catalyst for and a reaction to the very real political demands that were emerging at a 
time when people were ‘struggling to cast off their chains, to resist authority that has 
lost its claim to legitimacy, to construct more humane and more democratic social 
institutions’ (ibid.). During such times, argues Chomsky, the philosopher is impelled 
to ‘inquire into the nature of human freedom and its limits’, and, he says, ‘We are 
living, once again, at such a time’ (ibid.). In 1970 Chomsky was referring to 
‘revolutionary ferment’ in the developing world and the increasing feeling that 
advanced industrial societies too were ‘ripe for revolutionary change’ (ibid.), but it 
requires only a rudimentary understanding of contemporary global politics to see that 
his words might just as well ring true today, in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century. Given the ongoing crisis of capitalism and the global popular response to it, 
the renewed demands for freedom and democracy that have issued forth from 
various uprisings across the world and the countless social, political, economic and 
cultural challenges raised by the prospect of ecological catastrophe, one might claim 
once again that we are living in such a time as calls for radical transformation. Faced 
with these challenges, the natural response for Chomsky is to ‘consider, abstractly, 
the problems of human freedom, and turn with interest and serious attention to the 
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thinking of an earlier period when archaic social institutions were subjected to critical 
analysis and sustained attack’ (ibid.: p. 77). The period of which Chomsky speaks is, 
of course, the Enlightenment and he spends a great deal of time retrieving and 
reappraising the ideas of a number of its great (and also lesser known) thinkers and 
reapplying them to contemporary social conditions.  
Chomsky identifies the intellectual roots of anarchism – and indeed those of his own 
ideology – in Enlightenment and classical liberal thought, a tradition which he sees 
as the progenitor of modern concerns for individual liberty, social solidarity, equality 
and human flourishing more generally (Chomsky, 2008: pp. 96-100). The common 
link between classical liberalism and the predatory capitalism that came to 
maturation in the nineteenth century, argues Chomsky, is one that has been made 
only retrospectively, for the tradition’s most prominent advocates22 could not have 
foreseen ‘the ways in which the notion “private person” would come to be 
reinterpreted in the era of corporate capitalism’ (ibid.: p. 86). 
Indeed, argues Chomsky, ‘What we would call capitalism [Adam Smith] despised’ 
(Chomsky, 1996a: p. 19) and, in fact, the aggressive, accumulative individualism 
practiced by Smith’s contemporary admirers is quite contrary to his vision for human 
economic interaction in a genuinely free market. According to Chomsky, Smith’s 
advocacy of a market economy was borne of the assumption that ‘if you had perfect 
liberty, markets would lead to perfect equality’ (Chomsky, 2013: p. 36). Chomsky 
argues that Smith, as a classical liberal, devised a political economy founded on the 
belief that ‘people’s fundamental character involves notions like sympathy, and 
solidarity, the right to control their own work, and so on and so forth: all the exact 
opposite of capitalism’ (ibid.). However, this aspect of classical liberal thought has 
largely been lost; solidarity and equality have apparently migrated from the core of 
the ideology, allowing for individual freedom to be decontested in such a way that it 
carries within it notions of rapacious self-interest which served to justify the worst 
symptoms of the unfettered market. In Chomsky’s view, it seems, the emphasis in 
Smith’s philosophy and political economy on concepts such as solidarity 
(decontested through notions of reciprocal sympathy) and equality would place him 
                                                          
22
 He is speaking here specifically of Wilhelm von Humboldt, although the same observation could 
equally be made, argues Chomsky, of the likes of Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson, the more 
libertarian elements in the younger Rousseau and even in Locke. 
158 
 
in direct conflict with the productive modes and ideology with which classical 
liberalism would come to be associated soon after his death. 
Now, whilst Chomsky’s reading of Smith as a ‘libertarian socialist’ (Chomsky, 1996a: 
p. 21) who ‘thought that people ought to be completely equal’ (Chomsky, 2013: p. 
36) is clearly based – to say the least – on a somewhat selective appraisal of his 
writings, it is certainly arguable that Smith would be ‘strongly opposed to all of the 
idiocy [contemporary neoliberals] now spout in his name’ (ibid.). His work exhibits 
various evidence in support of this thesis. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith 
emphasised the human capacity for sympathy as the foundation of human moral 
conceptions – a quite stark contrast from his caricature as a champion of 
selfishness. Even in The Wealth of Nations, which has come to be seen as 
something of a bible of deregulated capitalism, Smith observes that throughout 
human history, ‘All for ourselves and nothing for other people’ has constituted the 
‘vile maxim of the masters of mankind’ (Smith, 1999a: p. 512). Later, in that same 
work, Smith warns against the dangers of the division of labour he is so often 
assumed to unmitigatedly extol: ‘The man whose whole life is spent in performing a 
few simple operations, of which the effects are perhaps always the same, or very 
nearly the same … generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a 
human creature to become’ (Smith, 1999b: p. 368). Of course, this is not to claim 
that Smith was in any sense anti-capitalist. However, as Chomsky has pointed out, 
he was ‘pre-capitalist’ (Chomsky, 1996a: p. 19 – emphasis added), and – despite his 
prescient remarks on the potentially damaging effects of excessive specialisation – 
from the vantage point of the late eighteenth century he could not have anticipated in 
their entirety the psycho-social ramifications that a completely unfettered, 
industrialised capitalism would subsequently have. In drawing attention to these 
strands in Smith’s thought, Chomsky seeks to demonstrate that contemporary liberal 
thought no longer reflects the most vital progressive concerns of its founding fathers. 
As we shall see, Chomsky believes these concerns to have been preserved within 
anarchist ideology. 
Chomsky applies the same line of thinking when dealing with the work of Humboldt. 
Whilst Humboldt’s classical liberal doctrine stands firmly against ‘all but the most 
minimal forms of state intervention in personal or social life’, writing in the 1790s, his 
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notion of individualism, says Chomsky, could not have taken into account the way in 
which industrial capitalism would come to alter the nature and effects of private 
power (Chomsky, 2008: p. 85). Indeed, Chomsky continues, quoting Rudolph 
Rocker, classical liberals such as Smith and Humboldt had no idea that ‘“Democracy 
with its motto of equality of all citizens before the law and Liberalism with its right of 
man over his own person both [would be] wrecked on realities of capitalist economy”’ 
(ibid.: p. 86). As such, classical liberalism made few if any provisions for social 
protection against the ‘irrational and destructive workings’ of the early capitalist free 
market (ibid.). Quite to the contrary, of course, its insistence upon the sovereignty of 
the free individual – conceived with the noble intention of protecting citizens from 
religious and governmental despotism – to this day has been deployed as the very 
justification for the exploitative socio-economic relations inherent to capitalist 
economic organisation. A self-described ‘child of the Enlightenment’ (Chomsky, 
2004: p. 657), Chomsky has sought to reclaim classical liberal vocabularies and 
concepts that have been appropriated by capitalist discourse and to reinstate the 
Enlightenment ideals of a ‘“brotherhood of man”’, of natural rights, fundamental 
equality and ‘the insistence that there [are] real bonds of unity and solidarity among 
people across cultures’ (ibid.: p. 648). Of course, in his attempt to (re)gain control of 
certain aspects of political language, Chomsky can be understood in Freeden’s 
terms as enacting a prime function of ideologies. He undertakes this project through 
a reappraisal of Enlightenment thinking and a remoulding of classical liberal 
concepts in light of capitalist development over the last two centuries or more. 
Chomsky concludes that a logical application of those original principles to 
contemporary capitalism lends support to an anarchist (or ‘libertarian socialist’) 
position which emphasises the importance of equality and social solidarity alongside 
individual freedom and non-coercion. Framed in morphological terms, solidarity – a 
concept largely jettisoned by contemporary neoliberalism – thus plays a crucial role 
in the decontestation of freedom. It is the morphological proximity of freedom to 
solidarity that prevents it from gravitating towards negative notions of mere non-
coercion and license, and allows for it to be decontested in a much more positive 
sense which emphasises the fulfilment of needs and the development of human 
potential. 
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We have already mentioned Humboldt, the German philosopher (and, incidentally, 
linguistic theorist) from whom John Stuart Mill took the epigraph to On Liberty (‘The 
grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages 
directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development 
in its richest diversity’ – quoted in Mill, 1989: p. 3). Humboldt has also borne 
considerable influence on Chomsky, who describes him as ‘one of the most 
stimulating and intriguing thinkers of the [Enlightenment] period’ and ‘an early and 
forceful advocate of libertarian values’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 83). Mill’s epigraph points 
to the central concept of Humboldt’s philosophy: bildung (translated literally as 
‘education’ or ‘formation’), meaning ‘the highest and most harmonious development 
of [human beings’] powers to a complete and consistent whole’ (Humboldt, 1969: p. 
10). Importantly, as J. W. Burrow has put it, this process refers to the ‘development 
of the potentialities of the individual, the community, or the human race’ (Burrow, 
1969: p. xxix). Bildung, then, is not concerned merely with individual flourishing – 
indeed, for Humboldt, the notion of individual development devoid of social context is 
an entirely fallacious one. Whilst ‘Freedom is the first and indispensable condition 
which the possibility of [the highest and most harmonious] development 
presupposes’ (Humboldt, 1969: p. 10), for Humboldt it is equally true that ‘The 
isolated man is no more able to develop than one who is fettered’ (ibid.: p. 100). As 
such, the goal of human society should be to forge ‘as many new social bonds as 
possible’ (ibid.). In other words, ‘social union’, as Humboldt puts it, along with 
freedom constitutes a prerequisite of successful human development. This idea is 
based on the natural interdependence which arises from the diversity of skills and 
faculties belonging to individuals within any given community. It is not possible for all 
of us to develop all of our innate capacities to their full. Even if every individual were 
endowed with equally natural ability in all areas of creative work and expression 
(which, of course, they are not), the nature of things simply does not permit each 
person to reach full maturation in each and every one of those aspects. Given this, 
says Humboldt, ‘It is through a social union … based on the internal wants and 
capacities of its members, that each is enabled to participate in the rich collective 
resources of all the others’ (ibid.:p. 11). Humboldt’s conception of ‘social union’ is 
therefore very similar to the organic model of solidarity developed almost exactly a 
century later by Durkheim (Durkheim, 1984). It is social interdependence as a 
product of individual difference that creates the solidaristic bonds necessary for both 
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individual flourishing and the development of society more generally, since it involves 
a degree of specialisation that allows for us to pursue our own personal needs and 
desires within a communitarian framework. Humboldt’s vision is thus defined, 
Chomsky tells us, by ‘a community of free association without coercion by the state 
or other authoritarian institutions’, conditions in which human beings are able to 
achieve the fullest development of their potentialities (Chomsky, 2008: p. 87). 
Further, the interdependence that arises as a result of our different capabilities and 
interests produces a solidarity that provides the best possible conditions for 
individual flourishing – since natural differentiation affords us the opportunity to 
pursue development in our desired specialist area – whether that be in the arts, in 
scientific investigation, in a particular craft or industry, in sport or in any other area of 
creative expression. 
Whilst in Humboldt’s day the church and the state constituted the foremost 
authoritarian institutions, Chomsky points out that in the current era, ‘the basis of his 
critique is applicable to a broader range of institutions than he imagined’ (ibid.). 
Indeed, industrial and economic development has brought forth a significant shift in 
the sources of power and authority. The power to coerce is no longer concentrated 
solely in the institutions of the church and state, but is now exercised principally by 
those of private capital. The new external authoritarianism is economic in character, 
embodied in wage labour, excessive specialisation of skills and the domination of 
society by corporate capital more generally, and Chomsky argues that Humboldt’s 
analysis is equally applicable to these institutions. 
It is clear to see how Humboldt’s philosophy appeals to the libertarian socialist in 
Chomsky, for Humboldt’s insistence upon the twin necessary conditions for human 
self-fulfilment – freedom and solidarity – clearly pre-empt anarchist priorities that 
would develop within the broader socialist movement during the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, as James McGilvray has observed, Chomsky sees anarchism as ‘a 
modification of the basic Enlightenment conception of the person as a free and 
responsible agent, a modification required to meet the challenge of private power’ 
(McGilvray, 2014: p. 198). The shift in social relations brought about by the new 
capitalistic economic model meant that freedom could no longer be conceived in 
terms relating merely to the absence of political coercion. Any meaningful notion of 
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freedom now had to be reframed in relation to the continuously morphing socio-
economic milieu, and Chomsky sees the anarchist conception – morphologically 
intertwined with notions of equality and solidarity – as resembling the best response 
to this challenge. For Chomsky, there is a natural progression from the classical 
liberal notion of a human essence characterised by ‘a kind of creative urge, a need 
to control one’s productive, creative labour, to be free from authoritarian intrusions’ to 
the development of a rejection of capitalism in the nineteenth century, the 
corresponding relations of production of which violated that basic need to have 
control over one’s own labour. Chomsky thus designates Humboldt’s thought as 
‘profoundly, though prematurely, anticapitalist’ and as suggestive of the early Marx 
and his discussion of alienated labour (Chomsky, 2013: pp. 8-9). Since classical 
liberal thought is opposed to state interference in social life as a result of its 
assumptions about the human need for liberty and so on, then ‘On the same 
assumptions, capitalist relations of production, wage labour, competitiveness, the 
ideology of “possessive individualism” – all must be regarded as fundamentally 
antihuman’ (ibid.: p. 9). Whilst the classical liberal concern for individual freedom had 
developed in response to the hierarchical structure of feudal society and the 
despotism of monarchical rule, its core ideals had not been extended to a critique of 
the deeply inegalitarian property relations ushered in by industrial capitalism. 
However, argues Chomsky, application of Humboldt’s reasoning to contemporary 
society leads to a different set of conclusions, ‘namely that we must dissolve 
authoritarian control over production and resources which … drastically limits human 
freedom’ (Chomsky, 2003: p. 26). In light of freedom’s newfound reliance upon 
economic equality, the libertarian baton was taken up by the socialist tradition. 
Indeed, given its response to the changing social and historical conditions, Chomsky 
argues that it is ‘libertarian socialism that has preserved and extended the radical 
humanist message of the Enlightenment’ and ‘is properly to be regarded as the 
inheritor of [the Enlightenment’s] liberal ideals’ (Chomsky, 2013: pp. 8, 9). 
For Chomsky, then, Humboldt’s opposition to external authority can be applied to the 
coercive character of productive relations under the capitalist mode. Indeed, 
Chomsky tells us, quoting Humboldt, if a person ‘acts in a purely mechanical way, 
reacting to external demands or instruction rather than in ways determined by his 
own interests and energies and power, “we may admire what he does, but we 
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despise what he is”’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 85). The condition of commodified labour 
under capitalist productive relations is unfree, for the compulsion to sell one’s labour-
power to the capitalist is rooted in material need and is therefore external to the 
worker. For Chomsky, Humboldt’s analysis is thus pre-emptive of Marx’s theory of 
alienated labour, in that it is founded on a notion of human essence as inclusive of 
the fundamental need for free and creative expression (ibid.: p. 246). Indeed, for 
Humboldt, the character of labour is dramatically altered depending on the 
framework of productive relations within which it is performed. ‘Every occupation, of 
whatever nature,’ he tells us, ‘is more efficiently performed if pursued for its own 
sake alone, rather than for the results to which it leads’ (Humboldt, 1969: p. 35). In 
other words, the instrumental nature of labour carried out under capitalism renders 
the productive process inhuman; work done ‘under external direction and control’ 
makes the worker ‘a machine, not a full human being’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 246). 
Conversely, says Humboldt, work done for the sake of work itself consists in the 
satisfaction of a fundamental human need and as such ‘what has first been chosen 
for its utility in general becomes ultimately attractive in itself … because action is 
dearer to human nature than mere possession’ (Humboldt, 1969: p. 35). More than 
this, satisfaction of that basic necessity – to do creative, productive work – must take 
place ‘under conditions of voluntary association in solidarity with others’ (Chomsky, 
2004: p. 213). So, the necessary conditions for the fulfilment of that fundamental 
need for creative expression and productive work include not only the absence of 
external coercion, but also a social organisation based on cooperation and solidarity. 
On Chomsky’s reading, Humboldt’s vision is for ‘a society in which social fetters are 
replaced by social bonds’; order is not ensured by force but by a spontaneous 
solidarity (Chomsky, 2013: p. 8). For this vision to be realised, argues Chomsky, we 
must go well beyond the expressly political revolution advocated by the 
Enlightenment libertarians. We must strive also, argues Chomsky, echoing Fourier, 
for economic emancipation, ‘a final act of liberation that places control over the 
economy in the hands of free and voluntary associations of producers’ (ibid.: p. 12). 
Chomsky’s concept of solidarity is thus morphologically fastened to a recognisably 
socialist concept of equality, one which stresses an equal stake for all in the 
productive life of the community. Only when equality is achieved in the economic as 
well as the political realm – in fact, we can assume that all types of social relation 
must be fundamentally equal – is a genuine solidarity able to flourish, since only then 
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do we have the necessary freedom that allows for voluntary association in both 
production and consumption. 
Aside from Humboldt, the Enlightenment thinker that Chomsky invokes most keenly 
is perhaps Rousseau. (Indeed, according to his editor, C. P. Otero, Chomsky himself 
should be thought of ‘as “a new Rousseau” or the Rousseau of our age’ (in 
Chomsky, 2004: p. 13).) Despite Bakunin’s vitriolic dismissal of Rousseau as ‘the 
real creator of modern reaction’, who ‘bred within himself the pitiless despotism of 
the statesman’ (Bakunin, 1970: p. 79), and subsequent interpretations of his Social 
Contract (1762) as a justification for totalitarianism (see, for example, Talmon, 1952; 
Crocker, 1968), Chomsky considers Rousseau’s earlier Discourse on Inequality 
(1755) to be ‘one of the earliest and most remarkable of the eighteenth-century 
investigations of freedom and servitude’ and ‘in many ways a revolutionary tract’ 
(Chomsky, 2008: p. 77). Indeed, the Rousseau of the Second Discourse,23 insists 
Chomsky, belongs to the same line of intellectual development that begins with 
Descartes and continues through Humboldt and the nineteenth century libertarians, 
which holds that the essential characteristics of the human essence involve an 
‘instinct for liberty and creativity, a real human need to be able to work productively 
under conditions of one’s own choosing and determination in voluntary association 
with others’ (Chomsky, 2004: p. 437). On Chomsky’s reading, then, the younger 
Rousseau belongs to the same tradition whose libertarian principles are contravened 
by ‘slavery, wage-slavery, domination, authoritarianism and so on’, social relations 
which constitute a violation of ‘essential human principles’, and ‘which are injurious 
to the essential human nature, and therefore intolerable’ (ibid.). As such, argues 
Chomsky, the goal of a libertarian politics should be to ‘discover and to overcome … 
forms of authoritarian control, interference with personal dignity, human liberty and 
so on and so forth’ (ibid.). 
                                                          
23
 It should be noted that Chomsky has been criticised for his allegedly ‘superficial reading’ of 
Rousseau (i.e. his overemphasis on the Discourse on Inequality and neglect of the Social Contract), 
which, so runs the accusation, presents ‘a simplistic distortion of Rousseau’s political views’, namely 
that he ‘believed that empirically existing laws are intrinsically corrupt, and that all existing forms of 
government are essentially illegitimate’ (Wise, 2011: p. 93). In Chomsky’s defence, whilst his 
representation of Rousseau is based solely on the Second Discourse, his work does imply a clear 
distinction between the young, libertarian Rousseau and the more mature author of the Social 
Contract (Otero, in Chomsky, 2004: p. 13). 
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Of particular interest to Chomsky is Rousseau’s conception of human nature and the 
fundamental role he assigns it in any rational process of social formation and 
organisation. Indeed, human nature, he insists, must always inform ‘the principles of 
natural right’ and constitute the ‘foundations of social existence’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 
78). Rousseau’s wish, argues Chomsky, is to see human beings ‘as nature formed 
[them]’ (Rousseau, 1997b: p. 124), which he takes to mean as living in accordance 
with their fundamental needs that in turn are dictated by a distinctly human essence. 
Indeed, Rousseau is in full agreement with Chomsky on this point: 
This same study of original man, of his true needs, and of the fundamental principles 
of his duties is also the only effective means available to dispel the host of difficulties 
that arise regarding the origin of moral inequality, the true foundations of the Body 
politic, the reciprocal rights of its members, and a thousand similar questions, as 
important as they are badly elucidated (Rousseau, 1997b: p. 128) 
Ultimately, argues Chomsky, for Rousseau, ‘the essence of human nature is man’s 
freedom and his consciousness of his freedom’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 79). Indeed, it is 
this that separates human beings from other animals, which act in accordance with 
mere natural instinct and are not capable in the same way of actions based on their 
own free agency. The most conclusive evidence for human beings’ freedom of 
thought, argues Chomsky, in line with Descartes and his followers, is our ‘use of 
language in the normal, creative human fashion’ (ibid.: p. 81). 
For Rousseau, there is another ‘very specific property’ that distinguishes human 
beings from other animals: ‘the faculty of perfecting oneself; a faculty which, with the 
aid of circumstances, successively develops all the others, and resides in us, in the 
species as well as in the individual’ (Rousseau, 1997b: p. 141). In Rousseau’s 
scheme, then, human beings’ striving for self-perfection occurs not just in terms of 
the fullest development of specifically personal potentialities. Rather, individual 
flourishing occurs as a corollary to the development and perfection of human beings 
collectively. However, whilst Chomsky admires Rousseau’s conception of human 
nature as inclusive of the will to freedom and self-perfection, he also views 
Rousseau as a ‘primitive individualist’ who fails to recognise the significance of 
human beings’ natural sociability and consequent proclivity for free association 
without external coercion by authoritarian institutions (Chomsky, 2008: p. 87). In 
morphological terms, and in Chomsky’s view at least, Rousseau does not consider 
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there to be a significant interrelationship between freedom and solidarity; he does 
not account for the freedom we stand to achieve through the development and 
perfection of solidaristic (and, of course, non-coercive and libertarian) social forms. 
However, Chomsky’s reading of Rousseau is perhaps fettered here by his over-
reliance on the Discourse on Inequality. For, as argued by Christopher Wise, by 
reading the Discourse in conjunction with the later Social Contract one stands to gain 
a much clearer picture of Rousseau’s position, most notably his view that ‘human 
beings may only experience freedom once they agree to embrace already existing or 
empirically real laws that enable them to become members of a collective political 
body’ (Wise, 2011: p. 94). Although Rousseau extrapolates from this central thesis in 
the direction of a distinctly republican politics which are seen as intolerable from an 
anarchist perspective, Chomsky fails to acknowledge that, at a conceptual level, one 
might still harness this aspect of Rousseau’s thought for libertarian purposes. For the 
‘laws’ of which Rousseau speaks in that passage need not refer to the arbitrary 
edicts of an external authority, but rather (as Bookchin acknowledges) to the 
outcomes of a collective decision making process in which citizens participate on 
absolutely equal terms. As such, one might read Rousseau in terms which 
emphasise that participation in a ‘collective political body’ can provide the basis for 
social solidarity and collective freedom. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s legacy aside, 
Chomsky’s criticism of him does hint at a concern on his part for solidarity as a 
necessary condition of human freedom. In flagging up what he perceives to be 
Rousseau’s individualist tendencies and in emphasising the human capacity – 
proclivity, even – for free association, he is highlighting a morphological 
interdependency between the two notions of liberty and solidarity. For Chomsky, 
human solidarity not only removes the need for an external authority to maintain 
social order (coercive institutions such as the state) and therefore allow for a social 
existence without political authority (negative liberty), but in allowing for human 
beings to realise their natural tendency for solidaristic relations speaks to human 
flourishing in a positive sense as well (positive liberty). 
Chomsky’s reappraisal of Enlightenment thinking – principally focused on the works 
of Smith, Humboldt and Rousseau – provide us with an instructive perspective on 
classical liberal notions of freedom. Contrary to the commonly held view that these 
thinkers’ concerns for individual liberty constituted the philosophical foundations of 
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the European bourgeois revolution and the highly predatory, antihuman forms of 
socio-economic organisation that would emerge in the nineteenth century 
(particularly in the case of Smith), Chomsky shows us that, in fact, their ideas need 
to be reinterpreted in light of the coercive social relations that became engendered 
by that very system. Chomsky insists – convincingly, it must be said – that from this 
vantage, it is clear that the social relations inherent to the capitalist mode of 
production would starkly contravene the central principles of classical liberal thought. 
Given the imperative of human freedom, under the capitalist mode it is not only the 
state and the church whose authority must be scrutinised and dismantled but also 
those economic institutions – wage slavery, excessive specialisation and so on – 
that reproduce coercive and hierarchical relations. Only in the absence of such 
institutions, argues Chomsky, and instead in a ‘community of free association’ can 
free human beings ‘create and inquire, and achieve the highest development of their 
powers’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 87). For it is in such a community that human needs are 
best served, particularly those for ‘spontaneous initiative, creative work, solidarity, 
pursuit of social justice’ (ibid.: p. 90). 
Chomsky’s libertarian socialism 
The Enlightenment values that characterise Chomsky’s position, concerning notions 
of human solidarity, freedom and equality, and founded on a distinctive notion of 
human essence constitute the foundations of his wider libertarian socialist critique of 
contemporary Western society (Rai, 2005: p. 232). Indeed, there is a clear lineage, 
argues Chomsky, between classical liberal principles and the socialist rejection of 
capitalism that emerged in the nineteenth century. Coupled with a rejection of 
authoritarian state socialism, these concerns were developed into forms of libertarian 
socialism, the leading idea of which, for Chomsky, was expressed by Bakunin when 
he declared himself a ‘fanatical lover of liberty’ (in Chomsky, 2013: p. 7). Chomsky 
endorses Rudolf Rocker’s assertion that anarchism constitutes ‘the confluence of the 
two great currents which during and since the French Revolution have found such 
characteristic expression in the intellectual life of Europe: Socialism and Liberalism’ 
(Chomsky, 2013: p. 9). Indeed, for Chomsky, the conceptual map of anarchist 
ideology straddles the territory occupied by those two great ideological families, so 
that ‘anarchism may be regarded as the libertarian wing of socialism’ (ibid.). 
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Anarchist ideology thus consists in a kind of intersection across and between the 
morphologically porous boundaries of liberalism and socialism, so that in hosting 
concepts found also in each of those ideologies it occupies a shared ideational 
space. Further, by drawing on concepts prioritised by other ideologies and by 
propelling them into closer proximity with one another, libertarian socialism creates a 
new and peculiar idea-environment in which those concepts can be decontested in a 
distinctive way. For Chomsky, the conceptual anatomy of libertarian socialism is 
characterised by a concern for liberty through ‘organisation in complex society based 
on equality and solidarity’ (Chomsky, 2004: p. 153). It is solidarity’s close relationship 
with liberty, for instance, that results in a concept that emphasises the importance of 
voluntary association as a necessary basis for free and creative work and individual 
flourishing, rather than, say, an authoritarian (and ultimately illusory) solidarity 
imposed by the state. The relationship between those two core concepts also serves 
to logically shape the libertarian socialist notion of freedom, preventing it from 
degenerating into a self-interested individualism. Chomsky explicitly identifies this 
tendency in right-wing libertarian (or ‘anarcho-capitalist’) thought, which, in affording 
‘no weight to notions like equality, solidarity, and so on’ effectively amounts to ‘an 
extreme form of authoritarianism’ as a result of the inevitable imbalances in power 
that would occur in a society organised according to market forces alone (Chomsky, 
2004: p. 153). In its reinterpretation of classical liberal ideals, and its insistence that, 
in Rocker’s words, ‘Socialism will be free, or it will not be at all’ (Chomsky, 2013: p. 
14), anarchism borrows, renews and recasts traditional liberal and socialist concepts 
so as to form a radical, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian ideology. 
Otero, describing Chomsky’s as ‘the most developed conception of anarchism to 
date, and the deepest and best founded, intellectually speaking’ (in Chomsky, 2003: 
p. 29), provides a clear explication of the significance of this conceptual interlinkage 
within Chomsky’s thought. (It should be noted that Otero recognises that Chomsky’s 
strategic preferences may be shared by libertarian socialists that are not explicitly 
anarchist.) I reproduce his tabulation here: 
Vision: 
1. (Libertarian) self-realisation (vs. neoliberal acquisitiveness) 
2. (Socialist) common appropriation of capital (vs. private expropriation) 
Strategy: 
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3. (Popular) cultural transformation (vs. elitist political revolution) 
4. (Industrial) syndicalism (vs. any atavistic alternative) (ibid.: p. 30) 
Otero correctly presents the idea-preferences above as a series of ‘choices’ (the 
choice of libertarian self-realisation over neoliberal – or anarcho-capitalist – 
acquisitiveness, for instance). However to understand the significance of these 
choices in relation to the reproduction of Chomsky’s ideology, the function of their 
interrelationships must be reviewed with reference to the notion of morphological 
decontestation. The decision to choose one logical option over another is not merely 
a value-judgment. Of course, it is a value-judgment, but it is one which has quite 
specific consequences for the shaping of an ideology and the concepts within it. The 
process of decontestation – by definition – concerns the affirmation of one logically 
possible contingency over another (or over a number of others). As such (and as 
Otero implies), in asserting the above idea-preferences, Chomsky is decontesting 
various concepts; in negating certain permutations so as to leave just one possible 
reading he is removing the concept’s contestability. The aspect that Otero does not 
mention is the part played in this process by the concepts’ interrelationships, by the 
cultural shaping that takes place by way of their mutual morphological proximity. In 
other words, the impact that a particular preference has goes well beyond the 
boundaries of the concept to which it directly pertains; it affects the way in which 
other concepts are decontested as well. In order to appreciate fully the complexities 
and nuances within Chomsky’s anarchism, particularly with regard to his notion of 
solidarity, these inter-conceptual relationships require some exploration. 
As we have seen, within Chomsky’s ideology we find a familiar interlinkage between 
the concepts of freedom and solidarity. As we said at the beginning of this chapter, 
Chomsky actually rejects the notion that he is in any sense an original ‘anarchist 
thinker’, preferring instead to think of himself as a ‘derivative fellow traveller’, drawing 
inspiration from his anarchist predecessors and enriching the anarchist tradition 
through careful selection of ideas from the point at which ‘radical Marxism24 merges 
                                                          
24
 For Chomsky, ‘radical Marxism’ refers to the thought of those non-orthodox, anti-Bolshevik Marxists 
such as Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek, Paul Mattick and Karl Korsch, amongst others, as well 
as the more libertarian strains in the work of Marx himself (Chomsky, 1998a: p. 120). As Paul 
Marshall has noted, Chomsky’s inclusion of such thinkers alongside the likes of Rousseau and 
Humboldt as representatives of a ‘libertarian socialism’ might seem odd, but his intention is to build up 
a ‘broader libertarian socialist tradition, whose essence can be found, at least in certain aspects of 
their thinking, in all the aforementioned figures’ (Marshall, 1994: p. 618). 
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with anarchist currents’ (Chomsky, 2003: p. 213; Chomsky, 2013: p. 14). Chomsky’s 
politics are profoundly influenced by Rocker, a fact to which he testifies in his preface 
to Rocker’s Anarcho-Syndicalism. Indeed, Chomsky praises Rocker’s ‘faith in the 
capacity of ordinary people to construct for themselves a world suited to their inner 
needs’, to develop a ‘culture of liberation’ and the ‘institutional arrangements’ that are 
most likely to ‘satisfy their deeply rooted striving for freedom, justice, compassion 
and solidarity’ (in Rocker, 2004: p. iii). In Anarcho-Syndicalism, Rocker echoes 
classical liberals such as Humboldt and proffers a positive decontestation of 
freedom, arguing that it consists in ‘the vital concrete possibility for every human 
being to bring to full development all the powers, capacities, and talents with which 
nature has endowed him, and turn them to social account’ (ibid.: p. 16). Again, this 
hints at the interrelationship between freedom and solidarity, since the products of a 
genuine freedom – in other words, the flourishing of individual talents – necessarily 
contribute in a positive way to the attributes of the social body and subsequently to 
the reinforcement of the feeling of group solidarity. Abilities and talents often 
manifest themselves as needs – needs to develop the variety of capacities with 
which an individual may be naturally gifted. And for Chomsky, in a genuinely socialist 
society, ‘a central purpose will be that the necessary requirements of every member 
of society be satisfied’ (Chomsky, 1988a: p. 192). Of course, individuals differ greatly 
in their abilities and preferences, so that should a person feel an overwhelming need 
‘to play the piano ten hours a day’, or indeed desire to engage in any other creative 
activity or physical or intellectual exercise, then provided that the material 
circumstances permit it, ‘these differential needs should be satisfied in a decent 
society, as in healthy family life’ (ibid.). However, Chomsky foresees an inevitable 
scenario in which the needs, wants and aspirations of individuals in a society will 
come into conflict with one another. Nevertheless, he insists that it is unnecessary – 
as well as impossible – to have any kind of formal, codified general principles or 
procedures by which disputes may be resolved. ‘Honest people’, he argues, ‘will 
differ in their assessments and will try to reach agreement through discussion and 
sympathetic consideration of the needs of others’ (ibid.). In a society whose politics 
function along these lines, social solidarity is paramount. The feelings of mutual 
respect, sympathy and recognition associated with solidarity are necessary 
conditions of the kind of do-it-yourself politics that Chomsky clearly favours. 
Currently, says Chomsky, we are unable to readily conceive of conducting social 
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relations in this way beyond the boundaries of only relatively small social groups 
such as the family or the immediate neighbourhood, since the dominant ideology of 
competitive capitalism is so pervasive. As such, ‘It is no wonder’, notes Chomksy, 
‘that “fraternity” has traditionally been inscribed on the revolutionary banner 
alongside of “liberty” and “equality”’, since in the absence of ‘bonds of solidarity, 
sympathy, and concern for others, a socialist society is unthinkable’ (Chomsky, 
1988a: p. 192). 
Chomsky’s preferred political system is intended to preclude the need for a 
centralised and professionalised bureaucracy which, at least under a capitalist 
economy, demonstrably cannot perform the function of genuinely impartial 
arbitration. In Rocker’s words, by seeking increasing supervision of the lives of 
citizens, the state serves to place ‘ever greater obstacles in the way of the solidaric 
[sic] co-operation of human beings and [crushes] out every possibility of new 
development’ (Rocker, 2004: p. 2). Chomsky’s prescriptions aim to overcome this 
stifling tendency of the bureaucratic state, to remove the barriers to solidaristic 
practices by means of a radical democratisation of the everyday, so that individuals, 
communities, workforces and various other associative groups have maximum 
control over the decisions that affect their lives. Under the current model of 
representative democracy, he argues, there exists ‘a monopoly of power centralised 
in the state’ (Chomsky, 2003: p. 211), and the role of ordinary citizens is merely to 
‘ratify decisions taken elsewhere, to adopt the doctrines prepared for them by their 
superiors’ (in Rocker, 2004: p. 2). Chomsky’s political project seeks to reverse this 
dynamic, so that ‘the delegation of authority is rather minimal’ and that those to 
whom authority is delegated ‘should be directly responsive to the organic community 
in which they live’ (Chomsky, 2003: p. 215). Though he does not provide a hugely 
detailed political blueprint, Chomsky does clearly make the case for direct 
participatory democracy at the levels of the local community and in industry and 
production. He does, however, concede that some level of representation or 
delegation is both inevitable and necessary, since to involve all members of a 
collective in absolutely all of the political decisions made is both inefficient and 
impractical. Such a system would lead inevitably to democratic overload. Ideally, 
argues Chomsky, participation in the necessary governmental forms is both partial 
and temporary, so that ‘the members of a workers’ council [for example] who are for 
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some period actually functioning to make decisions that other people don’t have the 
time to make, should also continue to do their work as part of the workplace or 
neighbourhood community in which they belong’ (Chomsky, 2003: p. 215). This 
rotation of governance serves to prevent the rise of administrative elites and 
consequently ensures that coercive power does not become concentrated within 
certain political institutions. In Chomsky’s mind, the ideal form of social organisation 
is one which reflects the human need for freedom and association and should 
therefore serve to minimise external authority (the ‘anarchist’ aspect) and enhance 
the potential for individuals to freely associate with one another (the ‘syndicalist’ 
aspect) (Wilson, 2005: p. 244). As James Wilson notes, the resulting ‘anarcho-
syndicalism’ (or ‘libertarian socialism’ – Chomsky makes no distinction) ‘maximises 
the opportunity to exercise autonomy, freedom, and creativity on the one hand, while 
finding friendship, solidarity, and love, on the other’ (ibid.). The system of 
representative democracy that prevails in modern liberal democracies is one in 
which power becomes centralised within the institutions of the state and the direction 
in which that power is exercised consequently flows from the top-down. For 
Chomsky, following Rocker, the effect of this is to stymie the development of the 
spontaneous solidaristic associations towards which human beings inevitably tend. 
His proposed alternative – a system of direct democracy whereby any delegation 
that does occur is minimal, temporary and responsive – is intended to reverse the 
direction in which political authority is exercised, so that it flows from the bottom-up. 
The theory is that in doing so it removes the constraints placed upon individuals and 
communities by centralisation and provides the space necessary for solidarity to 
flourish. Chomsky’s concept of democracy – though rudimentary and 
underdeveloped (he acknowledges as much25) – therefore constitutes an adjacent 
concept within his ideology, since it provides cultural support for solidarity. 
However, Wilson has also raised concerns over the feasibility of putting Chomsky’s 
vision into practice, arguing that it is ‘unlikely that anything like Chomsky’s anarcho-
syndicalist form of political organisation can be fully realised’ (ibid.). This criticism, 
Wilson says, is not founded on the flawed neoliberal assumption that human beings 
naturally seek to accumulate as many resources as possible and to dominate others, 
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 Chomsky refrains from prescribing a precise model: ‘these are matters over which anarchist 
theoreticians have debated and many proposals exist, and I don’t feel confident to take a stand. 
These are questions which will have to be worked out’ (Chomksy, 2003: p. 215). 
173 
 
but rather on several concerns over the practical administration of a system such as 
that which Chomsky seemingly favours that lead him to the conclusion that some 
degree of hierarchy is both inevitable and necessary (ibid.: pp. 244-245). Firstly, he 
argues, conflict resolution between human beings ‘is usually most effective when it is 
performed by neutral third parties backed up with the authority to enforce their 
solution’ (ibid.: p. 245). This third party, states Wilson, will inevitably involve some 
form of ‘state-vested hierarchy’ and some form of authority being assigned to 
‘institutional roles that are constitutionally fixed and vested in a government’ (ibid.). 
The second point refers to the necessity of specialisation: ‘management of complex 
institutions, including workplaces and industries, requires special talents and 
developed skills that take education, experience, and effort to develop’ (ibid.). As 
such, it is unavoidable that expertise will afford certain individuals with some form of 
decision-making authority. There is also the issue of efficiency, whereby continual 
rotation of positions and responsibilities requires individuals to learn the role from 
scratch each time they are assigned to a new position (ibid.). For Wilson, these 
factors combined likely make Chomsky’s model unworkable. However, he does 
concede that it might be more useful to consider Chomsky’s system as a ‘vision’, or 
an ‘ideal’, which serves not as a literal blueprint to be put into action but rather as ‘a 
measure to judge whether our current society meets the fundamental human needs 
of freedom and solidarity’ highlighted by Chomsky’s conception of human nature 
(ibid.: p. 246). On this approach, one might argue not for a maximal extension of 
democracy to every aspect of life, for a total abolition of supposedly neutral, third-
party arbiters, or for a workforce and administration that is completely non-
specialised. Rather, the proposition might be for more democratic decision making 
processes in more areas of public life, for less formalised, less centralised and less 
authoritarian procedures, and for less specialisation in industry and governance, at 
least to the extent that it substantially softens the worst effects of the division of 
labour. To interpret Chomsky’s writings in this manner provides us with the basis for 
a much more workable model of action, and seemingly places him in a similar 
position to that of the British anarchist Colin Ward, who maintained that whilst ‘The 
concept of a free society may be an abstraction … that of a freeer [sic.] society is 
not’ (Ward, 1961: p. 3). This approach provides us with a somewhat different 
conception of an anarchist society: ‘Not as an aim to be realised, but as a yardstick, 
a measurement or means of assessing reality’ (ibid.). 
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Chomsky makes a very similar distinction to that of Ward between the abstract 
notion of an anarchist future and the practical options that become available to us 
when we apply anarchist principles to the here-and-now. Indeed, Chomsky’s 
distinction between ‘visions’ and ‘goals’ is a very important and very practical one. 
Visions, says Chomsky, refer to ‘the conception of a future society that animates 
what we actually do, a society in which a decent human being might want to live’ 
(Chomsky, 1996b: p. 70). Goals, on the other hand, refer to ‘the choices and tasks 
that are within reach, that we will pursue one way or another guided by a vision that 
may be distant and hazy’ (ibid.). Chomsky’s anarchism in practice is thus centred on 
a set of practical objectives formulated from a realistic evaluation of the current 
socio-political environment. Despite the shift in focus from one set of problems and 
goals to another, the guiding principle remains the same: ‘The problem of “freeing 
man from the curse of economic exploitation and political and social enslavement” 
remains the problem of our time. As long as this is so, the doctrines and the 
revolutionary practise of libertarian socialism will serve as an inspiration and a guide’ 
(Chomsky, 1970: pp. xviii-xix). For Larry Portis, this is symptomatic of a certain 
‘pragmatism’ on the part of Chomsky, whereby the need for a solution to immediate 
problems overrides finer conceptual points and allows him to avoid the kind of 
‘sectarian strife’ produced by dogmatic ideologies (Portis, 2010: p. 327). Further, it is 
this pragmatic approach that explains Chomsky’s sometimes seemingly 
contradictory stances on the role of the state. If we consider his ultimate vision (to 
replace hierarchical and authoritarian institutions with democratic, participatory 
ones), and we accept that in a corporate-dominated democracy such as the United 
States, one of the only ways in which most people can have any influence at all is by 
voting in elections, then support of the state is not necessarily inconsistent with 
libertarian principles. As Wilson has stated, in such circumstances, ‘Chomsky the 
anarchist paradoxically supports efforts to increase the power of the state, at least 
where it can serve to regulate and check otherwise largely unconstrained and 
otherwise unaccountable corporate authority’ (Wilson, 2005: p. 247). Chomsky 
himself has acknowledged that his goals and visions can often come into conflict, but 
he insists that this does not necessarily amount to a contradictory or inconsistent 
position. Although his ultimate vision involves the dismantling of state power, his 
short-term goals often serve to shore up certain aspects of state authority which, 
though fundamentally illegitimate, ‘are critically necessary right now to impede the 
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dedicated efforts to ‘“roll back” the progress that has been achieved in extending 
democracy and human rights’ (Chomsky, 1996b: p. 73). State power is under threat 
not because it is incompatible with the libertarian vision, but precisely because it 
offers some protection – albeit fairly inadequate protection – to various aspects of it. 
As such, argues Chomsky, the immediate goals of anarchists should be to defend 
some state institutions from the neoliberal onslaught, ‘while trying at the same time 
to pry them open to more meaningful public participation – and ultimately, to 
dismantle them in a much more free society, if the appropriate circumstances can be 
achieved’ (ibid.: p. 75). For Chomsky, anarchism should be viewed as a ‘practical 
“philosophy”’, informed by a vision of the future that is ‘more free and more 
conducive to a wide range of human needs’, and according to which we should ‘each 
commit ourselves to the problems we feel most pressing’ (Chomsky, 2004: p. 364). 
He argues that there is no – and probably can be no – ‘general all-purpose strategy’ 
for the creation of a libertarian society (Chomsky, 1998a: p. 149). As such, 
Chomsky’s advice for those seeking to further anarchist aims is: ‘Pick your cause 
and go volunteer for a group that’s working on it’ (ibid.: p. 152). 
Having explored Chomsky’s practical political recommendations for the realisation of 
solidarity in society, let us return to the morphological significance of his concept. We 
have seen that, for Chomsky, solidarity is a prerequisite for the egalitarianism that, in 
turn, is necessary if individuals within a group are to attain the fullest development of 
their potentialities. As Edgley has noted, Chomsky’s libertarian socialism thus 
defends a ‘commitment to both equality and liberty’; the two concepts are treated as 
‘logically interdependent’ (Edgley, 2000: p. 52). Chomsky’s concept of equality is 
distinctly socialistic in character; it stipulates the crucial difference between equality 
of condition and equality of rights, and that the latter is rendered fallacious in 
conditions which do not allow for the former. Equality of rights is only meaningful if 
circumstances are ‘such that [individuals] can enjoy these rights. To the extent that 
inequality of condition impairs the exercise of these rights, it is illegitimate … in a 
decent society’ (Chomsky, 1988a: p. 193). For Chomsky, this egalitarianism amounts 
to a central socialist ideal. If we insist upon the primacy of equality of rights over 
equality of condition, and if those rights include the right to self-development, then in 
order to preserve the equality of rights, ‘conditions must be equalised at least to the 
rather considerable extent required to guarantee these rights’ (ibid.). In Chomsky’s 
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scheme, the role of guarantor is played – at least in part – by solidarity, since the 
right to self-development can only be exercised through free association with others. 
By way of its proximity to solidarity, the Chomskyan (socialist) concept of equality is 
decontested in such a way that it ‘denies that inequality of endowment merits or 
demands corresponding inequality of reward’ and ‘rejects equality of condition as a 
principle in itself’ (ibid.). Rather, it emphasises the necessity of insuring that each 
individual has access to the means and resources required to develop their innate 
talents and capacities. 
Collective responsibility and the question of the state 
We saw earlier the way in which Chomsky’s vision of an anarchist society is 
reconciled with his support for certain policies prompted and enacted by the very 
institution(s) to which anarchists are usually defined by their opposition: the state. 
Although he does, along with pretty well all anarchists, adhere to the view that the 
state constitutes an illegitimate and oppressive form of political authority which must 
ultimately be dismantled, his general attitude towards the state is much more 
ambivalent and pragmatic than one of outright opposition. Indeed, Chomsky readily 
admits that his ‘short-term goals’ often involve the defence or even the strengthening 
of ‘elements of state authority which, though illegitimate in fundamental ways, are 
critically necessary right now to impede the dedicated efforts to “roll back” the 
progress that has been achieved in extending democracy and human rights’ 
(Chomsky, 1996b: p. 73). As such, the state policies to which Chomsky offers 
support are those which he sees as providing some (albeit weak) protection against 
the very worst effects of the unfettered capitalist free market on individuals and 
communities. Very often they take the form of state-organised public provision for 
certain essential services and goods: education, healthcare, basic welfare, general 
infrastructure and so on. In this way, Chomsky’s position on social policy contrasts 
sharply with those anarchists such as Colin Ward (and many within the New Left 
generally) who adopt a much more critical, if not hostile stance towards state 
provision. Ward argues that the centralised provision of welfare by a highly 
bureaucratic state post-1945 effectively resulted in the writing off of valuable and 
empowering traditions of working-class self-help and mutual aid and created a 
culture of paternalism that tied people into stultifying relationships of dependency 
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that actually served to support rather than challenge the capitalist system (Ward, 
1996; 2008: pp. 17-18). For Chomsky, however, in a socio-political climate 
dominated by a corporate power over which the average individual or community has 
virtually no influence whatsoever, any conscious decision to relinquish the limited 
influence that one is able to exert through the liberal-democratic state is naïve at 
best.26 As such, he regards many anarchists as mistaken in their dogmatic treatment 
of the state as ‘the fundamental form of oppression’ (in Lilley, 2011). 
So, in contrast to the traditional anarchist critique of the paternalistic state, Chomsky 
posits public provision of certain services (he is speaking here specifically of 
education, but the principle stands for other policy areas) as a threat to private power 
and argues that this threat is derived from the fact that the meeting of needs in this 
way ‘is based on a principle of solidarity’ (Chomsky, 2014a: p. 38). This solidarity, he 
explains, is embodied in popular support for and broad consent to provide for others’ 
needs regardless of one’s own. ‘So, for example’, Chomsky says, ‘I had my children 
fifty years ago. Nevertheless, I feel and I’m supposed to feel that I should pay my 
taxes so that the kids across the street can go to school’ (ibid.). So within Chomsky’s 
notion of solidarity is the idea of mutual or collective responsibility for meeting the 
needs of all members of the community, regardless of one’s connection (or lack of 
connection) to them. It may seem here that Chomsky is deploying a distinctly social 
democratic notion of solidarity, one which emphasises ‘the preparedness to share 
resources … through … the state’ (Stjernø, 2005: p. 2). And, indeed, in instances 
such as these, he is of course expressing support for social democratic policy 
preferences, at least as they appear within a liberal-democratic framework. However, 
this does not mean that his concept of solidarity is necessarily decontested in 
precisely the same way as that which is found within social democratic ideologies. 
We have seen how Chomsky’s goals/visions distinction allows for a pragmatic 
approach which reconciles general principles and immediately available courses of 
action that are seemingly contradictory – in this case a support for state-organised 
provision as an alternative to bolstering private or corporate power. However, we 
might also observe that the mainstream Left preference for redistribution and welfare 
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 Chomsky offers a similar explanation for his focus on the US state in his writings on international 
affairs. Given that the American state, as a functioning democracy, is relatively responsive to 
domestic public opinion, it makes more sense politically for him to direct his critique at his own state 
rather than at others, since exposing the effects of its foreign policy, etc. is more likely to result in its 
modification (Chomsky, 2004: pp. 341-344). 
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provision through the state is not the only policy that is logically compatible with a 
general preparedness to share amongst members of a community, which is patently 
a more fundamental type of psycho-social feeling that denotes a form of solidarity as 
collective responsibility or obligation. As a component of Chomsky’s concept of 
solidarity, collective responsibility does not necessitate a specific policy preference; 
there are numerous peripheral concepts with which it may logically interlink, many of 
which do not involve state provision and thus are not incompatible with Chomsky’s 
libertarian socialist vision. Preparedness to share resources in and of itself does not 
specify the means by which they are to be shared. Redistribution (or sharing) can 
occur in a number of ways that bypass or preclude state-involvement – cooperatives 
and credit unions; the Israeli kibbutzim; workers’ councils models such as that 
experimented with in the former Yugoslavia in the 1950s may be cited as but a 
handful of examples, whilst anarchist movements and various alternative forms of 
living have doubtless involved many more forms. The crucial point is that regardless 
of form, the mode of sharing or (re)distribution is reliant on the feeling of which 
Chomsky speaks when he describes the attitudes of collective responsibility and 
mutuality that provide general support for public provision. As Barry Pateman points 
out in his introduction to Chomsky on Anarchism, the strength of the feeling of 
collective responsibility yields ‘ways of being that can operate within capitalism and 
point the way to a future of anarchy. Hence, Chomsky can argue that progressive 
taxation and Social Security are created by attitudes which, if pushed a little more, 
would be anarchist’ (Pateman, 2005: p. 8).  Besides, in more pragmatic terms, if 
collective responsibility is manifest as redistribution by the state, given that the 
immediate alternative would likely involve an extension of private power and 
consequently a diminution of individual and social freedom then, for Chomsky, it is 
an obvious political choice. As such, the policy of redistribution by the state is 
culturally adjacent to the core concepts within Chomsky’s ideology, wherein his 
notion of freedom is decontested as pertaining in part to a fundamental opposition to 
illegitimate state authority. Despite the ostensible incompatibility of freedom from 
interference by an illegitimate state and a concept of solidarity which, under certain 
circumstances is manifest as collective responsibility through state-organised 
redistribution, the association of the two notions, to put it in Freeden’s terms, is 
encouraged by ‘specific historical and socio-geographical phenomena’ (Freeden, 
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1996: p. 72), namely the pragmatic necessity of invoking collective responsibility 
through state redistribution in the face of corporate power. 
Nevertheless, Chomsky still insists upon a fundamental opposition to the state in 
principle: ‘States are … combinations of the rich and the government to oppress the 
poor … You don’t call upon that combination to get rid of injustice, what you do is 
dismantle it’ (Chomsky, 2014b: pp. 85-86). However, the attainment of the power to 
bring about such changes does not necessarily prefigure the dismantling of the state 
in itself and may be achieved ‘either through or over the state’ (ibid.: p. 86). In this 
way, Chomsky’s immediate goals may seem to conflict with his ultimate vision, but 
he insists that his position is not an inconsistent one, that progress can only be 
attained by rigorous assessment of the options available in specific circumstances. 
For Chomsky, the value of solidarity as collective responsibility lies in the challenge it 
poses to corporate power and the individualistic attitudes entrenched by 
neoliberalism. He argues that solidarity is precisely ‘counter to the doctrine that you 
should just look after yourself and let everyone else fall by the wayside’ (Chomsky, 
2014a: p. 38). He explicitly cites the examples of public education and Social 
Security, but we can assume that for Chomsky any similar form of public provision 
constitutes ‘a threat to [neoliberalism/individualism] because it builds up a sense of 
solidarity, community, mutual support’ (ibid.: p. 39). It is precisely because these 
policies are linked to the very idea of solidarity that they have generally been 
opposed by capital: ‘If you’re trying to maximise profit’, observes Chomsky, ‘then 
working together is the wrong idea … Solidarity makes people hard to control and 
prevents them from being passive objects of private power’ (ibid.). The priorities of 
capital generally and more recently in the form of neoliberal structural adjustment, 
have been aimed at undermining solidarity, not only in its attempts at ‘rolling back’ 
public provision (or ‘state intervention’), but also in its concerted attack on organised 
labour. Indeed, Chomsky points to the oppressive labour laws in the US (citing the 
Taft-Hartley Act and the 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 as a more recent example), arguing 
that they are draconian to the extent that in the US, meaningful expression of 
‘working-class solidarity is actually illegal’ (ibid.: pp. 40-41; Chomsky, 1996a: p. 156). 
We turn now to the importance of class in Chomsky’s decontestation of solidarity. 
Class 
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According to Pateman, Chomsky sees ‘class as the central tenet of anarchism’ and 
his work seeks to encourage an approach which emphasises ‘the importance of 
solidarity and community in a class-based way’ (Pateman, 2005: p. 8). The notion of 
class is thus crucial for both Chomsky’s anarchism generally and his peculiar 
decontestation of solidarity. However, Chomsky’s focus on class has come in for 
criticism from some quarters and has even led George Woodcock to insist that he is 
not an anarchist but rather a left-wing Marxist who ‘selects from anarchism those 
elements that may serve to diminish the contradictions in Marxist doctrine’ 
(Woodcock, 1974: p. 4).27  In doing so, argues Woodcock, Chomsky impoverishes 
anarchism by ‘abandoning the elements that do not serve [his] purpose’ and 
‘reducing it … to a mere cluster of tactical concepts’ (ibid.: p. 5). Woodcock’s quest 
for doctrinal purity has been rebutted by Milan Rai, who inverts the criticism of 
Chomsky’s ideological pluralism, observing that, in fact, ‘Chomsky regards 
anarchism as “primary” … and selects those elements in the Marxist tradition that 
help to enrich this tradition’ (Rai, 1995: p. 97). Indeed, Chomsky himself has 
declared a distaste for the doctrinaire thinking espoused by both Woodcock and 
many Marxists alike; he sees any deliberate refusal not to learn from Marx – whom 
he considers ‘a major intellectual figure’ (Chomsky, 2004: p. 365) – as equally foolish 
as accepting uncritically every aspect of his analyses. The thrust of Woodcock’s 
critique appears to centre on Chomsky’s conception of class. It is worthwhile here to 
review in more detail the nature of this critique, for in addressing its central points we 
can illuminate the way in which Chomsky understands the notion of class and the 
place it takes within the morphology of his anarchism and in relation to his concept of 
solidarity. 
In an article in Freedom in 1974, in response to the publication of Daniel Guérin’s 
Anarchism, for which Chomsky wrote the Introduction, Woodcock denied that 
Chomsky (nor Guérin, for that matter) could be considered an anarchist ‘by any 
known criterion’ (Woodcock, 1974: p. 4). His claim rests partly on Chomsky’s 
supposed over-reliance on ‘narrow’ anarcho-syndicalist theorists such as Rocker and 
libertarian Marxists such as Pannekoek, but also on his emphasis on ‘the classic 
category of the industrial proletariat’ as revolutionary agents (ibid.: pp. 4, 5). It is not 
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 Incidentally, some anarchists have in turn argued that Woodcock himself is not an anarchist 
(Marshall, 1994: p. 626). 
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clear whether Woodcock sees the latter aspect as cause or consequence of 
Chomsky’s choice of theoretical touchstones, but, irrespectively, its relevance is 
questionable when one considers that anarchists too – albeit often operating with a 
broader conception of the working class – have traditionally held that group to be the 
flagbearers of social revolution. Woodcock sees this approach as misplaced and out-
of-date, as a hangover from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century revolutionary 
dogma. To restrict revolutionary agency in such a way, he argues, is to place one’s 
hopes for social transformation in the charge of a group who ‘will continue to 
diminish both in numbers and in strength if present technological trends continue’ 
(ibid.). Further, he claims, it is to ignore the part played by non-working-class 
revolutionaries, by those who, regardless of their own social class, ‘seek a society 
where the potentialities of existence are varied and liberated, a society to be 
approached by lifestyle rebellion as well as by economic struggle’ (ibid.). 
It scarcely needs to be said that Woodcock is quite correct to point out that, firstly, 
the industrial proletariat, traditionally understood, can no longer bear the burden of 
revolutionary agency alone (still less in the 21st century than in the 1970s); and, 
secondly, that those from outside of the traditional working class have contributed 
and continue to contribute greatly to revolutionary and emancipatory struggles all 
over the world. Nevertheless, his criticism of Chomsky on this point is misplaced, for 
Chomsky’s conception of class is far more nuanced than Woodcock’s portrayal 
would suggest. Class is a key component of Chomsky’s writings on social 
transformation. However, whilst he makes no equivocation that ‘class analysis is 
indispensable to understanding of social processes’, he is sceptical as to whether 
the ‘particular formulations’ of class found in Marx (i.e. the ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’) ‘were either historically accurate or applicable today’ (Chomsky, 2004: p. 
144). Crucially, though, when Chomsky refers to ‘the proletariat’ or ‘the working 
class’, he is not speaking merely of urban industrial wage-earners. Rather, as he put 
it in an interview for Black Rose in 1974 (which, incidentally, appeared some eight or 
nine months before Woodcock’s article – one assumes he missed it), it is possible to 
‘identify roughly a class of productive workers which now includes a pretty diffuse 
spectrum going all the way from manual labourers to technicians to scientists to 
creators of intellectual culture’ (ibid.). This class, in Chomsky’s view, should now 
‘play the role that Marx’s proletariat played’ (ibid.: p. 145). And whilst Chomsky, as 
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he himself puts it, ‘wouldn’t expect professors at MIT to be spearheading the 
revolution’, he does argue in favour of a wider, more inclusive notion of a ‘proletarian 
class’, one which can potentially ‘include everyone’ and which should ‘have control 
directly of its own productive work’ (ibid.).28 
This idea is formed in part by Chomsky’s mistrust of the notion that class 
consciousness and class solidarity are crystallised solely or chiefly by the experience 
of material deprivation. Indeed, he sees ‘that sort of nonsense’ as a highly arrogant 
attitude characteristic of the worst tendencies of leftist intellectual elites (Chomsky, 
2004: p. 146). Rather, Chomsky argues, what impels people – of all classes – to 
social action is, quite simply, the fact that they ‘happen to be concerned about 
others’, or, as he puts it another way, a ‘tremendous concern for justice, not for 
material goods’ (ibid.: pp. 145, 146). Indeed, whilst Chomsky does accept that in 
some cases ‘material deficit … can contribute to some sort of new consciousness’, 
appeals to working-class revolutionary action formulated solely along such lines can 
in fact serve to prop up the very ideology that produces it in the first place, since it 
rests on a conception of human beings merely as consumers or economic 
maximisers (ibid.: pp. 146-147). Allied to the illusory ‘prospect of endless growth’ 
such strategies often encourage the idea that it is ‘rational to accept the society 
biased against you in the hope that in the future you’ll be able to consume more than 
you consume today’ (ibid.: p. 146). With this danger in mind, Chomsky’s strategical 
preference is quite straightforward: to actively confront society’s ‘official’ norms of 
economic maximisation and subservience in production by demonstrating how 
remote they actually are from the majority of human behaviours and social 
interactions (ibid.: p. 148). Further, such demonstration necessarily encompasses 
both ‘logical argument’ and practical ‘efforts to build solidarity among people by 
whatever means’ (ibid.: pp. 148-149). In this way, Chomsky feels that it is possible to 
‘illustrate by action and organisation the ways in which theological [sic.] arguments 
are correct and how the gaps between official values and human values can be 
overcome’ (ibid.: p. 149). 
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 In this sense, Chomsky can be seen to pre-empt, albeit in a crude, underdeveloped way, Michael 
Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s concept of the ‘multitude’, a social body that is potentially highly 
heterogeneous but which also constitutes an ‘active social subject, which acts on the basis of what 
the singularities share in common’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009: p. 100). 
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Chomsky is thus arguing for a reconfiguration of public discourse regarding general 
ethical orientation. This reconfiguration should be based on a normative appeal to 
human solidarity and social justice. His notion of class is central to this appeal, but 
rather than pertaining merely to some crude dichotomy of material surplus/deficit – or 
even solely to productive relations – it is arranged in such a way as to emphasise the 
importance of common human experiences of and concerns for injustice that 
transcend traditional social barriers. The inclusiveness of Chomsky’s conception of 
class is crucial in relation to his concept of solidarity. In the argument that a 
potentially progressive or revolutionary class is necessarily demographically and 
socially heterogeneous, Chomsky avoids the outmoded tropes regarding class 
consciousness and class solidarity that belong to traditional leftist vocabularies. This 
class, says Chomsky, amounts essentially to the ‘99 per cent’ invoked by the Occupy 
movement (Chomsky, 2012: p. 32). It may also be referred to as the ‘precariat’ 
(those ‘who live a precarious existence at the periphery of society’), whereas the 
super-rich minority (the wealthiest one per cent) have become the ‘plutonomy’ – the 
wealthy elite by whose fortunes the success or otherwise of the wider economy is 
measured. The imagery of the ‘99 per cent’ and the ‘one per cent’ is of course a 
rhetorical device rather than a literal assessment of the state of global wealth 
inequality. The super-rich ‘plutonomy’ to which Chomsky refers actually consists of a 
small fraction of the wealthiest one per cent. Equally, the 99 per cent – the ‘precariat’ 
– do not all live the marginalised, precarious existence that the simplistic distinction 
suggests (although Chomsky does argue that the precariat now constitutes ‘a very 
substantial part of the society in the United States, and indeed elsewhere – ibid.: p. 
33). Nevertheless, the slogan does capture the reality of the proliferation of extreme 
inequality in recent years that, according to a 2014 Oxfam report, has resulted in the 
world’s richest 85 people owning ‘as much as the poorest half of humanity’ (Seery 
and Caistor Arendar, 2014: p. 8). It is the gross injustice of issues such as global 
inequality that Chomsky sees as potential bases for solidaristic collective action in 
favour of radical social change. When an economic system serves none but the 
tiniest minority, appeals to solidarity founded on a broadly conceived notion of 
shared class experience are likely to resonate. Indeed, Chomsky’s analysis of the 
Occupy movement certainly emphasised this potential, despite the fact that, 
ultimately, it remained unrealised: 
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The most exciting aspect of the Occupy movement is the construction of the linkages 
that are taking place all over. If they can be sustained and expanded, Occupy can 
lead to dedicated efforts to set society on a more humane course (Chomsky, 2011) 
Conclusion 
Solidarity resides within the core of Chomsky’s ideological morphology; it is crucial to 
the articulation of his ideology as a whole. In addition to the ineliminable component, 
Chomsky’s concept of solidarity comprises four idea-components: universal 
inclusion; cohesion; collective responsibility; and the social production of 
individuality. Chomsky’s appeal for solidarity on the basis of a more broadly 
conceived notion of shared class experience indicates a clear preference for a 
normative notion of universal inclusion. Further, he explicitly states that solidarity 
involves collective responsibility for the satisfaction of the needs of all members of a 
community. Importantly, however, he is more ambivalent than some anarchists about 
the role of the state in relation to said provision. Whilst he ultimately conceives of the 
state as an illegitimate authority, in instances whereby the immediate alternative to 
state provision is the extension of private power, Chomsky sees no contradiction in 
anarchists defending what little protection against the free market the state does 
provide. Although they are administered by institutions whose authority he regards 
as illegitimate, for Chomsky these forms of provision signal a more fundamental 
feeling of mutual obligation which is rooted in a solidarity that need not necessarily 
be expressed in this way. Indeed, for Chomsky, the generally supportive attitude of 
the public for state provision of certain key services indicates the possibility of 
anarchist forms of organisation that are impelled by collective responsibility. 
Chomsky’s conception also emphasises the aspect of cohesion, which is formed in 
relation to his inclusive notion of class. According to this conception, Chomsky seeks 
to depart from more narrow, restrictive ideas as to revolutionary agency and class 
consciousness shaped solely by the experience of material deprivation. He attempts 
to construct a wider notion of class based on shared experiences of injustice that 
transcend traditional social divisions and provide the basis for a normative appeal to 
human solidarity, and function as a bulwark against egoistic individualism. 
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Further, the concept incorporates the notion of individuality as a social product, since 
Chomsky insists that the supportive network provided to individuals within a 
solidaristic community provides the best conditions for the realisation of individual 
flourishing. In turn, the natural differentiation produced when individuals develop their 
unique potentialities contributes in turn to a social interdependence that reinforces 
solidarity. Figure 7 displays the configuration of Chomsky’s concept of solidarity: 
 
Whilst he is convinced that human beings possess an essential nature, Chomsky is 
unable to say with any degree of certainty what that nature is and the consequences 
it has for political and social theory. Nevertheless, he expresses hope that it involves 
the capacity for social solidarity, for he sees solidarity as a prerequisite for the 
realisation of a genuine human freedom. Through a reappraisal of classical liberal 
thought, Chomsky recasts the Enlightenment preoccupation with freedom in terms 
which are applicable to contemporary industrial capitalism and argues that the 
present mode of production is inhumane on account of its reliance on coercive 
property relations. He conceives of these relations as obstructing the human 
tendency for free association and for solidaristic social structures which provide an 
environment in which we are able to fulfil the need for creative expression. Chomsky 
thus draws attention to an important three-way morphological relationship between 
solidarity, freedom and equality. Equality is absolutely necessary for the realisation 
of freedom, since its absence inevitably involves coercive property relations. 
Individual-
collective 
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Figure 7: Chomsky’s concept of solidarity 
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Freedom is a necessary precondition for solidarity since it allows for human beings’ 
spontaneous and voluntary association. Solidarity is essential for both of those core 
concepts: it is a necessary bulwark against the individualism that undermines 
equality and it provides the conditions of association and interdependence in which 
human beings are able to realise their creative potentialities (freedom). This 
conceptual interlinkage is clear in Chomsky’s characterisation of anarchism as a 
confluence of liberalism and socialism. 
At the periphery of Chomsky’s ideology are found the practical political proposals 
that stem from his core conceptual focus on solidarity. This aspect of Chomsky’s 
thought consists chiefly in a radical democratisation of everyday life, in an attempt to 
introduce more direct and responsive forms of decision making in communities and 
workplaces so as to give individuals and groups maximum control over their lives. 
Democracy is a crucial component of Chomsky’s anarchism, since it helps to 
overcome the authoritarian institutions and practices that undermine solidarity.
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7. Conclusion 
This study has presented analyses of the concepts of solidarity as found in the work 
of four anarchist thinkers: Bakunin, Kropotkin, Bookchin and Chomsky. Through the 
application of an analytical framework informed by Michael Freeden’s morphological 
method, it has sought to explore the way in which each of these thinkers ‘decontests’ 
solidarity – to ascertain more precisely the meanings affixed to the concept by each 
thinker. 
The purpose of this final chapter is ultimately twofold. The first aim is to establish, by 
way of cross-comparison of each thinkers’ concept, the extent to which there can be 
said to be a distinctively ‘anarchist’ concept of solidarity. This process necessarily 
involves the identification of commonalities and divergences in the internal 
morphology of each thinkers’ concept, and also in the way in which the concepts 
operate within the wider conceptual structure of their respective ideologies. I will 
argue that, despite some crucial differences between the four thinkers’ conceptions 
of solidarity, they share sufficiently similar ideational content, and function in 
sufficiently similar ways within their respective ideological environments for a 
representative ‘anarchist’ concept to be identified. However, this is not to say that 
one can offer a synthesis of the four conceptions; to impose an artificial homogeneity 
in such a way is inevitably to risk a degree of conceptual distortion. It would also be 
unnecessary, for as Freeden reminds us, ‘Ideologies are capable of bending under 
pressure, and of hosting a number of variations on each of their concepts without 
collapsing’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 82). So, whilst there are clearly important differences 
between the four concepts, this does not preclude their all being recognisable as 
anarchist notions of solidarity. Rather than synthesis, then, the intention is to 
construct a profile of a representative anarchist concept of solidarity by drawing 
attention to the shared ideational components that its various instances host in 
common, and exploring the morphological role played by solidarity in anarchist 
ideologies. 
The second aim is to consider how the anarchist concept might affect our 
perceptions of what solidarity means and how it might further our understanding of 
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anarchism as an ideology. This evaluation will draw upon the literatures on solidarity 
and on the conceptual configuration of anarchist ideology.  
It was argued at the outset that there is a strong empirical case for assuming that all 
concepts of solidarity contain the fundamental notion of a bond between individual 
and collective. This constitutes the ineliminable component of solidarity; if some 
notion of an individual-collective bond is absent from a concept, then that concept is 
almost certainly not solidarity. However, the ineliminable component in itself is not 
sufficient to communicate a full concept; it tells us nothing about the distinctiveness 
of the particular concept of solidarity to which it belongs. For this, more information is 
required. Given this, the final analysis is not especially concerned with the individual-
collective bond (since all concepts of solidarity host that component), but is focused 
instead on the additional ideational content which serves to elaborate the concept, to 
provide the ineliminable component with a more precise meaning, to allow for its 
application to political realities and to make it distinctive. Put differently, an 
understanding of the concepts of solidarity as decontested by Bakunin, Kropotkin, 
Bookchin and Chomsky necessitates the mapping of their additional idea-
components. These components fill areas of meaning that are logically necessary for 
the communication of a full and coherent political concept. Before proceeding to 
construct a profile of the anarchist concept of solidarity, I will briefly review the 
analyses of the concepts of each thinker. 
We saw that Bakunin’s concept of solidarity contains, in addition to the ineliminable 
component, four quasi-contingent components: mutual recognition, cohesion, 
fraternity, and collective responsibility. Further, I suggested that Bakunin uses the 
concept of solidarity in two distinct ways, and that certain of these components take 
on increased (or decreased) levels of importance depending on the nature of its 
usage and its relationship to various adjacent concepts at any one time. I labelled 
the first usage ‘natural solidarity’, which refers to the social interdependence that is 
inevitably produced by the need of individuals within a community to attain mutual 
recognition. This usage emphasises the link between solidarity and the adjacent 
concept of natural law, and the notion of mutual recognition becomes more 
prominent. I labelled the second of Bakunin’s usages ‘class solidarity’, which refers 
to the solidarity of the masses in their economic struggle against the bourgeoisie. 
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This usage emphasises the link between the core concept of solidarity and the 
adjacent concept of class struggle and the notions of cohesion, fraternity and 
collective responsibility become more prominent. 
By contrast to Bakunin, Kropotkin uses the concept of solidarity more-or-less 
consistently; his writings display only one usage, as it were. Kropotkin’s concept, in 
addition to the ineliminable component, contains four sub-conceptual features: 
universal inclusion, community, common interest, and the social production of 
individuality. 
Bookchin introduces an ecological aspect to the concept of solidarity. His concept 
contains notions of universal inclusion, collective responsibility and the social 
production of individuality but also stresses the idea of social-ecological harmony, by 
maintaining that the non-domination of the natural world by human beings requires 
as an essential precondition solidarity within human society. 
The internal morphology of Chomsky’s concept of solidarity is rather more elusive 
than those of the other three thinkers. As we saw in Chapter 6, Chomsky is not a 
political theorist as such, and this provides some explanation as to his lack of explicit 
conceptual definition. However, Chomsky is certainly an ideologist, and it is possible 
to discern a concept of solidarity from his writings, albeit with a partial reliance on his 
appraisals of other thinkers. This concept displays the components of universal 
inclusion, cohesion, collective responsibility and the social production of individuality. 
An anarchist concept of solidarity 
The four thinkers surveyed here each offer distinctive conceptions of solidarity. 
However, each of their concepts contains sufficiently similar ideas for an anarchist 
concept of solidarity to be sketched out. I propose that this concept contains, in 
addition to the ineliminable component of the individual-collective bond, three 
additional components: (i) universal inclusion (understood as a normative appeal to 
extend solidaristic relations to all in a global community organised along non-
hierarchical lines); (ii) collective responsibility (understood as a collective concern 
and provision for the welfare and development of all members of that community); 
(iii) the social production of individuality (understood as the belief that individuals are 
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able to realise their unique creative potentialities only in a social context). The 
morphology of this anarchist concept of solidarity is displayed in Figure 8: 
 
Not all of the four thinkers’ concepts contain all three of these components and some 
contain additional components that are absent in the others. However, there is 
sufficient evidence from the cross section of instances of anarchist concepts that one 
can reasonably expect anarchists to subscribe to a concept that is decontested in 
such a way. Despite this, there is little about the components I have identified as 
characteristic of anarchist concepts of solidarity that suggests that the concept is 
obviously and distinctively anarchist. Indeed, notions such as universal inclusion, 
collective responsibility and the social production of individuality might just as easily 
be located within concepts of solidarity as found in other ideologies, particularly in 
socialist ideologies. As a standalone concept, the ‘anarchist’ concept of solidarity is 
seemingly not necessarily anarchist at all. However, it must be remembered that it is 
impossible to fully understand a concept in isolation; as Freeden argues, ‘a concept 
is meaningless without locating it at the nodal point of a series of relationships with 
other concepts and ideas’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 75). In order to gain a true 
understanding of a concept, it must be firmly located within the ideology which 
promotes it and in relation to the other concepts hosted within that ideology’s 
morphology. Only then does it take on a distinctive meaning; in this case, only then 
can peculiarly anarchist values and political prescriptions be elicited from the 
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Figure 8: An anarchist concept of solidarity 
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concept of solidarity. In the following sections, I will seek to demonstrate that: (a) the 
variant of solidarity I have sketched above sits comfortably within pretty well all 
anarchist ideologies; (b) the interaction of this otherwise seemingly relatively 
indistinct concept with its conceptual context serves to provide it with a distinctively 
anarchist colouring. I begin by exploring in turn each of its three additional 
components. 
Universal inclusion 
I have said that an anarchist concept of solidarity might be expected to contain the 
notion of universal inclusion – the normative idea that relations of solidarity are 
extended to a community that is truly global in scope. According to the analysis I 
have presented thus far, this component features prominently in the concepts of 
each of Kropotkin, Bookchin and Chomsky. Kropotkin insists that solidarity must 
necessarily continuously expand its circle of inclusion if it is to guard against 
parochialism and individualism. The logical endpoint of his association of the 
expansion of solidarity with social progress is the normative goal of the solidarity of a 
fully inclusive human community. As Iain McKay has put it, Kropotkin’s ultimate goal 
was ‘the creation of a universal human community sharing the globe based on a free 
federation of peoples no longer divided by classes or hierarchies’ (McKay, 2014: p. 
47). Kropotkin’s solidaristic vision was for a community or society that was 
universally inclusive. Bookchin’s reading of history is similar to that of Kropotkin. Like 
Kropotkin, he seeks to excavate the lost traditions of mutual aid that prevailed in 
previous societies, but – again, like Kropotkin – he is critical of the parochialism of 
the forms of solidarity practiced in those societies and associates positive 
development with a widening circle of inclusion that makes possible the idea of 
human solidarity. He places great importance upon the steady evolution of habitual 
practices of solidarity within relatively exclusive social groups into normative ethics 
which applied to a ‘universal humanitas’ (Bookchin, 2005: p. 228). Although 
Chomsky does not construct a socio-historical account like those of Kropotkin and 
Bookchin, his concept of solidarity does pertain to a normative goal of universal 
inclusion. This is derived partly from his essentialism; his insistence that human 
beings share a common and fundamental essence can be seen as a basis for an 
appeal for a human solidarity with universal scope. Chomsky also places great 
importance upon the need for a truly inclusive notion of class – one which can 
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potentially ‘include everyone’ (Chomsky, 2004: p. 145) – in order to provide a united 
and cohesive agent of social change. 
I have not identified universal inclusion as a prominent notion within Bakunin’s 
conception of solidarity, which may undermine the claim that it is characteristic of 
anarchist conceptions. The principal reason for this anomaly concerns the fact that 
Bakunin uses the concept of solidarity in two distinct ways. His usage of class 
solidarity is necessarily exclusive – it pertains to the solidarity of the masses in their 
struggle against the bourgeoisie. Given this exclusivity, his concept of solidarity 
cannot explicitly contain a notion of universal inclusion, which is logically 
incompatible with the oppositional nature of class solidarity. Despite this, I would 
suggest that the morphology of Bakunin’s concept does display features which are 
eminently compatible with – or even suggestive of – the notion of universal inclusion. 
Bakunin conceives of solidarity partially in accordance with the notion of mutual 
recognition, whereby individuals only truly realise their own existence when it is 
recognised by others and when they recognise that of others. The inevitable product 
of this universally held need for recognition is solidarity, for it ensures that individuals 
within a community are interdependent – they are reliant upon one another for 
recognition. Solidarity as mutual recognition also has important implications for the 
way in which Bakunin decontests freedom. Whilst solidarity derives from the 
universally held need for recognition, for Bakunin, one is free only when one is 
‘acknowledged, considered and treated as such’ by all others (Bakunin, 1973a: p. 
147). More than this, he argues, one is ‘only properly free when all the men and 
women about [one] are equally free’, and this requires ‘the strictest equality and 
solidarity of each and everybody’ (ibid.: pp. 148-149). Solidarity is a precondition for 
the realisation of freedom, because the freedom of one person is dependent on the 
freedom of all others. The logical outcome of this requirement is a form of solidarity 
that incorporates the notion of universal inclusion, since any form of exclusion 
precludes the freedom of each and all. As such, although the component may not be 
explicit in Bakunin’s concept, it is implied through the notion of mutual recognition. 
The notion of universal inclusion that I have located within an anarchist concept of 
solidarity is not only a prominent feature of theoretical anarchism, but is also 
frequently reflected in the ideological expressions of anarchist activists. Indeed, 
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universal inclusion is a near-ubiquitous feature of activist propaganda and rhetoric. 
The stated principles of the International of Anarchist Federations, for instance, 
include ‘the abolition of all forms of authority whether economical, political, social, 
religious, cultural or sexual’, and ‘the construction of a free society, without classes 
or States or frontiers’ (International of Anarchist Federations, 2009). The desire for 
universal inclusion is also manifested in the frequently voiced demand by anarchists 
for the abolition of national and territorial borders. Indeed, the UK-based activist 
network No Borders explicitly states on its website that many of its members that 
identify as anarchists subscribe to the belief that ‘a world without borders must also 
mean a world without states’ (No Borders, 2015). In this instance, the commitment to 
universal inclusion contained within the anarchist concept of solidarity is projected at 
the ideological periphery as an explicit political demand for the removal of perceived 
barriers to inclusion – in this case the illegitimate borders imposed by nation states. 
Collective responsibility 
The second component of an anarchist concept of solidarity is collective 
responsibility, which refers to the concern of a community for the welfare and 
development of each and every individual within it. I have explicitly located the notion 
of collective responsibility within the concepts of solidarity of Bakunin, Bookchin and 
Chomsky. In Bakunin, we saw that collective responsibility was crucial both for the 
solidarity of the proletariat in class struggle, and for the consolidation of solidaristic 
practices in a post-revolutionary society. Bakunin’s writings indicate a clear 
preference that solidarity must entail a collective concern for the provision of welfare 
for all within a community; he insisted that the ‘welfare of each’ could only be 
realised ‘through the solidarity of all’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 149). He also argued for the 
importance of collective responsibility for the improvement of workers’ everyday 
existence and, in a more forward-looking sense, for the provision of support and 
welfare for all members of society. Bookchin’s positive appraisal of the solidaristic 
habits of preliterate societies betrays a similar preoccupation with the notion of 
collective responsibility. His account of the social practices of such societies 
emphasises the importance of communal participation in basic tasks as the 
foundation for ‘a sense of responsibility for the community’ (Bookchin, 2005: p. 111). 
Bookchin’s strict egalitarianism also stresses the importance of collective 
responsibility for the satisfaction of personal needs, which serves to make individuals 
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in a community ‘members of a larger natural whole’ (Bookchin, 1990a: p. 49). The 
import he ascribes to the concept of citizenship may also be seen as an attempt to 
bolster collective responsibility through civic engagement. Similarly, Chomsky 
conceives of solidarity in terms that explicitly reference the notion of collective 
responsibility. He insists that in a genuinely free society, ‘a central purpose will be 
that the necessary requirements of every member of society be satisfied’ (Chomsky, 
1988a: p. 192). Further, he makes a direct link between solidarity and collective 
responsibility, noting that the general collective agreement to the provision of 
universal education, healthcare, and a host of other public goods and services – 
even when organised by the state – ‘is based on a principle of solidarity’ (Chomsky, 
2014a: p. 38). 
I have not identified collective responsibility as a component of Kropotkin’s concept 
of solidarity. Given its prominence within other anarchists’ conceptions, it seems 
curious that the language of collective responsibility is rarely used by Kropotkin. 
When Kropotkin does refer to ethical notions of responsibility he usually has in mind 
the duty of individuals to conduct themselves in a certain way within a community, 
rather than the responsibility of the community to, say, provide for the wellbeing of all 
of its members. However, this is not to say that Kropotkin does not account for the 
collective provision of individuals’ wellbeing. On the contrary, in The Conquest of 
Bread (1913) he dedicates an entire chapter to ‘Well-being for all’, in which he 
stresses that ‘everyone, whatever his grade in the old society … has, before 
everything, the right to live’ and that ‘society is bound to share amongst all, without 
exception, the means of existence it has at its disposal’ (Kropotkin, 1995: p. 28). The 
point, however, is that Kropotkin does not explicitly conceive of this provision in 
terms which suggest a solidarity entailing collective responsibility. Nevertheless, 
collective responsibility is implicit in his notion of mutual aid, and his idea of 
community – which is a clear component of his concept of solidarity – constitutes a 
viable channel for collective responsibility to manifest itself. Indeed, in identifying 
mutual aid as the basis of human moral conceptions, Kropotkin’s ethical position is 
eminently consistent with an appeal for collective responsibility. For Kropotkin, 
mutual aid arises as a factor of evolution because it constitutes the best means of 
species’ survival. In time, the practices of mutual aid are translated into ethical 
conceptions: those actions which contribute to the continuation of the species come 
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to be seen as ‘good’ or ‘ethical’; those which have the opposite effect come to be 
seen as ‘bad’. In this sense, collective responsibility may be construed as an ethical 
more, since the cooperative provision for the welfare and development of members 
of a community through mutual aid provides that community with the means to 
flourish. 
 
Social production of individuality 
In contrast to liberalisms, which have often portrayed the individual and the 
community as potentially conflicting entities, social anarchist ideologies have 
consistently stressed the interdependence of the community and the individual. 
Indeed, rather than conceiving of social groups merely as aggregations of 
individuals, more often than not anarchists have viewed social living as a 
precondition for the production of the fully developed individual, understood as an 
autonomous agent in possession of the means to fully realise their own unique 
potentialities. The aim of anarchist political theory has often been, as Alan Ritter has 
put it, to ‘combine the greatest individual development with the greatest communal 
unity’ in ‘a society of strongly separate persons who are strongly bound together in a 
group’ (Ritter, 1980: p. 3). Ritter refers to this idea as ‘communal individuality’ (ibid.), 
which John Clark has in turn described as an assertion that ‘personal autonomy and 
social solidarity, rather than opposing one another, are inseparable and mutually 
reinforcing’ (Clark, 2013: p. 170). I have preferred the label ‘social production of 
individuality’, and have identified it as a key component of a representative anarchist 
concept of solidarity. 
Although I have not explicitly identified the notion within Bakunin’s concept, 
according to his theory the social production of individuality is achieved through 
mutual recognition. For Bakunin, individuals come to realise their own unique selves 
only when they are recognised as such by others, and so the attainment of 
individuality is necessarily a social product. From Bakunin’s insistence that ‘only in 
society can [man] become a human being’, it follows that, ‘[man’s] individuality as a 
man, his freedom, is thus the product of the collectivity’ (Bakunin, 1992: p. 47). 
Solidarity and individuality are thus interdependent: a solidaristic network of 
supportive community relations is required for the self-development of its individual 
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members, whilst in turn the diversity brought about by the realisation of each 
members’ unique capabilities contributes to the solidarity of the whole. Similarly, 
Kropotkin conceives of individuality as a social product, insisting that it is only when 
in possession of sufficient ‘social capital’ that society is able to seek ‘the most 
complete development of individuality’ (Kropotkin, 2002: p. 123). In turn, a society 
comprised of more rounded individuals is likely to be a more solidaristic one, since 
for Kropotkin ‘social inclinations and instincts of solidarity’ are inevitably qualities of 
the fully developed individual (quoted in Ritter, 1980: p. 30). Bookchin too insists 
upon the development of individuality as a necessarily social process. He sees social 
living as ‘the necessary flesh and blood for genuine individuality’ and argues that 
amongst our defining characteristics as social beings are ‘our capacities for solidarity 
with each other, for mutually enhancing our self-development and creativity and 
attaining freedom within a socially creative and institutionally rich collectivity’ 
(Bookchin, 1987: pp. 248, 249). Chomsky’s idea of human flourishing also relies 
upon the notion of individuality as a social product. Taking his lead from Humboldt, 
who saw ‘social union’ as an essential precondition of individual development, 
Chomsky argues that it is only within ‘a community of free association’ that human 
beings are able to achieve the fullest development of their potentialities (Chomsky, 
2008: p. 87). Further, this element of anarchist ideology – the ‘theoretical synthesis’, 
as Clark puts it, of social life and the realisation of individuality – is clearly reflected in 
anarchist practice in ‘various social forms, including personal relationships, affinity 
groups, intentional communities, cooperative projects, and movements for 
revolutionary social transformation’ (Clark, 2013: p. 170). 
I have identified above three idea-components which, in addition to the ineliminable 
component of solidarity, constitute a representative anarchist concept of solidarity. 
Where the notions of universal inclusion, collective responsibility and the social 
production of individuality are not explicit within the concept of one of the thinkers 
considered here, then they are implicit in relation to further ideational features. (For 
example, Bakunin’s notion of mutual recognition implies universal inclusion, a feature 
which is explicit in the concepts of the other three thinkers.) Anarchist thinkers and 
activists alike have consistently striven for a universally inclusive society based upon 
solidarity, in which divisions of class, race, gender, nationality, etc. are dissolved. In 
terms of the morphology of the anarchist concept of solidarity, the aspect of universal 
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inclusion lends definition to the ineliminable component so that the collective of the 
individual-collective bond is decontested as one which, in a normative sense at least, 
is non-oppositional and fully inclusive. Collective responsibility adds further meaning 
to the ineliminable component, for it cements the idea that the collective is ultimately 
responsible for the wellbeing and development of all individuals within it. The notion 
of the social production of the individual is common to all four of the concepts of 
solidarity considered here. For social anarchists, the idea of the necessarily social 
basis of individuality is indelibly bound to the ineliminable core of the concept of 
solidarity. Accordingly, it serves to provide that ineliminable component (the 
individual-collective bond) with a more sophisticated meaning: namely that the bond 
between individual and collective is a productive and symbiotic one, in the sense that 
the individual is dependent upon the support of the collective for the realisation of his 
or her individuality, whilst in turn the diversity of the individualities produced by social 
living contributes to the solidarity of the group. These three components thus provide 
solidarity with the ideational content necessary for it to be communicable as a full 
political concept; each adds meaning to the otherwise vacuous core so that the 
ideology is able to translate the concept into tangible political aims (as we saw with 
the examples of anarchist demands, derived from the notion of universal inclusion, 
for a dissolution of national borders). 
However, as I remarked earlier, the components I have identified as characteristic of 
the anarchist conception of solidarity do little to mark it out as distinctively anarchist. 
It is quite possible – probable, even – that non-anarchist ideologies might 
comfortably host a concept of solidarity that comprised notions of universal inclusion, 
collective responsibility and the social production of individuality. In order to make 
sense of this concept of solidarity as an identifiably anarchist concept, we must 
explore the way in which it operates within anarchist ideologies, paying particular 
attention to its relationship to other concepts within those ideologies and the way in 
which those relationships affect its decontestation. 
Solidarity at the anarchist core 
I have characterised solidarity as a core concept in the ideological morphologies of 
each of Bakunin, Kropotkin, Bookchin and Chomsky. It is important to remember 
that, as Freeden sees it, ideological cores are subject to a degree of flexibility, due in 
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part to ‘interpretive projections by the analyst of ideologies’ in relation to their 
conceptual classification. Nevertheless, he maintains that ‘the insistence on 
empirical evidence for such analysis must be safeguarded’ (Freeden, 1996: p. 84n). 
Put differently, it is virtually inevitable that different analysts will offer different 
readings of what constitutes an ideology’s core and this does not necessarily 
indicate conceptual incoherence on the part of ideologists or misinformed 
scholarship on the part of analysts. My own interpretation of the anarchist core 
differs to those that have been offered in other morphological analyses (see Gordon, 
2007b; Franks, 2012 and 2014; Freeden, 1996: pp. 311-314),29 and thus serves only 
to reinforce the view that a certain measure of interpretive differential is inevitable. 
Despite this, given that it is supported by detailed analyses of the ideologies of four 
different anarchist thinkers, I feel as though there is a strong empirical case for 
offering the conclusion that the anarchist core comprises three concepts: solidarity, 
liberty (or freedom) and equality. In the following section, I present an account of 
these three concepts as core concepts in each thinkers work, and discuss the way in 
which their interlinkage contributes to a distinctive decontestation of solidarity. 
For all four thinkers, the concept of solidarity is central to the articulation of their 
entire ideology and is crucial to the way in which their ideologies function to interpret 
the political world and formulate political prescriptions. However, it is not enough 
merely to consider each thinkers concept of solidarity in isolation; they can only be 
properly understood when firmly located in their quite specific ideational context. I 
have already explored the importance of the links between Bakunin’s concept of 
solidarity and his concepts of natural law and class struggle; likewise that between 
Bookchin’s concepts of solidarity and citizenship. However, the general, 
representative anarchist concept I have sketched above has not been explored in 
terms of its interlinkages with neighbouring concepts. As I have said previously, 
analysis of the concept in isolation does little to reinforce the distinctiveness of the 
concept or even to mark it out as specifically anarchist. In order to discover these 
aspects, further consideration of the way in which solidarity operates within the 
anarchist morphology is required, particularly in relation to its proximity to the other 
core concepts and the way in which they affect each other’s decontestation. 
                                                          
29
 These alternative readings of the anarchist core are discussed later in the chapter. 
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Each of the four thinkers considered here display a relatively consistent ideological 
core. Although their concepts of solidarity differed slightly from one another in terms 
of their ideational make-up (due to the proximity of various adjacent concepts – 
citizenship in Bookchin, for instance), the ideological morphology of all four thinkers 
displayed a core comprising three political concepts: liberty, equality and solidarity. 
Bakunin’s self-identification as a ‘fanatical lover of liberty’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 261) 
immediately suggests the importance he set by that particular concept, the 
realisation of which he saw as entirely dependent upon ‘the solidarity and equality of 
everyone’ (Bakunin, 1992: p. 84). For Bakunin, the interdependence of the three 
concepts is such that they serve to reinforce one another; each is essential to the 
realisation of the others. Further, he seeks a particular balance between the core 
concepts so that, for instance, freedom is not allowed to undermine ‘the superior 
claim of solidarity, which is and will always remain the greatest source of social 
goods’ (quoted in Ritter, 1980: p. 28). Kropotkin’s emphasis on freedom was such 
that he came to define anarchism itself as a call ‘for unlimited freedom’, a goal which 
he saw as unattainable ‘when capital is monopolised in the hands of a minority’ 
(Kropotkin, 2014: pp. 112, 113). As such, he came to believe that ‘There can be no 
liberty without equality’ (ibid.: p. 113) and that a true social revolution must be 
‘intoxicated with the beautiful words, Liberty, Equality, Solidarity (Kropotkin, 1995: p. 
114). Bookchin’s ideology displays similar conceptual interdependence. In his 
exploration of the ‘legacy of freedom’ – the liberatory social practices of ‘organic 
societies’ – Bookchin notes that freedom and equality are concomitant; any 
commitment to freedom is necessarily founded on a strict egalitarianism, whereby 
the natural inequalities of individuals are compensated so as to avoid imposing the 
same burdens ‘on very disparate individuals who have very different abilities to deal 
with them’ (Bookchin, 1990a: p. 98). For Bookchin, to ignore the need for such an 
arrangement is to promote an ‘inequality of equals’ which ‘denies the commonality 
and solidarity of the community by subverting its responsibilities to compensate for 
differences between individuals’ (Bookchin, 2005: p. 219). Solidarity is thus 
dependent upon an institutionally secured equality which also allows for the positive 
realisation of freedom by ensuring that each individual is able to achieve their 
potential. Chomsky also places great emphasis on the concept of freedom, arguing 
that it constitutes the central task of philosophy to ‘inquire into the nature of human 
freedom and its limits’ (Chomsky, 2008: p. 76). According to Chomsky’s critique of 
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neoliberalism, the ideology has jettisoned the values that, for classical liberals, were 
important supplements to liberty. On this analysis, the political economy of Adam 
Smith, for instance stemmed from the assumption that ‘people’s fundamental 
character involves notions like sympathy, and solidarity, the right to control their own 
work, and so on and so forth: all the exact opposite of capitalism’ (Chomsky, 2013: p. 
36). For Chomsky, a liberalism denuded of solidarity becomes profoundly anti-
libertarian, for it promotes a concept of liberty which is decontested in terms of an 
acquisitive self-interest that is used to justify hierarchical property relations wrought 
by the free market. As such, it is the morphological proximity of freedom to solidarity 
that allows for the former to be decontested in a positive sense: as the fullest 
development of individuals’ potentialities. Solidarity in turn is dependent upon 
equality – not merely before the law, but also in the economic realm, so as to place 
‘control over the economy in the hands of free and voluntary associations of 
producers’ (Chomsky, 2013: p. 12). Chomsky’s concept of equality is thus similar to 
Bookchin’s ‘equality of unequals’, for an equality that does not incorporate the 
economic factor and ignores the natural inequalities of individuals is one which, to 
paraphrase Anatole France, denies the rich and the poor equally the right to sleep 
under the bridge at night. 
Given that the morphology of all four thinkers displays a core that contains the 
concepts of solidarity, liberty and equality, there is a strong empirical case for 
asserting that these constitute the core concepts of anarchist ideology generally. 
Figure 9 shows the conceptual mapping of the anarchist core. Since the study is 
focused specifically on solidarity and its relationship with its neighbouring concepts, I 
have not specified the concepts that reside in adjacent and peripheral positions. 
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The place of solidarity is critical to the articulation of anarchism as an ideology, for it 
produces a decontestation of liberty that allows for both a positive and a negative 
aspect. Social solidarity does not, as liberals might suggest, impede the negative 
liberty of the individual; it does not constitute undue coercion or constraint. On the 
contrary, as we have seen, anarchists see solidarity as the very affirmation of 
individual liberty. Further, the relationship of solidarity to freedom is such that the 
latter is precluded from signifying the freedom to exploit or dominate. Solidarity thus 
plays a crucial morphological role in ruling out a decontestation of liberty as 
pertaining to egoistic notions of competition. As Kropotkin explains, ‘The ideal of 
liberty of the individual – if it is incorrectly understood owing to surroundings where 
the notion of solidarity is insufficiently accentuated by institutions – can certainly lead 
isolated men to acts that are repugnant to the social sentiments of humanity’ 
(Kropotkin, 2002: p. 143). Solidarity is thus central to the preservation of a properly 
conceived notion of individual liberty – one which emphasises development and 
individuality rather than self-interest.  
Figure 9: The morphology of anarchist ideology 
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Equally, solidarity is only made possible by absolute liberty positively conceived as 
the fullest development of individuality that contributes to diversity and social 
interdependence. It is the proximity of liberty to the anarchist concept of solidarity 
that marks it out as distinctively anarchist. Whilst various ideologies may subscribe to 
a notion of solidarity denoting universal inclusion, collective responsibility and the 
social production of individuality, it is only through its interlinkage with a particular 
notion of liberty that the concept takes on a distinctively anarchist appearance. As 
Bakunin puts it, unity can become ‘fatal, destructive of the intelligence, the dignity, 
the well-being of individuals and peoples whenever it is formed without regard to 
liberty’ (Bakunin, 2002: p. 106). Indeed, for Bakunin, ‘Liberty for all and mutual 
respect for that liberty’ were seen as ‘the essential conditions for international 
solidarity’ (Bakunin, 1973: p. 256). It is the proximity of liberty that allows for an 
understanding of solidarity which stresses its spontaneous and free organisation as 
opposed to that coordinated by the state or party apparatus. Thus, for Bakunin, ‘Herr 
Marx obviously wants nothing to do with that solidarity, since he refuses to 
acknowledge that liberty’ (ibid.). It is the interlinkage of solidarity and liberty that 
distinguishes the anarchist conception from those found in other socialist ideologies, 
since, as Kropotkin puts it, ‘In contrast to all these other parties, the Anarchists are 
the only ones to defend the principle of liberty’ (Kropotkin, 2014: p. 199). 
Anarchist ideologies: a contested morphology 
The principal contribution of this study has been to offer an original analysis of 
anarchist conceptions of solidarity. Through an application of Freeden’s 
morphological approach, it has identified the key idea-components that constitute the 
concepts of solidarity of four anarchist thinkers and has suggested a profile of a 
broadly representative ‘anarchist’ concept. The morphological analysis has also 
provided an instructive perspective on the place of solidarity within anarchist 
ideologies and, indeed, on the general morphological structure of those ideologies. 
There is an existing scholarship that has sought to capture the morphology of 
anarchist ideologies – not least that of Freeden himself, although his reflections on 
the morphology of various forms of anarchism amount to no more than a few pages. 
The anarchist academic Benjamin Franks has formulated a more detailed conceptual 
analysis of anarchism based on Freeden’s methodology which contests some of 
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Freeden’s central assumptions as to the nature of the ideology’s morphology 
(Franks, 2012; 2014). Similarly, Uri Gordon offers a novel interpretation of 
anarchism’s morphological core based on participant observation of anarchist 
movement actors (Gordon, 2007b). Although my focus in this study is primarily on 
the concept of solidarity within anarchist thought, the analysis has produced findings 
that offer an alternative perspective on the nature of anarchist ideologies generally, 
in terms of their conceptual morphology. Indeed, the exploration of the place and 
nature of the concept of solidarity in anarchist thought and anarchist ideology sheds 
considerable light on the way in which we might view the wider conceptual structure 
in which that concept is located. In particular, it is important to stress that this study, 
contrary to previous interpretations, has categorised solidarity as one of anarchism’s 
core concepts. 
On Freeden’s analysis, anarchism has three core concepts: 
first … antagonism to power, culminating in the desire to annihilate it (power is 
decontested as centralised and hierarchical and manifested above all, though not 
exclusively, in the state); second, a belief in liberty, decontested as spontaneous 
voluntarism; third, the postulation of natural human harmony (Freeden, 1996: pp. 
311-312) 
Franks argues – correctly – that although this is indeed an accurate representation of 
‘typical academic accounts’ of anarchism, when it comes to most variations of social 
anarchism (as opposed to individualist anarchism), these do not in fact constitute 
core concepts (Franks, 2012: p. 215). In Freeden’s defence, he does allow for the 
fact that ‘It may be mistaken to lump the two schools of anarchism under one roof’, 
given that their respective conceptual arrangements display ‘insufficient joint features 
to construct a collective family profile’ (Freeden, 1996: pp. 311-312). Freeden argues 
that the two anarchist schools become distinct by virtue of their adjacent concepts, 
which when conjoined to the common core detailed above ‘elicit very different sets of 
beliefs’ (ibid.: p. 312). Nevertheless, he maintains that these three features are 
fundamental. Freeden identifies ‘the socialist anarchist appeal to social solidarity’ as 
the adjacent concept supplying social stability (ibid.: p. 314). Solidarity is adjacent, 
he says, to the core concept of the postulation of natural human harmony, which is 
also found in individualist anarchism but decontested in that instance through an 
appeal to ‘the harmonious potential of benevolent reason’ (ibid.). Since I am 
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concerned here solely with social anarchisms, the category of ‘the postulation of 
natural human harmony’ within socialist anarchism becomes non-contingent. In other 
words, it is invariably satisfied by a notion of social solidarity which, as such, may be 
considered a core concept. 
Franks disputes Freeden’s reading in a number of other ways. First, he points out 
that anarchists are not opposed to power in all forms, but rather that ‘they recognise 
that power can be constructive and non-hierarchical’ (Franks, 2012: p. 215). Second, 
he contests the notion that, for anarchists, liberty is necessarily spontaneous, 
arguing that it is sometimes premeditated and coordinated through social institutions. 
Third, he opposes the idea that anarchists subscribe to a ‘benign essentialism’ such 
as that implied by Freeden’s emphasis on the notion of a ‘natural human harmony’, 
arguing that anarchists account for both social and anti-social tendencies in human 
beings (ibid.). Franks dismisses appeals to ‘humanism or, indeed, any sort of 
essentialism’ as ‘inherently weak and open to all sorts of criticisms’, but insists that 
anarchism need not rely on such assumptions. He argues that the characterisation of 
anarchism as non-coercion supported by a humanistic account of the individual is 
misplaced, for two reasons. First, because anarchists are clear that humans have 
malevolent as well as benevolent tendencies; second, because anarchism is not 
singularly concerned with the rejection of coercion, but ‘is connected to other 
principles, such as equality and solidarity’. As such, it is consistent with anarchist 
principles ‘to use minimally coercive methods against those institutions whose 
function is to disempower the already disadvantaged’ (Franks, 2012: p. 61). In other 
words, there is no need for a benign essentialism to support anarchism’s claims that 
coercive apparatuses are unnecessary, because it is quite justifiable to use a degree 
of coercion in order to dismantle oppressive institutions and structures. 
In place of these three concepts, Franks proposes that the anarchist core comprises 
‘anti-hierarchy’ (usually – but not always – evidenced in the anarchist rejection of 
state institutions and an opposition to capitalism); ‘anti-mediation’ (understood as a 
rejection of representative democracy and a preference for direct action); and 
‘prefiguration’ (a demand for political means to remain consistent with the stated 
ends) (ibid.: p. 216). Gordon’s analysis is not dissimilar. On his reading, the 
ideology’s ‘emergent stable core’ comprises ‘the construction of the concept of 
205 
 
“domination”, which clarifies how anarchists construct what they object to in society’; 
‘direct action and the ethos of “prefigurative politics”’; and a ‘strongly open-ended 
conception of politics that is detached from any notion of a post-revolutionary resting 
point, expressing the experimental nature of anarchist strategies and their focus on 
the present tense’ (Gordon, 2007b: p. 30). 
Franks’s conceptual classification thus relies in part upon negative concepts which 
are defined in terms of their rejection of something. Concepts of ‘anti-hierarchy’ and 
‘anti-mediation’ are negative, in that they consist in the negation of hierarchy and 
mediation respectively. Similarly, in locating the concept of domination within the 
anarchist core, Gordon seems to be saying that anarchism is defined in terms of 
what it opposes. As he himself recognises, ‘Domination is not a value, like freedom 
or equality or solidarity – it is a disvalue: what anarchists want to negate’ (ibid.: p. 
37). As such, the implication is that these concepts are actually more peripheral and 
that their roles within anarchist ideology stem from more fundamental normative 
values. One is not opposed to hierarchy and mediation merely for the sake of it; 
opposition to both phenomena must be derived from positive values that are 
inhibited by them. As Franks recognises in his critique of analytic accounts of 
anarchism that posit opposition to the state as its defining characteristic, ‘the 
rejection of the state follows from a more fundamental principle: the absolute respect 
for the negative freedom of the individual’ (Franks, 2014: p. 55). Similarly, one might 
suggest that the promotion of anti-hierarchy and anti-mediation in fact stems from a 
normative commitment to, say, individual liberty, which is curtailed by hierarchical 
social structures and a politics of mediation. As Kropotkin insists, the 
characterisation of ‘the anarchist principle’ as ‘“No State”, or “No Authority”, in spite 
of its negative formulation, had a deeply affirmative meaning’ (Kropotkin, 2014: p. 
197). For Kropotkin, the essence of anarchism was that human society ought to be 
reorganised ‘according to the principles of Anarchy, namely with complete and total 
liberty in individual relationships, with natural and temporary associations, and with 
social solidarity as a guiding principle’ (ibid.: pp. 197-198). The anarchist opposition 
to hierarchy and domination thus stems from a more positive commitment to 
freedom, equality and solidarity, the realisation of which is dependent upon the 
dissolution of external authority and inequality. It is this that led Bakunin to declare 
that, in order to achieve the end of genuine social revolution, ‘there is but one 
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means: Destroy all the institutions of Inequality; establish the economic and social 
equality of all, and on this basis will arise the liberty, the morality, the solidary 
humanity of all’ (Bakunin, 1970: p. 43n).
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